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Chapter 1 
Introduction 

1.1 Motivation  
Modern states are characterized by the delegation of policymaking responsibilities. 
The citizens elect politicians and pay taxes and in return they expect an efficient 
provision of public goods and services. On many occasions, the politicians 
delegate the policymaking responsibilities to the bureaucrats based on the belief 
that bureaucrats have access to more reliable information about the consequences 
of policy choices, a point on which legal, economics, and political science 
scholarships converge (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989). The reliance 
on bureaucrats to formulate and implement public policies is advantageous to 
politicians as it allows the latter to draw on the expertise of bureaucrats without 
having to invest time and resources to acquire such expertise (Shepsle 1979; 
Rochefort and Cobb 1991; Carpenter 2004). 
However, bureaucrats don’t always produce results in line with the policy 
guidelines of politicians. In a seminal contribution, “Law and Economics of 
Procedure”, Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast (1987) defined 
the theory of bureaucratic drift in policy delegation, according to which the 
bureaucrats pursue policies that subvert or diverge from the goals of the politician 
(Gailmard 2002; Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson 2007; Horn and Shepsle 
1989; Shepsle 1992).  
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As an illustration of bureaucratic drift, consider, for example, how a policy 
decision would be made about whether or not to ban a toxic substance called 
asbestos. This decision may be delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) that is charged with protecting human health and the environment by 
writing and enforcing regulation based on laws passed by the Parliament. The 
policy may be delegated by the politicians on the premise that the agency possesses 
the relevant expertise about the potential impact of the proposed ban including 
information on potential costs and benefits of the policy. However, delegation 
carries the risk that bureaucrats may use their policy discretion to follow their own 
preferences rather than those of the politicians. For example, the bureaucrats in 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may be more inclined than the politicians 
to ban hazardous substances and may therefore choose to ban asbestos in 
circumstances where fully informed politicians may not have done so.  
Also policy delegation that is justified on the basis of information asymmetry 
makes it difficult to monitor the bureaucracy. As the above example illustrates, a 
politician may know exactly which policy outcomes should be achieved – such as 
banning a toxic substance – but the politician may be uncertain about the specific 
policy, which will achieve the desired objective. The bureaucrats may be better 
informed about specific policies to reach a certain policy goal (and hence the 
choice of policy may be in the hands of the bureaucrats). For example, a bureaucrat 
may know all the relevant information about the appropriate technology available 
at the implementation level. This gives a sort of advantage to the bureaucrat, and 
hence the latter’s policy stance becomes crucial for the politician. The bureaucrat 
may even exploit his informational advantage in order to leverage his agenda 
setting power to constrain the choices of the politician.  

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Within this line of enquiry, a voluminous body of legal, economics, and political 
science literature has explored different institutional mechanisms and 
administrative procedures that politicians or courts may employ to induce better-
informed bureaucrats to make decisions that more closely track the politician’s 
policy preferences. However, most of the policy studies of bureaucratic drift 
establish the standard economic relationship between policy choices of rational 
bureaucrats and their economic incentives (material self-interest). The material 
self-interest may include pay job security and prospects for promotion (Niskanen 
1975). Besides material self-interest, the bureaucrat’s policy choices may also be 
influenced by non-material self-interest such as utility gain from pursuing a 
specific policy, recognition from others and relationship with co-workers (Alchian 
and Demsetz 1972).  
The bureaucrat may also derive utility from performing his tasks and this may be 
the key reason for a bureaucrat to join a particular department – the so-called 
“selection effect” (Derthick 1979; Goodsell 1981). For example, a police officer 
may join a police department because arresting criminals is his passion. Given his 
preference, the police officer will always get utility from performing this task. 
Similarly, a district management officer who has intrinsic motivation towards the 
public service activities will always derive utility from his efforts to ensure 
efficient public service delivery. Also, agents working in an Environment 
Protection Agency (EPA) are sometimes already the ones who care about air 
pollution.  
Despite the importance of non-material self-interest, the standard models of 
bureaucratic policy drift pay scant attention to the relationship between policy 
choices of bureaucrats and the non-material self-interest (non-economic 
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incentives) that directly stem from their membership in the organisation (Simon 
1947; Perrow 1986; West 1997).  That is, neither the institutional nor social 
determinants of an organisation, as direct constraints on public policy choices of 
bureaucrats, have become an explicit topic in the literature on bureaucratic policy 
drift so far. 
However, a deeper understanding of the policy choices of bureaucrats requires due 
consideration of institutional and social factors prevalent in an organization. As an 
example, on September 15, 2015, former US President Barack Obama issued an 
Executive Order 13707 that directed the Social and Behavioural Sciences Team 
(SBST) to provide research insights on the behaviour of bureaucrats working in 
Federal Government agencies. The objective was to properly understand the 
constraints and choices of bureaucrats in the course of formulating and 
implementing public policy. The team’s annual report (2016) highlighted that the 
preferences of bureaucrats towards specific public policy operations do not depend 
on the maximization calculus of individual bureaucrats as neatly as predicted by 
standard economic models. Rather the institutional and social factors matter in 
determining public policy preferences of bureaucrats (Executive Office of the 
President 2015).  
The earlier studies on bureaucratic choice of public policies have emphasized the 
agency structure, intrinsic motivations, the agency’s organizational mission, and 
the functional activities of an agency based on its production processes and 
outcomes (Wilson 1989; Prendergast 2007; Carpenter and Krause 2011). These 
studies pay scant attention to provide institutionally embedded explanations for 
bureaucratic preferences towards certain public policies. However, the bureaucrats 
may be inclined to pursue a certain policy stance simply because it becomes a 
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shared belief in the organization and leads individuals to consider other policy 
options as improper. For instance, Meyer and Rowan (1991) argue that 
organizational policies and strategies tend to be highly institutionalized and hence 
are considered as legitimate regardless of their impact on outcomes. Furthermore, 
organizational strategies persist due to their taken-for-granted characteristics, 
which make the former self-sustaining. Hence, organizational context can have 
long-term impacts if it contributes to a persistence of bureaucrat’s policy 
preferences (Meyer and Rowan 1991; Zucker 1991; Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). 
Another way, the organizational context can have a significant impact on public 
policy preferences, if pursuing organizational policy stances becomes a goal for a 
bureaucrat (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). He may learn of what is seen in-house as 
a “good public policy” and how this translates into certain budgetary allocations. 
In this sense his budgetary preferences are based on narratives, norms and 
identities prevalent in an organization. Subsequently, he may choose specific 
budget allocations through the lens of his organizational social context (Arrow 
1994; Davis, 2003, 2006, 2007).  
The objective of this dissertation is to analyse the policy choices of the bureaucrats 
duly taking into account the institutional and social factors that can influence their 
policy choices. More specifically, the institutional and social determinants are 
analytically seized and conceptually integrated into economic research on 
bureaucratic drift.  
Furthermore, the institutional and social factors not only provide a context in 
which individual actions interact but also significantly constraint the policy 
choices of bureaucrats. That is, the organizational context can have significant 
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impacts if it affects the maximization calculus of individual bureaucrats through 
(non) economic factors.  
Hence, a new pendulum swing of analysis with an emphasis on “institutional and 
social” considerations in the public policy choices of the bureaucrats can provide 
the context of persistent, institutionalized, and inertial public policies and can add 
value to the legal, economic and political science literature on bureaucratic policy 
drift.  
Before the specific research questions of the study are spelled out, it is important 
to define some key terms for ease of exposition. 
1.2 Key terms  
The term “bureaucrats” in this dissertation refers to permanent government 
employees organized hierarchically and working in the administrative departments 
of the government. Apart from pure administrative functions, bureaucrats perform 
many policy-making functions that are delegated to administrative agency by the 
legislature.  
The discretionary powers conferred on the administrative agency are of different 
types: the agency may perform simple functions such as maintenance of birth and 
death registers, or it may exercise its power to regulate the economy.  
It is important to distinguish whether the institutional context influences outcomes 
through shaping individual incentives or through influencing individual 
preferences. From a neo-classical perspective, institutional factors influence 
behaviour through determining the incentives faced by individuals. On the other 
hand, the institutional context may directly impact individual preferences as 
expounded by the behavioural approach. In this dissertation, the institutional 
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context is assumed to influence individual behaviour at the level of incentives, 
which define their opportunity sets. Furthermore, these incentives may indirectly 
shape individual preferences through shared thoughts and beliefs (Hodgson, 2006) 
as, for example, a certain preference for public policy by the bureaucrats. 
In order to illustrate the principal argument of the dissertation and to conceptualize 
institutional determinants in a bureaucratic organization, the bureaucracy in 
Pakistan is specially discussed. This provides the means for an in-depth 
examination of the processes and mechanisms fundamental to institutional 
persistence. The study’s focus on a single country case allows for a detailed 
investigation of the historical mechanisms and socio-legal conditions to propose 
relevant policy recommendations. 
The following paragraphs will describe the functions, which can be delegated to 
administrative agencies (bureaucracy) in Pakistan constitutional law.  
In the “Principles of Administrative Law”, Mahmood (2011) documents the areas 
of permissible delegation under the constitution of Pakistan. According to “The 
Supreme Court order 572”, if public policy is formulated by the legislature, the 
function of supplying details may be delegated to the administrative agency for 
giving effect to the policy. According to “The Supreme Court order 560”, the 
legislature can empower the administrative agencies to extend the latter’s 
jurisdiction to different locations, persons or commodities. For instance, according 
to section 183 of the Railways Act 1989, the administrative agencies were 
authorized to apply the provisions to other transport areas. Some statues, for 
example “The Supreme Court order 714”, state that the framing of rules and 
regulations by an administrative agency is constitutional provided that these are 
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presented to the legislature before their enforcement with the proviso that the 
legislature retains the power to amend, modify or rescind them. 
The institutional devices for the transparency of the delegated budgetary policies 
fall under the category of Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs). The Fiscal 
Responsibility Act, 2005 was introduced to eliminate mismanagement of budgets 
and introduce greater transparency in fiscal operations. According to Act No. VI 
of FRA 2005, the government should take all suitable measures to accomplish 
policy goals with respect to budgetary allocations. In practice, however, actual 
budgetary allocations by the bureaucrats can often diverge from these targets. For 
instance, the budgetary allocation to education and health as percent of GDP was 
aimed to double from FY05 to FY15. However, this expenditure shows no 
significant increase in terms of their share of GDP since 2005-06. On the other 
hand, social security and development projects showed remarkable budgetary 
increase despite the fact that such increases were not the policy target (The 
Economics Survey of Pakistan 2016). 
This illustration highlights the important role of bureaucrats in the choice of 
budgetary allocation policy as well as the potential for policy drift. It is precisely 
for this reason that the budgetary allocation policy has been chosen as a focus of 
the analysis. Simply put, the budgetary policy plays a significant role in the 
provision of public goods and services and the bureaucracy holds considerable 
discretionary power in the choice of budgetary allocations. But the models which 
we have developed are flexible enough to allow for applications in more general 
settings where bureaucrats’ choices are influenced by a combination of pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary incentives such as maximization of perks (pecuniary) and other 
possible motives such as public service ethos and career concerns (non-pecuniary).  
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After discussing the key terms of this dissertation, the next highlight is on the 
research questions of this study.  
1.3 Research questions  
The two main research questions investigated in this dissertation are: First, how 
are the policy choices of bureaucrats shaped by the institutional and social context 
of the organisation. Second, what are its implications for public policy outcomes 
in terms of allocation of public budgets? 
As an illustration, consider the case of bureaucracy in Pakistan, an administrative 
organization inherited from the British rule. The structure of bureaucracy, its 
power and administrative outreach were dictated by the institutional and social 
contexts prevalent during the British rule. For example, weak political and 
legislative institutions resulted in a powerful organization that was meant to 
provide legal and administrative apparatus to govern a vast and diverse country. 
On the other hand, the social class structure was mirrored in the bureaucracy with 
bureaucrats in higher ranks enjoying a high social status and taking pride in their 
identity. This inherited institution failed to adapt itself to meet the new challenges 
of development after independence. As a matter of fact, this set up has continued 
to this day and bureaucracy in Pakistan retains the status of a ruling class and a 
symbol of power and social status geared more towards consolidation of its power, 
perks and privileges rather than effective public service delivery (Kardar 2006).  
This illustration serves to highlight a key point of this dissertation; that the 
behaviour of bureaucrats is shaped by the institutional and social environment that 
determines the organizational attributes. Consequently, in order to develop a 
proper understanding of the complexity of a bureaucrat’s policy choice beyond the 
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conventional individual self-interest paradigm, it is essential to bring into focus 
the organizational context that shapes and rationalizes certain preferences of 
bureaucrats. The illustration also highlights the fact that in order to understand 
institutional determinants, the key historical mechanism and processes have to be 
investigated. Simply put, it is necessary to examine the formative history of an 
organization to understand the institutional factors.  
In order to answer the two main research questions, the study focuses on a number 
of sub-questions, which are stated in detail below. 
In the first part (chapter 2) the study seeks to answer two questions with respect to 
the specific role of the institutional context in the policy choice of bureaucrats. 
o How do the historical and institutional contexts influence the structure and 
mode of governance of the organisation? 
o What phenomenon explains the stickiness of inefficient bureaucratic 
features concentrating on particular bureaucratic control on public 
expenditure and corruption? 
In the second part of the dissertation (chapters 3 and chapter 4) a number of sub 
questions are addressed to see how the preferences/policy choices of bureaucrats 
are shaped by institutional and social context.  
o How does imprinting lead to bureaucratic inertia and policy rigidity? 
o How does bureaucratic inertia affect the policy choice of bureaucrats? 
o What are the implications of inertia in terms of economic efficiency? 
The social determinants referred to are the factors not attached to particular 
individuals but instead to social groups such as identities, norms, public sector 
ethos etc. These social determinants become pivotal, following experience of and 
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exposure to an organization, for example a sense of collective identity enhances 
altruism towards group members. Thus, in the presence of those social 
determinants, the decisions of agents not only depend on calculation maximising 
their individual utility functions but also on the degree of identification with 
organizational goals. In this context, the following questions are addressed in 
chapter 4: 
o What role does a bureaucrat’s identity (social context) play in the policy 
outcome? 
o Do all agents identify alike with the goals of the bureaucracy? 
o What are the trade-offs between individual and organizational goals faced 
by a bureaucrat who identifies with the organization?  
After discussing the research questions of this dissertation, the next highlight is on 
the relevance of this study to administrative law and economics literature. 
1.4 Relevance of the study to administrative 
law and economics 
The administrative law and economics literature draws insights from the public 
choice theory that takes the discretionary powers of the bureaucrats as given and 
assumes that bureaucrats are self-interested individuals who maximize their 
budgets. This self-interested behaviour of the bureaucrats can explain the corrupt 
practices and inefficiency of the bureaucrats. In administrative law and economics, 
studies have investigated the mechanisms to reduce inefficiency and control 
bureaucratic opportunistic behaviour so as to prevent and punish deviation of a 
bureaucrat’s policy choices from those of a politician (Rose-Ackerman 1986, 
2007; Stephenson 2006, 2008). In particular, researchers have widely studied the 
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role of statutory instruments such as judicial control, legislative control, political 
control and an extensive set of rules and administrative procedures in ensuring the 
efficiency, responsibility and accountability of the decision-making by 
administrative agencies (Posner and Vermeule, 2002). 
Many scholars in the field have pointed out the need to properly understand the 
constraints and choices of bureaucrats in order to enhance understanding of the 
(non) opportunistic motivation of bureaucrats. As Schuck, (1994) mentions that 
the law and economics literature about administrative agencies is highly 
concentrated around the cumbersome procedures, judicial reviews and audits to 
guide the course of action and to control administrative discretion, but however 
very scant attention is paid to exploring the underlying factors that influence 
agency policy choices. Weigel (2006) also stresses that general administrative 
issues such as policy drift, discretion over budget, goal conflict and choices of 
bureaucrats are rarely addressed through the lens of bureaucrats’ incentives; the 
focus has been more in terms of how to minimize distortions through complex 
rules. 
This dissertation adds value to the field of administrative law and economics in 
that it extends the earlier literature to incorporate both the pecuniary and non-
pecuniary incentives of the bureaucrats that could affect their choices in ways that 
are not yet fully understood. In particular, there has been less attention paid to the 
complexity of organizational structure and the interplay of material and non-
material interests of bureaucrats in determining public policy outcomes. As 
Coglianese (2002) suggests, research along these lines could provide insights that 
can help in evaluating and ultimately improving administrative law and procedures 
in ways that contribute to more effective governance and better policy outcomes. 
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The following section will briefly sketch out the works of pioneering scholars on 
the study of bureaucracy with a focus on traditional approaches. The modern 
advent of the scientific study of bureaucracy is documented in the next chapters of 
the dissertation. 
1.5 Scientific studies on bureaucracy: a 
(brief) review of the literature 
In the early scientific study of bureaucracy efforts were made to discover the 
structures and principles of administration. German sociologist Max Weber’s 
(1947) normative theory put forward the idea of “rational-legal authority” as a 
governance mechanism. His theory provided insights on the design of bureaucratic 
institutions focusing in particular on the development of trained professionals 
having specialized knowledge and training to conduct the administrative functions. 
He also advocated a hierarchical organizational structure with clearly defined 
responsibilities and accountability mechanisms. Similarly, Wilson (1887) 
established a dichotomy between the role of politicians and bureaucrats in public 
policy such that the politicians carry the task of policymaking and bureaucrats 
implement these policies. He called for an administrative apparatus that should be 
devoid of any role in politics with an independent administrative status. 
Though Taylor (1911) also advocated the division of tasks between politicians and 
bureaucrats his work focused more on structural designs and incentives in order to 
find the optimal methods to increase the work efforts of public agents. He 
introduced the pecuniary motivations in his motivation theory, where he advocated 
the reliance on material incentives such as piecework, incentive pay, and other 
pure economic incentives to increase production. Simon (1947) stressed that the 


ͳͶ

unit of analysis should be individuals to understand the performance of 
administrative organizations. The two key components of his theory of 
administration included efficiency considerations and cognitive limitations of 
human rationality that can hinder the efficiency of bureaucrats. The intellectual 
roots of the behavioural revolution in the study of public organizations started with 
Barnard’s (1938) “The functions of the executive”, in which he analysed the issues 
related to boss-subordinate relationships. This work emphasized the normative 
questions such as how administrative agencies function under the constraints of 
formal rights and organizational environment. On the other side, March and 
Simon’s (1958) account introduced a behavioural challenge to the scientific 
inquiry of public agencies. The study documented that the rationality in the neo-
classical paradigm is unfounded and problematic to study the behaviour of the 
public agents. It also suggested that standard operating procedures should be 
employed by the organizations to control the individual cognitive limitations that 
allow them to behave in a more efficient manner.  
As the administrative science literature focused on management and 
organizational questions, a parallel movement ‘public choice approach’ 
documented the problems that the material interests of administrative agents  may 
create and focused on its implications for the performance of the organization. 
More specifically, pioneering scholars including Buchanan (1949), Tullock 
(1965), Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1968) used economic tools to handle the 
problems of control and responsiveness in bureaucrats. The scholars in this field 
drew insights about administrative agency, from among others, C. Northcote 
Parkinson’s book “Parkinson’s law and other studies in administration”. Parkinson 
(1957) quoted the example of the British navy to argue that bureaucrats should not 
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be seen as agents with altruistic motivations who would selflessly work in the 
public interest. The bureaucrats leverage their discretion in order to increase the 
size of the budget, which results in private benefits for them such as perks, 
privileges, and salaries etc.  
Tullock’s (1965) work highlighted the effects of disinformation channels 
stemming from the hierarchical distortions in public organizations. His work 
established that agents in public organizations are not easy to control since these 
agents do not face the risk of losing their jobs due to the lack of market based 
sanction mechanisms in public organizations. Michel Crosier’s “Bureaucratic 
Phenomenon” (1964) arrived at a conclusion similar to Tullock’s. Rather than 
focusing on information channels he focused on the internal structure and power 
dynamics of public organizations. His work established a novel account of how 
bureaucracies actually function and how the power interests of different 
stakeholders such as interest groups and politicians shape organizations. Both 
Crosier and Tullock concluded that bureaucracies are inefficient organizational 
forms and the problems inherent in these organizations are inevitable. 
One notable departure from these negative accounts of bureaucracy is Downs 
(1967) famous work “Inside Bureaucracy” that studied bureaucrats at a micro level 
and maintained that agents in public organizations have diverse ideologies and 
preferences. He described bureaucrats in certain groups such as zealots, advocates, 
statesmen, conservers, and climbers. He argued that due to the different 
personalities of bureaucrats the performance distortion in the system is 
unavoidable. However, he contended that performance distortions could be 
corrected by different means such as collecting feedback from outside agencies, 
creating innovation and encouraging competition. Perrow (1972) emphasized the 
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importance of organizational sociology in understanding organizations. He 
maintained that the focus should be on correcting the system rather than 
individuals. Mosher (1968) focused on questions of organizational behaviour 
especially in relation to the political dimension of the bureaucracy and argues for 
strong checks on bureaucratic autonomy.  
The literature on bureaucracy that focuses on identifying different mechanisms to 
control bureaucratic discretionary power through ex-post and ex-ante methods is 
well developed. A number of studies have investigated how budgets, 
appointments, and oversight mechanisms influence bureaucratic discretion. In 
administrative law, research on the politics of procedural choice has provided 
insights on how to control the behaviour of bureaucrats through administrative 
rules. Whereas the organization theory emphasizes institutional design, staff 
relationships, hierarchical structures, and procedures of public administration, 
political science concentrates on questions of the political control of bureaucracies 
and the conjunctions between legislature and bureaucracy. The literature on public 
bureaucracy in the field of economics adopts a more rigorous approach to study 
bureaucratic behaviour by emphasizing the rational actor model. These classic 
accounts of bureaucrats’ motivations that are widely based on the neo-classical 
self-interest axiom have their own significance. However, a theoretical framework 
that offers a mediated approach by taking individuals as the primary unit of 
analysis while situating them in their social and institutional contexts can help 
achieve a better understanding of policy choices of public bureaucrats.  
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1.4 Methodology 
In broad terms, the dissertation uses multi-disciplinary approaches encapsulated 
with neo-classical analytical methodologies, to investigate individual behaviour 
within an organizational context. The approaches are individual-centred yet also 
institutional in that these bring into focus social and institutional factors as explicit 
constraints on individual behaviour.  
The dissertation is composed of two parts. The first part (chapter 2) presents a case 
study of Pakistan’s bureaucracy focusing in particular on historical processes to 
shed light on key organizational and institutional variables that impact behaviour 
of organizational actors. The second part of the dissertation (chapters 3 and chapter 
4) applies the insights of the case study to develop a conceptual framework for 
analysing policy choices of bureaucrats duly taking into account social and 
institutional dimensions.  
In the following there will be a brief discussion of the methodologies used in the 
two parts of the dissertation. The details are provided in the respective chapters. 
The methodology adopted in chapter 2 is a historical case study based on a 
descriptive approach anchored in the theory of organizational imprinting. In this 
chapter, the bureaucracy in Pakistan is taken as a case study to explore the role of 
the historical and institutional context in shaping the key attributes of bureaucracy. 
The focus has been in particular on investigating the significant role of bureaucrats 
in public policy. Furthermore, the root causes of rampant corruption in 
bureaucracy from a historical perspective are explored. In the light of a historical 
narrative, we explain the deeper roots of corruption and power and inclination of 
bureaucrats towards certain public policies 

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The second part of the dissertation builds on insights gained from part one and 
uses a rational choice approach with status quo bias theory (chapter 3), and social 
identity theory (chapter 4).  
In the proposed approach, there is recognition of the critical place of individual 
preferences in determining individual behaviour, as well as the role of historical, 
institutional and social factors in shaping the preferences. The individuals are 
central to the method throughout the analysis, but the approaches are more 
attentive to the role of social and institutional elements in seeking to understand 
the policy choices of bureaucrats.  
Central to the methodology are three concepts that explain preference formation 
in historical, institutional and social contexts, namely imprinting (chapter 2), 
structural inertia (chapter 3), and identity (chapter 4). These concepts help to 
explain how policy choices of the bureaucrats stem from different contextual 
factors. Although these concepts/theories (Figure 1.1) have their own distinctions 
possibly with some overlap, the common denominator of these approaches is to 
provide more valid explanation of decision-making when historical and 
institutional aspects matter.  
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Figure 1.1: Three concepts used in the dissertation to illustrate preference 
formation in organizational, institutional and social contexts. 
Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework that incorporates the concept of inertia 
directly stemming from organizational imprinting (chapter 2). Simply put, we 
elaborate a “principal-agent model” with status quo bias and solve the bureaucrat’s 
policy choice problem. The framework specifies conditions under which 
institutional factors hinder the policy choice of the bureaucrat and hence could 
have economic implications. This approach helps in identifying the causal factors 
of policy rigidity especially in terms of the institutional context that influences the 
policymaking of bureaucrats.  
Chapter 4 uses a social identity approach that incorporates multiple agents in 
bureaucracy in a game theoretic framework. More specifically, the chapter 
elaborates on a principal supervisor and agent (subordinate) (P-S-A) model of 
policy choice, where politicians and bureaucrats are motivated by different career 
concerns. The framework introduces multiple agents within the bureaucracy with 
 framwork 
Imprinting Inertia Identity
models


ʹͲ

different functional tasks as well as different individual policy goals, making the 
overall goal conflict between legislature and bureaucracy less predictable.  
Essentially, the individual choice theoretic approaches used in chapters 3 and 4 
can be conceived in terms of cost benefit analysis between the material (pecuniary) 
and non-material (non-pecuniary) interests of bureaucrats (Figure 1.2).  
 
Figure 1.2: The potential trade-off a bureaucrat faces between his material 
and non-material self-interests. 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the potential trade-offs between material self-interest such as 
budgetary resources and non-material self-interest stemming from status quo bias 
in the form of adherence to past policies, and identities based on bureaucratic 
hierarchy or social norms. Interestingly, a bureaucrat may be willing to sacrifice 
material gains (i.e. budgetary resources) for non-material interests driven by their 
social and institutional context. This is because while a bureaucrat derives positive 
utility from budget maximization, he may experience a utility loss due to non-
material factors. This calculus between material and non-material incentives 
Material 
self-interest  
Non-material
self -interest
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becomes critical in determining the policy choices of bureaucrats, as is elaborated 
in chapters 3 and 4. 
To sum up, the main thrust of this dissertation is to unfold the organizational 
context in influencing the policy choices of bureaucracy. Within this framework, 
the role of non-material incentives such as status quo, inertia, social norms, 
identities, and public sector ethos in agent’s choices, are investigated from an 
organisational perspective.  
1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents a historical explanation 
of specific bureaucratic attributes such as corruption and power dynamics in 
bureaucracy in Pakistan. The objective is twofold: first to set out the historical 
context including the economic environment and founders’ preferences in creating 
structure and strategies of bureaucracy; and second to provide an account of how 
certain practices during the colonial era led to the unintended consequences in the 
form of bureaucratic power, corruption and control over economic policies after 
change in the external environment (post-independence). The chapter uses the 
framework of Organizational Imprinting (OI) and explains the implications and 
outcomes due to imprints on bureaucracy in Pakistan, a descendant of colonial era 
civil service. It is argued that bureaucracy in Pakistan shows significant imprints 
many of which tend to persist because of forces of inertia and institutionalization. 
In addition to the historical and institutional approaches to bureaucratic behaviour 
discussed in chapter 2, the next two chapters of the dissertation carry out a rigorous 
analysis of how the institutional factors contribute in shaping the policy choices of 
the bureaucrats. 
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In Chapter 3, the insights of chapter 2 are applied to explore how the policy choices 
of bureaucrats are influenced by their past choices. More concretely, this chapter 
develops a formal theory of bureaucratic budget optimization in the presence of 
state-dependent alternatives. Drawing on a theory of “organizational imprinting,” 
(chapter 2) the model creates dependence between the alternatives at an initial state 
(say, when an agency was created) and the current state. The chapter discusses 
how the policy preferences of bureaucracy can be shaped by economic, social and 
institutional context factors that define the operational scope, policies and 
capabilities of bureaucratic organization. The chapter reveals how sub-optimal 
policy choices may arise due to imprinted policy preferences dictated by past 
organisational trajectories. 
In chapter 4, a further step is taken for studying more deeply bureaucratic 
behaviour in an organizational hierarchy. The model discusses mission orientation 
in bureaucracies, taking into account the statutory distribution of power and 
functional responsibilities of agents across different layers of bureaucratic 
organization. In particular, a game-theoretic model is developed that emphasizes 
strategic interaction among bureaucratic actors and the legislator to determine 
public policies. In the model, it is assumed that bureaucrats aim at their individual 
advantage but have different identities. Bureaucrats may identify themselves with 
the goal of the bureaucracy and derive utility from this identity. Or, they may not 
identify with the goal of the bureaucracy and gain utility only from pursuing 
strategies to their own benefit. This model set-up highlights the possibility of trade-
offs between individual and organizational goals and provides a more realistic 
approach for the analysis of bureaucracies. 
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In chapter 5, the major conclusions and policy implications of the dissertation are 
discussed. In addition, the areas for future research are spelled out. 
 
  

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Chapter 2 
A Bureaucratic Organization with 
Imprinted Attributes1 

2.1 Introduction  
Since the advent of centralized administration, it has been observed that, despite 
several reform efforts, many bureaucracies continue to retain the inefficient 
characteristics, failing in most cases to provide an effective system of governance.  
This chapter aims to address the persistence and rigidity of bureaucratic features 
over long time spans. The study provides a long-term temporal perspective on the 
persistence of organizational design. The long-term view on the matter allows us 
to better explore and explain why corruption and rent seeking continue in many 
bureaucracies although the founding characteristics have disappeared a long time 
ago and history has provided ample chances to change the course.   
It is instructive to mention that the analysis in this chapter is exploratory. The 
investigation does not aim to offer specific policy solutions in this chapter; rather 
certain “insights” are distilled from the narrative developed here to facilitate  

ͳI gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions received during the EDLE seminars as 
well as from the participants in the panel on “History and Institutions” during The European Group 
of Organizational Studies Annual Meeting 2015 (Athens, Greece), and The Workshop on 
Organizational Behaviour and Legal Development 2014 (University of Bournemouth, UK), for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. I gratefully acknowledge Pieter Desmet’s guidance and 
suggestions on the survey part of the chapter. The usual disclaimer applies. 

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understanding the choice problems of bureaucrats formalized in the third and 
fourth chapters of the dissertation.  
To sharpen our focus, the bureaucracy in Pakistan has been chosen for a case study. 
The bureaucracy of Pakistan presents an interesting case study for at least two 
reasons. First, it has a long history with its roots going as far back as the British 
colonial regime in the sub-continent (Cheema and Sayeed 2006; Islam 1989). 
Second, due to weak democratic institutions2 in the country, the bureaucracy has 
displayed a remarkable continuity of the features it acquired during the colonial 
era including its dominance in the axis of power, culture of rent seeking, cadre-
based structure, and patron-client relationships, as well as the mode of governance 
and interventionist economic policies (Kardar 2006; Cheema and Sayeed 2006).  
Furthermore, despite several reform efforts3, bureaucratic framework is following 
the same inefficient practices; hence the bureaucracy in Pakistan serves as an ideal 
laboratory to explore the role of historical and institutional context in the 
persistence and rigidity of bureaucratic features.  

ʹAfter independence in 1947, Pakistan was under military dictatorship in the 1960s, 1980s and 
2000s and a democracy in between. Currently, the country has a democratic government, since the 
2008 elections which were held after the Lawyers’ Movement, which in March 2007 protested 
against General Pervez Musharraf's dictatorship, which had started in 1999. Both under 
dictatorship and democracy the government has relied more on the bureaucracy. 

͵General Ayub Khan (1958-69), introduced “Reform Commission 1962”, General Yahya khan 
(1969-1970) introduced reforms based on the Fulton Report which recommended ways of 
professionalizing British civil services, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977), introduced the famous 
“Civil Services Reforms 1973” ,General Zia Ul Haq (1977-88), established the, “Civil Services 
Commission 1978”, General Musharraf regime (1999-2008) introduced “The Devolution of Power 
Plan”. The ultimate loser in this political see-saw between civilian and military regimes has been 
the bureaucratic framework in the country, each successive  government be it civilian or military 
scaled back the previous reforms or maintained the status quo without building upon these reforms.  
 

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The analysis argues that in order to understand the current rigidity and power 
structure in the bureaucratic framework in Pakistan it is imperative to review the 
historical context of organisation. In the process, we provide a detailed history of 
Pakistan bureaucracy to better understand the context and potential causes behind 
the inefficient bureaucratic set-up. It is expected that analysing the Pakistani 
experience will help shed light on the positive political economy question of why 
many bureaucracies continue to retain  inefficient characteristics.  
It is instructive to mention that providing a detailed account of current reforms is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, rather the objective is to explore aspects of 
history that may help in understanding the current bureaucratic structure. In this 
latter context, we examine the pre- and post-independence periods in the light of 
organisational theory that helps explain the persistence of bureaucratic attributes. 
Due to limited case studies and systematic data, we conducted a perception-based 
survey4 among bureaucrats in Pakistan, designed around the key matters relating 
to the organizational features discussed here. It needs to be emphasized that our 
objective was to get some insights into the perceptions of civil servants about the 
structure and features of the organization that they are part of. It focuses primarily 
on the links between bureaucratic hierarchy and bureaucratic performance, where 
hierarchy largely represents the same power structure as was prevalent in the 

ͶA perception-based survey, targeting 200 bureaucrats, was conducted to gather the bureaucrat’s 
feedback about their perception of the organization they work in. The survey gave an opportunity 
to hear from the bureaucrats regarding the organizational identity, competitive psychological 
climate, public service motivation, performance pay, development experience, social justice, 
distinctness and turnover intention (see appendix 2).  Although we collected extended data for 8 
variables (comprised of 74 questions), we restrict our attention to our key variable of interest, which 
is the correlation between hierarchy and core institutional characteristics. 
 

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colonial era. Following the aggregate findings of the survey, we continue, as in the 
next chapters (chapters 3, 4), with a discussion of impact of organizational context 
on individual-centred choices and preferences. However, in this chapter, we 
restrict our attention to provide a macro-level long-term temporal perspective on 
the persistence of organizational design.  
Overall, while we refrain from strong causality claims, our general findings are 
supportive of the view that public officials’ (bureaucrats) perceptions about the 
rules and regulations governing the agency differ according to their position in the 
hierarchy that signifies distribution of power in the bureaucracy. The survey5 
provided an opportunity to investigate empirically a common assertion that the 
rigid organizational structure of colonial era has an impact on the performance of 
bureaucracy in Pakistan. The key findings of the survey are summarized as 
follows.  
Firstly, the survey explained that the bureaucratic framework6 is based on the 
outdated structures of cadre-based system of governance and vertical hierarchy 
that have serious effects on the motivation as well as performance of the civil 
servants.  

ͷA detailed account of survey design, method followed, measures used, results, correlations are 
mentioned in appendix 2. 
6 There are six officer cadre pay scales ranging from grades 17 to 22. According to 2015 censuses, 
the largest numbers of officers are in Basic Pay Scale (BPS) 17 (49%), BPS 18 (28.64%), BPS 19 
(13.21%) and BPS 20-22 (10.15%) respectively. Furthermore, there are 12 occupational groups: 
The Office Management Group is the predominant one which is 5.10% of the total number of 
employees in BPS 17-22 followed by Income Tax 5.07%, Accounts 4.60%, Railways Commercial 
4.41%, Secretariat 4.10%, District Management Group 3.68%, Foreign Services Group 3.20%, 
Customs & Excise 2.62%, Police Service of Pakistan 2.53%, Economists & Planners 1.81%, 
Information 1.24%, Postal 1.03%, Commerce & Trade 0.85%, Military Lands & Cantonment 
0.38% and 59.37% are ex-cadre. 
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Secondly, the more senior bureaucrats in the hierarchy of bureaucracy showed 
strong organizational identity, which is taken here to mean the degree of the 
bureaucrats’ identification with the goals of the organization (for a rigorous 
investigation of this see chapter 4). The bureaucrats in grade 17, which is the first 
grade in officer rank, showed a higher level of identity as compared to officers in 
grade 18. This could be due to the fact that at the start of their career bureaucrats 
are highly motivated and strongly identify with the bureaucracy, since being part 
of the highest government jobs in Pakistan gives them a level of pride. But after 
spending four to five years their motivation may weaken somewhat due to some 
adverse circumstances typically observed more frequently at this level of 
hierarchy. These may include postings to some remote areas, fewer development 
opportunities, discontent with the senior bureaucrats, and lower pay. All of these 
negatively affect the identity with the organization. 
However, with promotion to grade 19, that on average requires ten to twelve years 
in the organization, there is an increase in identity. The promotions increase the 
power over resources, strong interlinks with the political coalition and hence the 
stake in the bureaucracy increases for the bureaucrats. From grade 19 to grade 20 
the bureaucrats identify almost to same degree. However there is a very sharp 
increase in the identity after grade 20. That is the level in the hierarchy (grade 22) 
where bureaucrats identify most strongly with the organization and enjoy absolute 
power over resources with a direct role in policy making (for more on this, see 
chapter 4 where an economic explanation of identity and hierarchy is provided). 
Hence it is plausible to assume that bureaucrats identify differently with the 
organization according to their hierarchal level with an increase in their sense of 
belonging as they are promoted to the higher grades. 
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Thirdly, the overwhelming majority of civil servants agreed with the assessment 
that the civil service is characterized by a rigid power structure (hierarchical 
structure) which is emblematic of the colonial era power relations in the 
organization. Furthermore, patron client relationships persist as postings to big 
districts with a lot of revenue responsibilities that give more chances of rent 
seeking, and are based on political ties, patron client relationship and networking. 
Finally, the perception of justice7 among civil servants differs with the hierarchical 
level. The officers in grade 17 responded with the lowest score in terms of how 
much distributive and procedural justice they receive in postings and job-related 
evaluations. This is in contrast with the Weber conception of ideal bureaucracy 
that is aimed at ensuring equality of rights and is established on the legal certainty 
of procedural justice. An administration, where a rigid hierarchical system 
impedes distributive justice, would be more prone to corruption activities 
especially in lower ranks where officers do not receive fair treatment8 in terms of 
distributive and procedural justice. The grade 17 officers showed the lowest level 
of satisfaction with procedural justice while there was a significant increase in 
justice perception after grade 18. However there is a significant fall in justice 
perception from grade 19 to grade 20, which could be due to politically driven 

7 Clawson (1999) defines justice perception as an agent’s perceptions of fairness in an organization. 
The distributive justice is defined as “fairness of outcome”, while the procedural justice is related 
to “fairness of decision making used to evaluate a worker’s performance”. 
8 Conversely, a poor procedural justice climate has a negative impact on employees’ perceptions 
of being treated fairly and valued by the organization, and hence they will be more prone to get 
involved in corrupt activities (Posthuma, Maertz, and Dworkin  2007; Siers  2007). According to 
Rawls (1971), justice is the first and foremost virtue of a social organization. It signals legitimacy 
of authority with fairness so that directives are perceived as legitimate (Lind et al. 1993). It is for 
this reason that workers listen to authority and when they perceive an overall fair justice climate in 
an organization, they consider higher authority as fair and carry out directives without questioning. 
Barnard (1938) defines Justice as the pillar on which the whole structure of an organization’s 
success can be built (Clawson 1999). 
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promotions at this level of hierarchy, which create a sense of injustice among the 
peers. The bureaucrats who get promoted to grades 21 and 22 strongly feel the 
justice of the environment since they reach the highest echelon of bureaucracy. 
To sum up, the general insights of the survey indicate that the bureaucracy in 
Pakistan follows a rigid hierarchical structure inherited from the past. The 
bureaucrat’s responses show their dissatisfaction of the methods to evaluate their 
performances, promotions, and development opportunities and public service 
motivation. This suggests that past administrative practices and systems continue 
to be in vogue despite the fact that better options such as a new public management 
framework are available. This observation inspires us to dig deeper into why 
organizational structures and strategies endure even when these are inefficient and 
adversely impact the performance of the bureaucracy.   
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 elaborates how the inefficient 
organisational structure question is approached in this chapter. In this section, the 
methodological framework employed in the study is explained; emphasizing how 
imprinting theory can explain institutional persistence. Furthermore, this 
framework is critically evaluated against the theory of path dependence, which 
also stresses historical factors in the study of present organizational attributes.  
Finally, the section describes the selection of historical sources. Section 2.3 lays 
out the mechanisms and drivers of the imprinting process in the light of the 
literature on organizational imprinting. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 provide a historical 
analysis of the evolution of bureaucracy in Pakistan, focusing on the colonial roots 
as well as on the post-independence period. Section 2.6 addresses the implications 
of the relationship of imprinting with current organisational features. Section 2.7 
discusses the main insights of the analysis. 
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2.2 The persistence of suboptimal forms of  
the organization 
An influential literature on organisational studies asserts that once an 
organizational form is entrenched, its survival depends less on its performance 
than on the “reassuring sense of order it conveys” (Brint and Karabel 1991). 
Following this line of enquiry, in this chapter, we argue that the weaknesses of the 
bureaucracy are linked to perverse incentives, power structure and the institutional 
environment within which successive cohorts of civil servants have functioned for 
over 150 years. These macro-level insights set the ground to investigate the 
behaviour of bureaucrats in the following chapters of the dissertation where public 
choice framework of utility-maximizing individuals acting strategically within the 
institutional contexts is used as an analytical approach.  
Our investigation is related to the literature, which emphasizes that individual 
behaviour is conditioned by the institutional context, which exerts an almost 
deterministic effect on the actions taken by different actors. That is, institutions 
embody particular beliefs and norms that inform the preferences, interests and 
choices. This observation is line with the views of Powell (1991) who argues that 
institutional and social arrangements can persist even if they are sub-optimal 
because they involve sunk economic and/or psychological costs, which cannot be 
recovered. The persistence is further reinforced by the formation of shared 
expectations that contribute to a sense of psychological security and facilitate the 
flow of information and coordination of diverse activities. Change is often resisted 
because it threatens the sense of security of individuals, and disrupts the 
established procedures and routines. Furthermore, the structural features, routines 
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and strategies of an organization may persist simply because these are taken for 
granted as “the way things are done” and consequently they are neither questioned 
nor evaluated against available alternatives (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Powell 
1991). Furthermore, public sector organizations can persist with their archaic 
procedures, work methods and routines not least because they are less subject to 
the ‘selection mechanisms’ as in the case of corporate organisations which face 
competitive pressures to adapt to changing circumstances (Friedland and Alford 
1991).  
These considerations have led researchers to study bureaucracy as an organization 
emphasizing the economic, historical and political context that determines the 
performance of the bureaucracy (Moe 1990; Williamson 1999). 
Following this line of enquiry, in the next part of this chapter we aim to elicit 
exploratory insights on how organizations and their specific modes of operation 
become persistent over very long time frames. The idea is to provide historically 
informed theoretical narrative that can inform the theoretical models used in the 
following chapters.  
A significant body of literature examines the nexus between historical mechanisms 
and present organizational forms (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Banerjee and Iyer 2005; 
Nunn 2008a). The historical accounts, in the tradition of Acemoglu et al (2001), 
show that past events play a significant role in shaping different features of 
organizations. Consequently, it is important to focus on institutional and historical 
factors to shed light on the persistence and dominance of certain features in a 
bureaucratic agency (Hall and Taylor 1996).  
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Organisational theories that emphasize historical aspects include path dependence 
and similar theories such as imprinting. Both concepts relate to historically or 
institutionally driven processes that can constrain individual choices. In the 
following, we explore, which theory offers a better frame to provide a historically 
informed theoretical narrative. 
The concept of organizational imprinting encompasses two distinct features 
(Johnson 2007). First, it refers to the process through which economic, social and 
institutional factors, prevailing at the time of founding, shape organizational forms 
and attributes. The second feature embodied in the idea of imprinting is the 
reproduction of various organizational features acquired at the time of founding as 
a result of inertia and institutionalization of organizational forms and 
characteristics (Hannan and Freeman 1984; DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). While 
the concept of imprinting has diverse applicability depending on the context, the 
notion of organisational imprinting pertains to the case where organisations 
become imprinted in terms of management and administrative structures, 
organisational culture and values, and organisational identity. 
The notion of path dependence has been popular in economics to explain how the 
interaction of initial conditions and chance events define a particular path in terms 
of rigid structures and strategies in an organization (Arthur 1989; David 1994; 
Liebowitz and Margolis 1995).  
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2.2.1 A comparison of organizational 
imprinting  and path dependence 
According to Marquis and Tilcsik (2013), path dependence is distinct from 
imprinting as the latter is concerned with the stamping of the environment rather 
than historical events, “short sensitive periods rather than long-term event chains, 
and stability of the stamped-in-features rather than the increasing dominance of a 
pattern.” 
They document three important differences between organizational imprinting and 
path dependence (see Table 2.1). The imprinting of organizational features takes 
place in a relatively short sensitive period, usually the time of founding. In 
contrast, path dependence is driven by a series of contingent events over a long 
period of time forming “institutional patterns or event chains that have 
deterministic properties” (Mahoney 2000, p.  507). 
The organizational imprinting focuses on strong influence of the external 
environment at the time of founding on organizational features as opposed to 
triggers of path dependent processes. 
The imprinting concept postulates that once specific organizational features are 
stamped in at the time of founding, these remain stable over time. On the other 
hand, path dependence focuses on the dynamic interplay of increasing returns and 
positive feedbacks that lend increasing prominence to organizational forms and 
practices (Sydow et al.  2009). 
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Table 2.1: A comparison of organizational imprinting and path dependence 
 Organizational Imprinting Path dependence 
Influence of initial conditions Very strong Very weak 
Source/triggering event External environment at 
founding; founders’ 
preferences 
Contingent events 
Sustaining mechanisms Structural inertia; 
institutionalization 
Self-reinforcement due to 
increasing returns to scale 
and positive feedbacks 
Outcome Persistence of structural 
properties; institutional 
stability 
Lock-in on a specific path 
due to cumulative 
advantages that make 
alternative paths unviable 
Source: Adapted from Vergne and Durand (2010) 
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Following Acemoglu (2012), a sharper distinction can be made between the notion 
of persistence as implied by organizational imprinting and path dependence in 
terms of dynamic processes. Formally, let ܺ௧ be a vector of some organizational 
attributes at time ݐǤ Then persistence can be modeled as a system of first order 
stochastic linear difference equations as follows: 
ܺ௧ ൌ ߚܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௧ሺͳሻ 
According to equation (1), initial conditions would have a lasting impact as long 
as the stochastic process has a unit root. The path dependent processes, on the other 
hand, can be specified as: 
ܺ௧ ൌ ௧݂ሺܺ௧ିଵǡ ߝ௧ሻሺʹሻ 
In this formulation, how the dynamic path of ܺ௧ is shaped by initial conditions 
depends on random shocks ߝ௧. Path dependence would imply that the gradient ȟ ௧݂ 
evaluated at a given ܺ has eigenvalues close to 1 or in other words the dynamic 
stochastic process in (2) has a unit root. In mathematical parlance, equation 2 is 
also known as a Markov chain. In this characterization, a non-ergodic Markov 
chain would imply path dependence (Vergne and Durand 2010).  
The non-ergodicity of the Markov chains implies that statistical properties of the 
process cannot be predicted on the basis of a single realization of the dynamic 
process. Whether or not a Markov chain is non-ergodic depends on the eigenvalues 
of the transition probability matrix. 
From equations 1 and 2, it is clear that while initial conditions have a lasting effect 
in the case of persistence of imprints, path dependent processes are dominated by 
random shocks. In other words, the outcome of a path dependent process is 
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impossible to predict with certainty on the basis of initial conditions alone (Vergne 
and Durand 2010). This implies that the probability of any outcome of path 
dependent process conditional on initial conditions must be less than one, i.e. 
ሺȁሻ ൏ ͳሺ͵ሻ 
In essence, the imprinting theory is based on a causal relationship whereby the 
initial conditions and agents’ choices, conditioned by contextual circumstances, 
create a dominating cause that influences structures and choices in the future. The 
initial conditions or choices are also important in path dependence but these 
conditions do not play a critical role in determining the final outcomes. That is, 
path dependence refers to a situation when institutional arrangements become 
sticky because of increasing returns and positive feedback mechanisms (Powell 
1991). The above discussion shows that, though both concepts provide information 
about past patterns, there are significant differences between organizational 
imprinting and path dependence concepts. 
2.2.2 The imprinting approach for the 
analysis of bureaucracy 
The concept of path dependence has its own significance yet it is not the favourite 
approach to explore the organizational features of the public bureaucracy for at 
least two reasons. 
First, it focuses on chance events rather than the adoption of specific organizational 
features by design to achieve conformity with the prevailing environmental 
conditions (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). The issue of adoption of organizational 
features by design is especially important in the context of public bureaucracy 
whose organizational structure reflects the inclinations of the founders such as 
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political actors towards particular bureaucratic forms, modes of governance and 
public policies. For example, Moe (1990) argues that political actors concentrate 
on expediency rather than efficiency considerations because of the need to make 
political compromises, which may design the bureaucracy. 
Second, path dependence implies an increasing pattern of dominance of the 
organizational features and arrangements, as opposed to the stability of acquired 
organizational features (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). The example of the 
persistence of the QWERTY keyboard is instructive here. Once the keyboard made 
its way into the market, more and more users adopted it and its production became 
increasingly profitable due to increasing returns to scale. As the keyboard 
proliferated and became a standard, it engendered positive feedback loops that 
further contributed to lower costs, increased profitability and still further adoption 
(David 1985). The theory of path dependence underscores random historical 
events that are exacerbated due to increasing returns to scale and positive feedback 
mechanisms. Consequently, organizational forms, strategies and products are 
dynamically locked-in and perpetuated owing to accumulated advantages (Powell 
1991; Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). 
Based on a comparative analysis of the two approaches, it is argued that the theory 
of organizational imprinting is a better approach to answer our research question. 
First, organizational imprinting allows the study of how the bureaucracy is 
systematically shaped or imprinted by known initial conditions as well as the 
founders’ preferences at the time of its founding. 
Second, organizational imprinting provides a better explanation for the persistence 
of various organizational characteristics of the bureaucracy. For example, 
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according to organizational imprinting, bureaucratic methods and procedures can 
persist owing to the forces of structural inertia and institutionalization even 
without any positive feedback loops, which underlie path dependent processes. 
Third, in contrast to the theory of path dependence, the theory of organizational 
imprinting allows the study of how economic conditions and founders’ preferences 
towards bureaucratic forms and structure are embedded in the bureaucracy as an 
organization and hence are key determinants of bureaucratic performance 
especially in terms of economic policies and their outcomes. 
Finally, the fact that the acquired features of the bureaucracy tend to remain fairly 
stable over time is better captured by the theory of organizational imprinting as 
against the theory of path dependence, which emphasizes an increasing dominance 
of organizational arrangements and practices. Furthermore, the theory of 
organizational imprinting uses the notion of inertia in a much broader sense 
including the presence of vested interest, tendency of practices to become 
normative standards, and threat of losing legitimacy in response to change. 
Hence, the imprinting theory provides a coherent framework for understanding 
how economic and technological conditions, the political context, and individuals 
can leave lasting imprints on organizations which consequently affect their internal 
structures, capabilities and public policy decisions. Within this line of enquiry, the 
theory of organizational imprinting provides a frame of reference to underpin past 
patterns in an organization. Such a line of research can contribute in providing a 
temporal perspective on the persistence of organizational design such as powerful 
bureaucracy inherited at the time of founding (initial conditions) and its 


Ͷͳ

unintended consequences in terms of corruption and rent seeking, which continued 
long after the founders were gone. 
Following these observations, the rest of the analysis is primarily built on 
organizational imprinting insights. The assumption here is that organizations are 
initially shaped by the external environment prevailing at the time of their 
founding and then continue to retain their characteristics in the future because of 
the forces of inertia and institutionalization (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). 
In this context two research questions are especially investigated. First, in what 
way the historical and institutional context, predominantly the economic 
environment and founders’ inclinations, shape the structure and mode of 
governance of the organization. Second, what phenomenon explains the stickiness 
of inefficient bureaucratic features emphasizing in particular bureaucratic control 
of public expenditure and corruption? 
2.2.3 Selection of sources 
As noted by Pierson and Skocpol (2002), scholars interested in historical 
explanations traditionally rely on secondary sources of their data. Garud, 
Kumaraswamy and Karnoe (2010) underscore the importance of case study and 
narrative approach for providing historically entrenched explanations.  
The qualitative information on the case study has been obtained from widely cited 
published historical accounts of the colonial bureaucracy in the Indian sub-
continent as well as the post-independent bureaucratic set up in Pakistan.  
Notable works that were cited for qualitative information include, Alavi (1973), 
Ali and Malik (2009), Braibanti (1963), Burki (1969), Cheema and Sayeed (2006), 
Dixit (2012), Ganguly and Fair (2013), Goodnow (1964), Gould (2013), Habib 
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(1973), Haque and Din (2006), Islam (1989), Kardar (2006), Kenny (2013), 
Maddison (1971), Washbrook (1999) and Wilder (2013). 
The historical window analysed stretches right from the colonial roots of the 
bureaucracy during the British Raj (1858-1947) to the post-independence 
bureaucracy in Pakistan (1947-to present). 
Within the methodological framework of qualitative case study, employing the 
concept of imprinting lays out how the relationship between the founder’s 
preferences and current features of a bureaucratic agency has evolved.   
It needs to be emphasized that the historical narrative covering pre- and post-
independence periods has been deliberately kept succinct to focus more on 
implications that can be derived from organizational imprinting rather than a mere 
description of historical events. Based on the insights from the theory of 
organizational imprinting, it is argued that the colonial roots as well as the initial 
conditions at the time of independence have left a lasting imprint on Pakistan’s 
bureaucracy particularly in terms of its powerful and ruling class status and 
corruption. Furthermore, it is shown that power relations as well as bureaucratic 
structure, work methods and routines are deeply entrenched in the bureaucracy 
through the forces of inertia and institutionalization. 
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2.3 The imprinting process: mechanisms and 
drivers 
The idea of imprinting can be traced to the seminal contribution of Stinchcombe 
(1965) who argued that organizations are shaped by their historical contexts. The 
organizations acquire specific attributes during their founding period that last long 
into the future due to economic, social and cultural factors that introduce inertia in 
business processes, behaviours, and norms. Focusing on employment patterns at 
the industry level, the study finds that industries established at a particular time 
exhibited similar employment patterns that were shaped by the socio-economic 
conditions prevailing at that time, implying a strong correlation between the 
formative years of the industries and their structures at present. Working along the 
same lines, Kimberly (1975) focuses on the organizational characteristics of 
sheltered workshops and demonstrates that the external environment and social 
philosophy prevailing at the time of their founding left a significant impact on the 
type and operational scope of these entities which lasted well into the future. 
Following these early contributions, several studies have further developed these 
ideas and have explored how the external conditions including technological, 
economic, political, and social forces prevailing at the time of founding shape 
organizational forms, structures and attributes. The founding period is usually 
considered to be a particularly sensitive time during which an organization is more 
open, malleable and receptive to adopting specific structures in line with the 
demands of the external environment (Johnson 2007). DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991b, p. 73) argue that organizations exhibit a tendency to become ‘isomorphic’ 
with the external environment to avoid uncertainty and gain legitimacy (see also 
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Hannan and Freeman 1977). Reflecting further on this theme, Carroll and Hannan 
(2004) argue that the viability of particular organizational forms is dictated by the 
broader social and institutional context, which is ‘mapped’ onto the organization 
leaving a lasting imprint on key organizational features. Besides influencing the 
type of organization and its form at the macro level, the environment at the time 
of founding can also have deep influence on various micro level characteristics of 
an organization including management practices, staff composition, intra-
organizational distribution of power, and other social attributes such as work 
ethics, and organizational norms and values (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). In 
addition to the broader institutional context, founders of organizations also exert 
powerful influence on organizations by incorporating their strategic thrust and 
vision for managerial and operational aspects of the organizations (Mintzberg and 
Waters 1982; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; Johnson 2007). 
More specifically, a significant body of literature has analysed various aspects of 
organizational imprinting focusing in particular on how organizations are shaped 
by their founding environment and how various organizational attributes such as 
business methods and processes, norms, values, ethics, and behaviours are 
embedded in the organizational cultures through imprints of the past that persist 
over time. 
In the following we will briefly sketch out some key features of the imprinting 
theory that can hint to the relevance of taking imprinting into account for a proper 
understanding of institutional factors prevailing in the bureaucracy. 
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2.3.1 The mechanisms of imprinting 
Marquis and Tilcsik (2013) consider three major mechanisms of imprinting 
including economic conditions, institutional conditions, and the imprints of 
individuals on organizations. Several studies have examined how organizations 
can carry imprints of the economic and technological conditions in terms of 
various outcomes and processes at the level of organization as well as at the levels 
of sub-processes and individuals working in the organization. For example, 
research has shown that organizations established during a favourable economic 
environment with better financing options tend to develop better business 
strategies and service delivery that persist well into the future (Boeker 1989a; 
Tucker et. al. 1990). Similarly, organizations tend to persistently follow the 
technological conditions prevailing at the time of their founding due mainly to 
standardization and high replacement costs (Zyglidopoulos 1999). A good 
example of how the broader economic system leaves lasting imprints on 
organizations is firms in eastern European countries which retained their ‘socialist 
imprints’ long after their transition to market oriented economies (Kriauciunas and 
Kale 2006). Similarly, research has shown that older firms in China that were 
steeped in the socialist tradition are still mired in socialist era business practices 
showing a strong influence of imprinting of the overall economic environment 
(Peng 2004; Marquis and Qian 2013). 
Some studies have argued that the overall institutional environment including 
economic, social and political institutions play an important role in shaping 
organizations. Organizations found within a particular institutional context tend to 
imprint prevailing norms into their eco-systems, which are retained well into the 
future. For example, research on semi-conductor firms has shown that the 
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availability of financing options during their founding period produced a lasting 
impact on the firms’ business strategies (Boeker 1989a; Tucker et. al. 1990). 
Similarly, the bureaucratization of older finance agencies in the US has been traced 
to extensive legislation prevailing at that time (Meyer and Brown 1977). A study 
of the Paris Opera shows that the interplay of the institutional conditions prevailing 
at the time of its founding and the cultural entrepreneurship of its founder created 
a lasting impact on its strategic choices with far reaching implications for the 
organization (Johnson 2007). 
Marquis and Huang (2010) examine firms established in different US states and 
show that firms established in states where the regulatory apparatus fostered intra-
organizational coordination were more likely to acquire other firms to exploit their 
previous coordination experience. In a study of four US state governments’ 
decisions to adopt generally accepted accounting principles, Carpenter and Feroz 
(2001, p. 592) attributed the resistance to adopt these principles to various factors 
including the imprinting of institutional context manifested in the persistence of 
their past accounting practices. Research has also highlighted different ways in 
which the institutional context can be imprinted on individuals. For example, the 
broader institutional environment and the organizational culture can leave an 
imprint on individuals in terms of their work habits, beliefs and values (Higgins 
2005; Dokko 2009). Similarly, an unfavourable macro-economic environment 
during the formative years of an individual would tend to make the individual 
conservative in his approach and this attitude can persist in the later years of his 
career (Schoar and  Zuo 2011; Malmendier and Nagel 2011). Research has also 
highlighted the role of internal economic conditions within an organization on 
individual level imprinting (Kacperczyk 2009; Tilcsik 2012). For example, 
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individuals whose careers are shaped during periods of strong finances in the 
organization develop different attitudes towards risk taking and financial decisions 
than those whose careers are formed during times of financial scarcity and such 
differences then tend to persist into the future. 
Some studies have explored how individuals themselves can be a source of 
imprints both on organizational building blocks as well as on other individuals. 
For example, individuals, particularly the first incumbents, may imprint a 
particular position within an organization through their social and educational 
background, experience and skills, leaving a defining stamp that will continue to 
shape the behaviour of future entrants (Burton and Beckman 2007). Similarly, the 
behaviour of individuals themselves within an organization is shaped by their own 
experiences during their initial years that can persist well into the future. Finally, 
individuals within an organization can imprint other individuals as experienced 
incumbents can leave an imprint on the behaviour and attitudes of new entrants 
and such attributes tend to be retained by them in the long term (McEvily et. al. 
2012). 
2.3.2 The drivers of imprinting 
A key feature embodied in the idea of imprinting is the persistence of various 
organizational traits acquired at the time of founding. Hannan and Freeman (1984) 
argue that once organizations adopt specific strategies and practices, it is difficult 
to dismantle these due to the difficulty of reversing investments and structural 
inertia. Simply put, in order to secure reliability and accountability agents repeat 
the same decisions as were made in the past. 
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These ideas have been further developed by organizational ecologists who argue 
that the persistence of various organizational features can be attributed to three 
powerful and complementary forces (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). 
Forces of inertia play a major role in the persistence of organizational imprints by 
locking-in organizational traits. 
The institutionalization of norms, beliefs and practices contributes to the 
persistence and reproduction of organizational imprints. 
Other traditionalizing forces including vested interests may perpetuate the existing 
organizational structures and processes. Furthermore, these forces are not mutually 
exclusive and may either work alone or in tandem to induce persistence of various 
attributes of an organization. 
“Structural inertia” is defined as the persistent resistance of an organization to 
change in response to a changing environment (Hannan and Freeman 1984). 
However, there is no fixed theory that explicitly explains the causes of structural 
inertia. Some of the main historical approaches employed to understand inertia 
include path dependence, imprinting, or commitment with an organization. 
According to Hannan and Freeman (1984), the forces that contribute to structural 
inertia may be internal and/or external to the organization. There are several 
internal factors that can lead to structural inertia in organizations. For example, an 
organization may have incurred sunk costs in its systems, work methods, and 
personnel training which may force the organization to adhere to its original 
structures and processes. Similarly, the dynamics of political coalitions within an 
organization may prevent change in business strategies and modes of operations. 
Another important force that is internal to an organization and contributes to 
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structural inertia is the tendency for established norms, processes and values to 
become normative standards and hence difficult to change. The external factors 
that can lead to structural inertia include regulations that govern the activities of 
an organization, inter-organizational relations, and the threat of losing legitimacy 
in response to radical change. 
A multi-disciplinary literature under the rubric of ‘new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis’ draws on economic, social and cultural explanations for 
the institutionalization and hence persistence of various organizational norms, 
beliefs, strategies, attitudes and routines (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Meyer and 
Rowan (1991) delineate the institutionalization processes through which 
organizational traits and behaviours assume a rule-like status and become 
embedded in social thought and action. Organizations tend to incorporate these 
institutionalized rules in their structures to acquire resources and legitimacy that 
could lead to better chances for their survival. Jepperson (1991, p. 145) views the 
process of institutionalization as a social pattern that has a built-in reproductive 
process that resists change. Seen in this light, institutions can reproduce 
themselves not by action but by ‘self-activating social processes’ that contribute 
to the persistence of organizational characteristics.  
Powell (1991), on the other hand, takes a broader view of institutional reproduction 
and highlights four avenues of institutional reproduction including the exercise of 
power, complex inter-dependencies, taken-for-granted assumptions, and path-
dependent development processes. To elaborate, organizational characteristics 
may persist through the deliberate efforts of individuals who have the power to 
control organizational processes and who have an interest in maintaining the 
system. Organizational routines and processes may also persist due to 
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organizational inter-dependencies that create complex linkages making it difficult 
to change one aspect without disturbing the whole chain. One example of such 
persistence of organizational forms is the reluctance of US automakers to revamp 
their assembly lines even in the face of declining demand for big cars (Powell 
1991). 
Similarly, organizational routines can persist as taken-for-granted rules, which 
become accepted practice. Finally institutional arrangements may become difficult 
to move due to path-dependence that makes such arrangements increasingly viable 
due to increasing returns and positive feedback mechanisms. 
To sum up, a diverse body of literature has explored how the external 
environmental context imprints organizations and how such imprints tend to 
persist over time. Organizations are particularly sensitive to imprints of the 
external environment at the time of founding because they are not saddled by any 
historical baggage and hence are open to the adoption of new forms, practices and 
strategies. The social and institutional context prevailing at the time of founding 
dictates the viability of particular organizational forms and defines the constraints 
and resources that determine operational scope, strategies and capabilities of the 
organizations. As organizations strive to achieve a fit with their external 
environment, they acquire specific attributes that range from organizational 
hardware such as technological apparatus and routines, human resources and 
business methods, right up to the software of the organizations such as norms, 
values, attitudes and beliefs. With the passage of time, such organizational 
characteristics become embedded in the organizational culture and tend to persist 
because of the forces of structural inertia and institutionalization. These insights 
have been applied not only to understand the genesis of organizational forms, 
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structures and attributes in terms of their historical and institutional contexts but 
also to seek plausible explanations for why organizations exhibit a tendency to 
remain locked-in to their past structures, routines and practices despite the 
availability of better options. By using a multi-disciplinary approach that 
incorporates economic, sociological and organizational perspectives, the literature 
on organizational imprinting contributes to a broader understanding of the role of 
historical and institutional factors in shaping organizations. 
2.4 Foundation of the powerful bureaucracy:  
the English leviathan 
Before applying the insights of the organizational imprinting theory to provide a 
factual account of how organizations are conditioned by their past, this section 
traces the colonial roots of the bureaucracy in Pakistan. In tracing the colonial 
origins of the bureaucracy, it is instructive first to explore the type of colonial 
settlement in the Indian sub-continent. The literature on the historical origins of 
institutions has argued that the type of institutions shaped by the colonial rulers 
critically hinged on the extent of European settlement in the colonies which in turn 
was determined by the mortality rates for the settler population (Acemoglu et al. 
2001a; Nunn 2008a). In colonies with low settler mortality and resultantly a larger 
share of settler population, the colonizers had an incentive to establish institutions 
that promoted rule of law and property rights, which underpinned their economic 
development. On the other hand, colonies with high settler mortality and a 
consequently low share of the settlers in the population mainly saw the emergence 
of extractive institutions as the settlers had little incentive to establish growth-
promoting institutions in these colonies. The contexts that led to the foundation of 
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a powerful elitist class of bureaucracy in Sub-Continent are summed up in the 
following. 
India was not an attractive place for European settlers due mainly to the high 
population density and local disease environment such as malaria, which signified 
a high mortality rate for European settlers (Acemoglu et al. 2001b; Arnold 1983). 
Consequently, European settlement in the Indian sub-continent remained sparse 
(there were only 168,000 British in India in 1931, up from 31,000 in 1805 
Maddison 1971) leaving little incentive for colonizers to establish institutions 
conducive to economic development and growth. Furthermore, during the reign of 
the British East India Company, land holdings out of towns were barred which 
effectively discouraged European settlers. As a matter of fact, the East India 
Company was not too keen to attract settlers as it feared that a greater number of 
European settlers would threaten its monopoly rights and other privileges 
including revenue collection (Marshal 1990). With a low degree of European 
settlement combined with its early experience of extraction by the East India 
Company, the Indian sub-continent became a colony of extraction (Acemoglu et 
al. 2001b). The company had monopoly rights in a wide range of products 
including opium, salt, woods, minerals, tobacco, alcohol and betel (Washbrook 
1999). There is more to the story of extraction in the Indian sub-continent which 
then became embedded in the Indian bureaucracy as well. The East India Company 
controlled the land revenue system and had the right to collect revenues through 
direct taxation of the farmers which was frequently revised and raised to extract 
more and more from the poor peasants often pushing them into destitution 
(Washbrook 1999). The company’s right to collect taxes in the states of Bengal, 
Bihar and Orissa alone gave it access to a tax base of 20 million people with annual 
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tax revenue of 3 million pounds (Marshall 1998). India being predominantly a rural 
economy, the extractive practices of the Company adversely impacted the Indian 
economy by squeezing agricultural output (Bayly 1988; Marshall 1998). The 
monopoly rights of the Company, which restricted competition and allowed the 
company to extract monopoly rents, further exacerbated this economic decline. 
With the economy in the doldrums, the local population became increasingly 
rebellious which consequently resulted in the armed struggle of 1857 that uprooted 
the reign of the East India Company and the Indian sub-continent came under the 
direct control of the British crown. 
The British in the Indian sub-continent faced the challenge of governing a vast, 
ethnically diverse, multilingual, and multi-religious population that was often 
rebellious and not easily controlled. The administrative service introduced by the 
East India Company was rudimentary, fragmented and lacked the control 
mechanisms to govern a vast and diverse continent. The Company primarily had 
trade interests and thus showed little concern for broad-based administrative 
functions. 
In order to meet the pressing governance challenges at the time, the British thus 
laid the foundations of a strong and powerful bureaucracy, the Indian Civil Service 
(ICS), which was supposed to provide administrative functions, serve as collector 
of revenues, and maintain law and order. All of this required the vesting of powers 
in the bureaucrats to allow them to effectively control a fractious population and 
extract revenues. Thus, bureaucrats used their absolute powers to collect revenues 
for the British crown and in the process the bureaucrats often indulged in corrupt 
practices to maximize their rents in collaboration with local elites that included big 
landlords and industrialists (Gould 2013; Wilder 2013). So the colonial rulers in 
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the sub-continent sowed the seeds of a powerful, extractive and corrupt 
bureaucracy. Corruption in bureaucracy was further amplified by the Official 
Secrets Act 1923 which aimed to restrict the flow of information between the 
government and the general public. The law was originally designed to protect 
sensitive security related secrets, but it was abused by corrupt officials to cover up 
their corrupt practices (Stocker 2011). The bureaucracy was a cadre based and 
strong hierarchical system dominated by British officers especially in higher 
echelons who wielded immense administrative power and enjoyed various perks 
and privileges, which included palatial bungalows, and membership of exclusive 
clubs. Being representatives of the British crown, the officers had an elitist mind-
set and maintained their exclusiveness by restricting entry of the locals into the 
civil service.  The induction of Indians into the civil service was governed through 
a competitive examination, which meant that only people with good education and 
command over the English language were able to qualify. The examination was 
conducted in English and was designed to maintain significant entry barriers for 
the local population (Cheema and Sayeed 2006). 
Consequently, the few Indians who managed to enter the civil service belonged to 
a small segment of local elites who were highly westernized and owed their 
allegiance to the colonial regime. Despite the induction of Indians into the 
bureaucracy, the civil service remained far from being indigenized and rather 
continued to be elitist and serving the interests of the colonial rule (Cheema and 
Sayeed 2006). These Indians together with their British counterparts constituted a 
powerful, exclusive and elitist class of civil servants, with its own “esprit de corps” 
which dominated the colonial administrative apparatus in the Indian sub-continent 
(Hussain 1979; Islam 1989). 
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The political control of the bureaucracy rested with the Viceroy who was the 
representative of the British Crown in India and who managed administrative 
affairs through provincial governors. The Viceroy and provincial governors 
functioned under the umbrella of an Executive Council. The Viceroy held sway 
over authority in the Council, which was just an endorsing body for decisions 
already taken by the Viceroy and governors (Tinker 1966). 
While the bureaucracy implemented policy directives from the Viceroy, the 
bureaucrats tolerated no other outside influence. Within the vice-regal system, the 
bureaucracy held paramount importance while other domestic factors including 
local politicians were not consulted and thus had no role in administrative matters 
and policies. The civil servants were thus not attuned to working with local 
politicians and tended to govern authoritatively only under the command of the 
British Crown (Ahmad 1964). With Imperial control over politics, and weak local 
political and legislative institutions and interest groups, the bureaucracy faced no 
domestic pressure to uphold and promote the public interest (Kennedy 1987). The 
most important function of the bureaucracy was revenue collection, which 
required effective law and order to create a secure environment for revenue 
collectors who often faced resistance from the local population. Consequently, the 
British established a command system with strong local administrative apparatus 
– known as District Administration – that was meant to quickly and effectively 
deal with law and order situations (Goodnow1964). This powerful administrative 
group was the crème de la crème of the colonial bureaucracy with the 
Collector/Deputy Commissioner at the helm of the district administrative affairs. 
Such was the power of the Collector that he was popularly dubbed as ‘the judge, 
jury and executioner’ (Kenny 2013, p. 11). These local administrators were given 
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absolute powers to deal effectively with local conflicts so that the extractive 
functions of the state were not disrupted (Braibanti 1963). Often these local 
administrators sought the support of local elites to maintain law and order in their 
districts and this resulted in the development of patron-client relationships at the 
local level. 
As a matter of fact, these patron-client relationships were part of a much broader 
strategy of the British to forge alliances with local elites to stabilize and 
consolidate their rule, gather information to mitigate their information 
disadvantages, and facilitate the collection of land revenues. The British relied 
heavily on these relationships especially during the uprising of 1857 when British 
allies among the rural elites helped to quell the uprising. In return for their loyalty, 
the British bestowed favours on such groups in the form of land grants and other 
privileges (Ali and Malik 2009). The bureaucracy played a central role in 
establishing and fostering such relationships and used these as instruments not 
only to leverage their administrative power but also to seek rents in return for their 
favours to the local elites. The alliance of the bureaucracy with the local elites was 
the bedrock of corruption during the colonial regime. The local elites had a long 
tradition of being partners in extractive practices especially during the reign of the 
East India Company when such groups gained immense prosperity by colluding 
and cooperating with the Company in its economic plunder and extraction of land 
revenues (Acemoglu et al. 2001b). The local elites thus had an incentive to 
perpetuate extractive institutions and were willing partners with the bureaucracy 
in corrupt practices. The role of elites in corruption has been particularly 
emphasized in colonial regimes where European settlers were in a minority and 
elites were powerful (Angeles, Kyriakos and Neanidis 2010). 
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The bureaucracy controlled vast segments of the Indian economy. Being 
predominantly an agrarian economy, irrigation played an important role in the 
economic development of the Indian sub-continent. The bureaucracy developed a 
centralized irrigation management system to control the distribution of canal 
water, which was the most valuable and prized resource for the Indian farmers. 
The bureaucratic grip over the irrigation system provided the bureaucracy with a 
powerful tool to control agricultural output and through this the bureaucracy 
exerted an enormous influence on the local landed class and peasants alike. In 
addition to irrigation water, arable land was another precious resource in the Indian 
economy and the bureaucracy had complete control over this resource as well as 
through the system of land grants, transfers, and acquisitions. In an environment 
with weak political oversight and lack of bureaucratic accountability, the control 
over precious resources was a potent instrument in the hands of the bureaucracy to 
maximize rents (Ali and Malik 2009). 
When the British left the sub-continent, they left a powerful legacy in the form of 
colonial bureaucracy that was steeped in authoritative culture and had deep 
influence in the socio-economic spheres. Pakistan inherited this bureaucratic set-
up at the time of independence. As emphasized by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997, 
p. 522), “bygones are seldom bygones”, and so was the case with the bureaucracy 
in Pakistan. 
The newly established Civil Service of Pakistan was mainly carved out of the 
colonial bureaucracy and retained many of the characteristics of the colonial era 
as detailed in the next section. 
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2.5 The bureaucracy in the post-colonial 
period: the institutional change 
At the time of independence, Pakistan established the Civil Service of Pakistan 
that was essentially a descendent of the Indian Civil Service ‘in law as well as in 
spirit’ (Braibanti 1963, p. 389). The civil service was structured and designed 
strictly along the lines of the Indian Civil service with a powerful hierarchical 
system of administration. The Civil Service of Pakistan was just a renamed version 
of the colonial era Indian Civil Service with its form, structure and functional 
characteristics intact (Cheema and Sayeed 2006). During the formative period, 
Muslim Indian Civil Service officers who opted for Pakistan as well as some 
British officers who were hired on contract manned the service. With the 
appointment of three out of four provincial governors from the British officers, 
this bureaucratic apparatus quickly gained the prominence and the status of a 
ruling class. The bureaucracy assumed a powerful position early on as the 
Governor General directly consulted the provincial governors and senior 
secretaries – who were all civil servants – without any political consultations 
(Braibanti 1963; Islam 1989). Though the induction of British civil service officers 
was phased out during the initial years, their elitist and ruling class mind-set 
persisted as the new entrants into the civil service internalized these attributes 
through ‘training and indoctrination’ (Hussain 1979). 
Political institutions during the initial years were very fragile and lacked the broad-
based popular support and clout to effectively govern the fledgling country facing 
myriad socio-economic challenges. The major challenges for the new government 
were the rehabilitation of millions of refugees who migrated to Pakistan, the 
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establishment of an effective system of governance, and revival of the economy. 
The bureaucracy quickly filled the power vacuum left by weak and fragmented 
political institutions and forged an alliance with the powerful feudal class to 
strengthen its administrative rule (Burki 1969). 
As a matter of fact, the stunting of the political institutions during the early years 
has been blamed on powerful bureaucrats who loathed the democratic institutions 
and thus actively worked to weaken the political process (Ganguly and Fair 2013). 
Once accustomed to power, bureaucrats tend to use discretion in their decisions 
and governing relationships. As Wood and Waterman (1994, p. 231) put it 
“Bureaucracies also have powers in their own right, and sometimes use that power 
to alter outcomes in their relations with other actors”. This use of bureaucratic 
discretion translates the bureaucrats’ preferences into economic policies. 
In the absence of a strong middle class and effective political checks and balances 
on bureaucratic rule, this axis of power was the predominant and authoritative 
force that ruled Pakistan (Alavi 1973). Soon after independence, the army came to 
the centre stage of politics and found the bureaucratic-feudal nexus as a convenient 
partner in extending its rule over the country. With its control over a highly 
centralized administrative apparatus, the bureaucracy played a central role in this 
triumvirate structure of power with most decisions of public policy made by senior 
bureaucrats and military officials (Islam 1989). During most of the early and 
subsequent military rules, the bureaucracy remained a powerful player and the 
‘bureaucratic-military oligarchy’ largely controlled the policy-making process. 
The bureaucratic-military nexus also strived to undermine political development 
to perpetuate their power and rule (Haque 1997). The bureaucratic control over 
policy and administrative functions was further strengthened by three factors 
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(Cheema and Sayeed 2006). First, the bureaucracy effectively strived to gain 
autonomy through constitutional protection in 1962, which insulated the 
bureaucracy from political control, and consequently the bureaucracy had virtually 
a free hand in policy formulation and implementation. Bureaucratic autonomy may 
be desirable when bureaucracy plays by the rules but the politicians often have 
narrow and personal interests. However, if the bureaucracy is powerful and is 
prone to abuse of authority, then bureaucratic autonomy can lead to undesirable 
outcomes (Cheema and Sayeed 2006). The power of the bureaucracy was further 
reinforced by the introduction of the system of ‘Basic Democracies’, which gave 
greater control to the bureaucrats over the local political actors. Second, the 
bureaucracy was at the centre of the interventionist model of development 
followed in the early years and this gave the bureaucracy a large sway on the 
economy and enabled the bureaucrats to maximize their rents (Nadvi and Saeed 
2003). Third, the bureaucracy developed interlocking ties, based on mutual 
interests and favours, with domestic elite groups including leading business houses 
and feudal landlords, and devised policies to protect their interests without any fear 
because all the powerful actors had a stake in perpetuating this system. For 
example, wealthy and influential individuals are allied in a network based on 
mutual favours and corruption, and then the threat of exposure compels them to 
perpetuate their influence and power (Rose-Ackerman 1996). 
The bureaucracy retained its predominance even during political regimes, which 
were often marred by political instability and hence needed the support of a strong 
administrative apparatus to deal with the challenges of governance. As Wilder 
(2009) illustrates, Pakistan’s bureaucratic institutions have been much stronger 
than its political institutions ever since its independence from the colonial regime. 
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During the early years of political government in Pakistan, there were no clearly 
defined policy guidelines from the political leadership and hence the bureaucracy 
autonomously took policy decisions thus retaining its colonial mode of 
administration i.e. policy formulation and execution without political control and 
oversight (Cheema and Sayeed 2006). In a weak, unstable and fragmented political 
structure, politicians tend to lack long-term goals and rather have shorter time 
horizons, focused on maximizing their short-term gains (Rose-Ackerman 1996). 
The bureaucracy remained at the centre of power even during the democratic 
regimes when the political institutions were somewhat consolidated, not least 
because the bureaucrats were able to leverage their specialized administrative 
knowledge combined in many cases with their professional expertise to hold sway 
over politicians especially in the public policy arena (Haque 1997). It is thus not 
surprising that observers have generally recognized that in Pakistan, the 
bureaucracy, thanks to ineffective legislative control over policy making has 
assumed the roles of both policy formulation and implementation (Shafqat 2014). 
A hallmark of the bureaucracy during both dictatorial and democratic regimes has 
been its ability to develop strong linkages both with the ruling elite and other 
powerful segments of the society including big businesses and landed aristocracy. 
While such alliances during dictatorships naturally arose out of the necessity of 
the dictatorial regimes to consolidate their rule without significant opposition from 
the bureaucracy and the civil society, even the democratic set-ups saw the 
emergence of such alliances thanks to political coalitions that bestowed privileges 
on special interest groups including industrialists and big landlords (Ali and Malik 
2009).  
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In this network of power, politics, and privileges, the bureaucrats and politicians 
drew their power from their regulatory control over the economy and public policy 
while elites held control over productive assets. This system of mutual interests 
and favours ensured that economic policy was geared towards protecting the 
interests of the big businesses who in return provided support and favours to the 
ruling elite and bureaucracy (Ali and Malik 2009). 
Nothing describes the lingering colonial legacy of power and privileges of the 
bureaucracy more vividly than the case of the District Management Group (DMG), 
an elite and prestigious cadre of civil service that provides administrative functions 
at the local level. This group is the direct descendant of the district level 
administrative apparatus established by the British in the sub-continent under the 
umbrella of the Indian Civil Service. As in the colonial era, the group enjoys 
immense power through its control over instruments of law and order and 
collection of local level revenues. Among all the civil servants, members of this 
group enjoy a special status and are the so-called Brahmins of the bureaucracy 
with their clout extending deep in the society. Given its immense power and 
prestige, it is not surprising that the group remains as one of the most favoured 
choices for the new entrants in the civil service (Khan and Din 2008). 
To sum up, Pakistan inherited a civil service that had its roots in the colonial period 
during which the British established a powerful and elite administrative 
organization meant to rule, ensure political stability and extract revenues in an 
environment that was devoid of electoral representation and parliamentary 
oversight. The bureaucrats enjoyed immense power and drew support from a 
coalition of landed aristocracy and other elite groups to develop a system of mutual 
rewards in the form of perks and privileges for the bureaucrats and patronage to 
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the elite in the form of grants and land titles. The colonial rule therefore put in 
place a strong bureaucratic system that thrived on patron-client relationships and 
rent seeking. This institutionalization of power and rent seeking behaviour 
continued in the post-independence period when the bureaucracy developed new 
patron-client relationships with powerful industrial groups and landlords (Wilder 
2013). Since political institutions were not developed, the bureaucracy remained 
the key player in economic decision-making and bureaucrats enacted policies 
without any fear of accountability. Despite a change in the socio-economic context 
and institutional environment, this set up has continued to this day and bureaucracy 
in Pakistan retains the status of a ruling class and a symbol of power and social 
status geared more towards consolidation of its power, perks and privileges rather 
than the delivery of an effective public service (Kardar 2006). 
While the case of Pakistan’s bureaucracy illustrates how colonial legacy carried 
its imprints, similar experiences have been documented in other former colonies 
as well. For example, both Zambia and Mozambique inherited bureaucratic 
institutions that carried the imprints of their former colonial rulers (Nkomo 1986).  
In Zambia, for instance, the professional training of officers in routine 
administrative matters was designed in line with the colonial administrative 
practices, which ensured continuity of colonial administrative systems. Such 
administrative systems relied on colonial practices to rule by power but these were 
inappropriate for development purposes. Similarly, bureaucracy in Bangladesh is 
viewed as a carrier of British legacy with poor public service delivery, inefficiency 
and lack of accountability and transparency (Ferdous 2016). These examples 
suggest that there is sufficient objective reason to argue that colonial legacy has 
tended to persist through the process of imprinting. The next section thus details 
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how imprinting works to perpetuate the colonial legacy of the bureaucratic 
organization, focusing on Pakistan as a case study.  
2.6 The traditionalizing forces that kept the 
imprints in place 
The preceding sections have provided a historical perspective on the evolution of 
the bureaucracy focusing in particular on the colonial heritage and subsequent 
developments that played a significant role in shaping the bureaucratic 
organization.  This section situates the historical evolution of the bureaucracy 
within the theory of organizational imprinting with a view to understanding, first, 
how the environmental conditions imprinted specific traits on the bureaucracy. 
Second, it explores the question of why the imprints of various attributes acquired 
by the bureaucracy during its founding period have persisted over time. In 
particular, it focuses on how forces of structural inertia and institutionalization can 
explain the persistence of various traits of the bureaucracy including its ruling class 
and elitist orientation, culture of rent seeking, structure and routines, patron-client 
relationships as a mode of governance, and economic policy stance. 
2.6.1 The cadre based structure of the 
bureaucracy 
As already discussed in the section 2.3, the importance of external environment in 
shaping the characteristics of organizations during a ‘sensitive period’ when an 
organization is stamped with the imprints of its environment. The founding period 
is usually taken to be a particularly sensitive time during which an organization is 
more open, malleable and receptive to adopting specific structures in line with the 
demands of the external environment. During this period, an organization is 
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particularly susceptible to external environment because it has no historical 
baggage and hence can easily adopt new structures and strategies that match the 
environmental context. Marquis and Tilcsik (2013, p. 205) characterize the 
external environment as a “richly textured, multi-faceted space, rather than a 
homogenous, one-dimensional force.” 
Building on the same premises, the external environment during the sensitive 
period shaped the characteristics of the colonial bureaucracy. The sensitive period 
starts at the founding of the Indian Civil Service after the British crown formally 
gained control from the East India Company in the aftermath of the armed struggle 
of 1857. As described in the Section 2.4, the British were facing enormous 
challenges of governance in an environment characterized by a sagging economy, 
a hostile population, and the rubble left by the armed struggle. Consequently, the 
colonial regime needed a powerful organization that could effectively deal with 
the challenges of law and order and thus help strengthen its rule while at the same 
time ensuring smooth collection of revenues. Against this backdrop, the British 
established a powerful and highly centralized bureaucracy – an imprint of the 
environment – that was mandated to exercise its administrative power to protect 
colonial interests. The cadre based structure of the bureaucracy was designed to 
provide an effective centre of governing power that could perform complex 
administrative tasks in multiple arenas ranging from local administration to 
economic management and from social services to the provision of physical 
infrastructure. This structure of the bureaucratic organization is consistent with the 
view that organizations tend to incorporate the complexity of their environment 
into their own structures, which reflect a greater level of administrative complexity 
(Scott 1991). 
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2.6.2 Ruling class and elitist culture 
Another trait that the bureaucracy acquired at the time of its founding was the 
ruling class and elitist culture which shaped bureaucratic attitudes and power 
relations both within and outside the organization. In the absence of effective 
political institutions, the bureaucracy was the sole centre of power that governed 
without any challenge to its authority. Fligstein (1991) observes that organizations 
are shaped by the institutional contexts in which they operate and one aspect of 
this institutional context is their relation with the state, which is supposed to 
specify the rules of the game for the organization. According to Fligstein (1991, p.  
314), “the state is a set of formal organizations that interacts in much the same way 
as other organizations.” In this sense, though bureaucracy is an organization of the 
state, it interacts with other state organizations, which set the rules for it. 
However, in the context of colonial bureaucracy the state was the imperial 
government, which wanted the bureaucracy to have absolute authority to 
strengthen the colonial rule. So the bureaucracy was moulded by design as a 
powerful organization singularly controlling all administrative functions including 
the formulation and implementation of public policies. Hofstede (1985) 
emphasizes that organizations tend to embed the values and norms of their 
founders into their routines and cultures. Seen from this perspective, the British 
being the colonial power had a ruling class and elitist orientation and consequently 
the bureaucracy was infused with a ruling class and elitist ethos mirroring the 
norms and values of its founders. The ruling class and elitist character of the 
bureaucracy had a direct bearing on bureaucratic attitudes and modes of 
administration reflected in its aloofness from local society including local political 
actors and its authoritative style of governance.  
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Not surprisingly, the locals viewed the Civil Service Officers as a breed apart and 
popularly referred to them as Mai-Bap or mother-father because of the latter’s high 
social status and power (Kenny 2013). 
2.6.3 Networks of power and patronage 
As emphasized by DiMaggio and Powell (1991b), organizations tend to achieve a 
fit with their institutional environment to deal effectively with their functional 
responsibilities. During the colonial rule, the bureaucracy became a powerful 
ruling class because of weak domestic political institutions that left a power 
vacuum, which was naturally filled by the imperial bureaucracy. With fragmented 
political power, the institutional environment immediately after independence 
simply reinforced the bureaucracy as a powerful player. The lack of populist 
pressure helped the bureaucracy to retain its colonial status of a ruling class that 
governed authoritatively without any accountability especially from domestic 
political actors (Cheema and Sayeed 2006). 
While the environmental context ensured the continuity of the bureaucracy as a 
powerful organization, the bureaucracy subsequently strived to perpetuate its 
power through forging alliances with other centres of power or through efforts to 
constrain the political authority (Cheema and Sayeed 2006). This behaviour seems 
consistent with the new institutionalisms’ arguments that once an organization 
gains a position to assert its control, it invariably strives to expand its jurisdiction, 
and agents who stand to gain from such a system of power will tend to invest effort 
in maintaining their dominance (Powell 1991). Moreover, dominant organizations 
within an organizational field tend to continuously pursue strategies to maintain 
their power (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). Powerful organizations can even go to 
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the extent of attempting to influence their environmental context through moulding 
their relational networks so as to make them conform to their objectives as well as 
through attempts to gain social acceptance of their goals and purposes as 
institutional rules (Meyer and Rowan 1991). Viewed from this perspective, the 
persistence of the powerful bureaucracy and its dominance in the axis of power 
can also be seen as emerging from the elaborate efforts of the bureaucracy to shape 
its relations with political institutions and civil society in a way that relevant actors 
take the distribution of power as an accepted mode of governance. As discussed in 
the previous section, the bureaucracy formed patron-client relationships with the 
ruling elite to maintain its power. Also, it effectively worked to limit political 
authority over its functions. For example, it succeeded in gaining autonomy 
through constitutional protection in 1962, which gave it a free hand in policy 
formulation and implementation without political oversight. 
Besides the bureaucracy’s strategies to perpetuate its influence and power in the 
organizational field, forces of institutionalization and inertia can also sustain 
bureaucratic power. Organizations tend to persist with patterns of authority that, 
with the passage of time, achieve the status of ‘objective social fact’, which lends 
social acceptance and legitimacy to the existing power relations (Boeker 1989b; 
Zucker 1991, p. 83). Furthermore, forces of inertia also contribute to the 
persistence of the authoritative bureaucratic apparatus. Organizational patterns of 
authority exhibit strong inertia because they are systems of power sustained by the 
interests of key actors in the status quo which confers benefits to those who wield 
power and control resources of the organization (Fligstein 1991). The power of 
bureaucracy means a certain scope; structure and purpose in terms of the 
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bureaucratic control on policies and programs, and those controlling powers have 
a vested interest in perpetuating the system. 
The forces of inertia can also help explain the persistence of patron-client 
relationships, which formed the backbone of the governance strategy, adopted by 
the British and the same mode of governance continued after independence. The 
key insight here is that organizations learn from their experience and become 
committed to arrangements that result from early successes (Powell 1991). 
Developing patron-client relationships was an effective and successful strategy for 
the British to govern a vast empire with a thinly stretched bureaucracy. The support 
provided by the local elites was necessary for the colonial rulers not only to 
strengthen their rule but also to gain legitimacy in society. After independence, 
learning from the organizational memory, (see Walsh and Ungson 1991 for a 
detailed treatment of the notion of organizational memory) the bureaucracy forged 
new alliances with feudal landlords and industrialists thus retaining the patron-
client relationships as a mode of governance. Another reason for the persistence 
of such arrangements is the presence of vested interests that benefit from the 
system and hence strive to perpetuate it (Powell 1991). The patron-client 
relationships created stakeholders in the bureaucracy and expanded their links with 
influential businesses to actively work to consolidate the system. 
Institutional theorists have highlighted the acquisition of organizational structures 
and models by organizational actors that are thought to be appropriate or rational 
within a given environmental context (Scott 1991). Viewed in this light, the model 
of governance through patron client relationships can be seen as a deliberate 
strategy of the colonial regime to consolidate its rule. More specifically, the 
colonial regime in the sub-continent critically needed the support of the local 
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population to effectively govern a geographically expansive and culturally diverse 
country. Local elites who had considerable influence in the society through their 
control over the means of production were natural allies. Being the operational arm 
of the colonial regime, the bureaucracy was at the forefront of developing such 
alliances to protect colonial interests. This mode of governance inevitably resulted 
in a culture of rent-seeking – another imprint of the environment – as the players 
involved in the alliance tended to maximize their mutual benefits. It is important 
to emphasize here that rent-seeking and corruption, though entrenched in the 
bureaucratic culture, may simply have been an unintended consequence of a 
particular mode of governance necessitated by the given environmental context. 
2.6.4 The persistence of policy stances 
The economic environment at the time of founding is believed to strongly 
influence various organizational attributes including operational scope, 
management principles and business strategies (Carroll and Hannan 1989; 
Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). In the case of colonial bureaucracy, the economic 
environment was a critical factor in determining what type of economic policies 
and programs were needed to administer the economy. Though the monopoly 
rights of the East India Company were phased out in 1833, the key commercial 
and business interests remained in the control of foreigners and the British regime 
protected these through regulatory measures thus exhibiting an interventionist 
model of economic management. On the other hand, the British regime had a 
development orientation too as far as it protected its economic and other interests 
(Maddison 1971). It is well known that the British developed a vast network of 
railways and an irrigation system in the sub-continent, which were a boon for the 
local economy. 
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Consequently, the economic policy paradigm, which the bureaucracy adopted, was 
one of state-led development with extensive intervention in the economy to 
maintain monopolistic domination of the foreign owned business interests. 
A defining characteristic of the historical imprints is their persistence over time 
despite changes in environmental conditions (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). Since the 
independence of Pakistan from British rule, the socio-economic and political 
landscape has undergone considerable changes, but the bureaucracy, which 
Pakistan inherited from the colonial rule, has defied change and has retained many 
of the characteristics of the colonial era including power and privileges of the 
bureaucrats, a culture of elitism, and distrust of politicians. As Habib (1973, p. 
117) notes: 
“Apart from being unequal, authoritarian and unscientific and an instrument of 
colonial rule, the administrative system in Pakistan has doggedly defied the winds 
of change and in the process has earned a nation-wide disgust and dislike. It has 
blighted creative and professional talent everywhere and has vitiated the 
educational system. It has hindered the founding and flowering of democracy and 
people's sovereignty”. 
Describing the characteristics of the bureaucracy in Pakistan during the same 
period, Ziring and LaPorte (1974, p. 196) observes: 
“The higher or elite bureaucracy in Pakistan held enormous power and enjoyed 
exceptional privilege. Their contempt for the politicians and their paternal 
management of the public produced the abrasive reactions that characterized 
Pakistan government”. 
Besides the persistence of authoritative rule and power and privileges of the 
bureaucrats, the bureaucracy continues to display other colonial era characteristics 
including interventionist economic policies and rent-seeking. At the time of 
independence, Pakistan inherited an economy that was dominated by feudal 
landlords and a few powerful industrial magnates who became allies of the 
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bureaucracy to gain preferential treatment in economic policies in return for their 
favours to the bureaucrats. Consequently, economic policies were mainly aimed at 
protecting the interests of the landlords and industrialists. For example, 
agricultural income was exempted from income tax and this exemption continues 
to this day. Similarly, the industrialists were protected from internal and external 
competition through a plethora of licences and regulatory instruments that 
suppressed market development and created rent- 
seeking opportunities (Ali and Malik 2009; Husain 1999). Some policies were 
directly aimed at maximizing rents by the bureaucratic and industrialist alliance. 
For example, industrialists were allowed accelerated depreciation allowances with 
high tariff walls that enabled them to reap super profits at the cost of consumer 
welfare. Similarly import licences allowed the holders of the licences to earn 
monopoly rents (Husain 1999). Though the economic environment, including 
economic policies, has changed considerably since then, the culture of rent-
seeking still pervades the bureaucracy as well as the industrial elites. To be sure, 
economic policies have seen some re-orientation towards deregulation but the state 
continues to have a large footprint in the economy reflecting a continuing 
interventionist bias in economic policies (Haque and Din 2006; Kardar 2006). 
A similar reasoning can be applied to explain the persistence of interventionist 
economic policies and the state-led model of development of the colonial era. The 
initial impetus for the continuation of the public sector-led model of development 
was provided by huge development challenges at the time of independence, which 
meant a significant role for the public sector in the economy. At the same time, 
with the limited presence of the private sector, the public sector expanded its role 
in the economy through direct involvement in productive activities as well as 
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through interventionist policies purportedly to regulate the market and address 
market failures. As a result, bureaucratic intervention in the economy has persisted 
despite changes in the economic environment reflected in a reasonable state of 
physical infrastructure, a well-diversified economy, and a growing private sector 
(Kardar 2006; Haque and Din 2006). 
This persistence of an economic policy paradigm can be explained by two key 
factors. 
First, a particular policy stance that becomes a shared belief and hence 
institutionalized can be reproduced because the individuals may not ‘conceive of 
appropriate alternatives’ or the available alternatives may simply be considered as 
improper (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Bureaucrats may thus perceive 
interventionist economic policies as the most appropriate mode of managing the 
economy and consider other policy options as unsuitable. Kardar (2006) observes 
that the bureaucrats prefer interventionist policies not only because of certainty of 
command but also because of their distrust of markets underpinned by their belief 
that the state is more knowledgeable and that markets are imperfect and thus 
require the regulatory hand of the state. 
Second, powerful vested interests who stand to gain from specific policies and 
programs tend to expend significant efforts to perpetuate such policies (Powell 
1991).  In this context, since public intervention in the economy entails rent-
seeking opportunities, bureaucrats have an incentive to maintain the interventionist 
policy stance to maximize their rents. Interventionist economic policies are 
instruments in the hands of the bureaucrats to affect the playing field for private 
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businesses to seek rents. Indeed, the rent-seeking motive partly explains the still 
pervasive role of the state in the economy (Kardar 2006). 
Strictly speaking, policy formulation is typically considered to be the prerogative 
of the politicians and the bureaucracy is supposed to implement policies set by the 
political actors. So how can the bureaucracy be responsible for the persistence of 
economic policies when the politicians may simply dictate such policies? To see 
this, recall from the arguments made above that the bureaucracy is a dominant 
player in the axis of power, which is manifested in its influence and control over 
the process of policy formulation as well. Notwithstanding this, the ability of the 
bureaucracy to independently determine policy choices can also be seen in the light 
of the observation that organizations are often able to develop a logic of their own 
and may pursue their own specific policies and goals which may neither be aligned 
with the goals of other groups nor reflect the distribution of power in the larger 
society. Institutional policies may thus be driven more by the logic of the 
organization itself rather than the interests of the external groups (Brint and 
Karabel 1991, p.  352). Accordingly given the bureaucracy’s sway over 
policymaking, its predilections towards a particular policy stance do matter for the 
perpetuation of such policies over time. There are other factors, which can provide 
a leading role to the bureaucracy in policy making. For example, both politicians 
and bureaucrats may have interlocking interests in specific policies. Thus in the 
case of interventionist policies, for instance, both actors may have an interest in 
perpetuating such policies because of rent seeking opportunities (Cheema and 
Sayeed 2006). 
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2.6.5 Persistence of corruption 
In their seminal work, Becker and Stigler (1974) laid the micro-economic 
foundations of corrupt behaviour by emphasizing the role of rents, risk of detection 
and reporting and gains associated with corrupt practices. More recent work has 
greatly expanded the scope of research on corruption and the key themes of this 
research include the role of corruption in economic development, mechanisms to 
fight corruption including legal framework, and policy analysis (See, for example, 
Anderson and Gray 2007; Baltaci and Yilmaz 2006; Heineman and Heimann 
2006; Schatz 2012, 2013;  Schutte 2012; Asthana 2012). By and large there is a 
consensus that corruption not only adversely impacts static efficiency but also 
hurts long-term investment and growth by diverting resources away from 
productive uses to support the private consumption of the corrupt individuals 
(Bardhan 1997). A number of approaches have been highlighted to combat the 
menace of corruption including legal and regulatory reforms (Anderson and Gray 
2007), internal control and audit in public sector organizations (Baltaci and Yilmaz 
2006), compliance with international treaties to deal with corruption (Heineman 
and Heimann 2006), and political will in the implementation of anti-corruption 
policies (Brinkerhoff 2000). 
Recent policy oriented research on corruption builds on detailed case studies to 
identify effective mechanisms to combat corruption. It is argued that anti-
corruption programs especially in developing countries must focus on 
administrative oversight, transparency, and involvement of civil society in the 
fight against corruption. The role of civil society to fight corruption in public 
administration is particularly important as it can lead to social accountability 
through involvement of citizens (Schatz 2013;  Schutte 2012). However, social 
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accountability can be sustained only through electoral accountability and thus 
there is a need also to strengthen democratic governance (Schatz 2013). Another 
important initiative to control corruption in the public sector is decentralization of 
powers from central government to provincial and local levels. However, 
experience shows that decentralization may initially lead to more corruption but 
once decentralization takes hold with the passage of time corruption is 
significantly reduced (Asthana 2012). It is important to emphasize here that while 
the case studies provide practical and policy-relevant guidelines there is a need to 
explore how the policy prescriptions can be adjusted duly taking into account the 
diverse institutional backgrounds of developing economies. 
Furthermore, corruption in organizations may emerge possibly as an (un) intended 
consequence of historical and institutional factors as emphasized by the theory of 
organizational imprinting. As elaborated in the preceding sections, the culture of 
rent-seeking and corruption is another colonial era imprint on the bureaucracy that 
has persisted until now. In this context, corruption is viewed as a behavioural trait 
that is hardwired in the bureaucracy and is shaped by the institutional environment 
in which the bureaucracy operates. 
Several factors can help to explain the persistence of corruption. 
First, bureaucratic power can be an important factor in the prevalence of corruption 
as powerful bureaucrats can use their control over public policies and resources as 
instruments of rent-seeking9. It is plausible then to argue that as long as bureaucrats 

ͻThere is considerable empirical evidence that power contributes to corruption, whether it is 
corruption by powerful political elites or malfeasance by close-knit power structures such as local 
governments. See, for example, Gerring and Thacker (2004). 
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have powers, there will be room for abuse of power and corruption will tend to 
persist (Toerell 2007). 
Second, corruption as a social behaviour may tend to persist through forces of 
institutionalization. Once corruption becomes a shared norm in the organization 
(for example a shared norm among coalitions of corrupt bureaucrats), it has the 
tendency to become an institutionalized act or what Zucker (1991) refers to as 
“socially constructed reality” which is resistant to change because it is viewed as 
an objective and external fact assuming a taken-for-granted character. 
Third, interest groups who have a stake in the system tend to actively block efforts 
to change the system to maintain their benefits that accrue through their corrupt 
practices (Brint and Karabel 1991). 
Finally, aside from institutional reasons, there are mechanisms that can make 
corruption self-reinforcing and hence persistent over time (Aidt 2003). 
For example, the more corrupt individuals there are in an organization the more 
incentive there is for an individual to engage in corruption, because it may be 
harder to catch corrupt officials in an environment where corruption is endemic. 
Moreover, corrupt individuals tend to work together in networks (Nielsen 2003), 
which attract other individuals to join the club because of network externalities 
that make it easier for them to engage in corrupt practices. Also, the reward to rent 
seeking relative to entrepreneurial activities is higher in situations where a 
majority of individuals are engaged in rent seeking from entrepreneurial activities 
and this lures more individuals to indulge in corrupt practices. The underlying 
mechanism here is the allocation of talent between rent-seeking and productive 
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activities. If the relative rewards for rent seeking are higher more talent will be 
allocated to rent-seeking activities (Acemoglu 1995). 
2.6.6 Rigid hierarchal structure 
This section describes the persistence of the colonial era structure of a cadre based 
bureaucratic apparatus in Pakistan. More specifically, this section critically 
discusses the impact of rigid hierarchical system prevalent in the bureaucracy 
taking into account the statutory distribution of powers across different layers of 
bureaucratic organization.  
As mentioned before, the Civil Service of Pakistan, an offshoot of the colonial 
Indian Civil Service, was established at a time when Pakistan was facing pressing 
challenges of governance amidst the turmoil following independence from the 
British rule. The inherited structure of colonial bureaucracy was useful to provide 
administrative functions in a turbulent situation. As Carroll and Hannan (2004, p. 
64) have put it, “changing a core feature exposes an organization to great risk of 
mortality”, altering the structure of bureaucracy was too risky in those challenging 
times. Moreover, organizations tend to cling to their existing structures because of 
familiarity with the mode of operations and habituation through accumulated 
experience. As a result, design of organizational building blocks that are in 
lockstep with specific organizational structure, imply high switching costs for 
changing the form and structure of an organization (Powell 1991). 
In addition, the bureaucracy was staffed by former Indian Civil Service officials 
who were attuned to working in a powerful hierarchy and hence were naturally 
averse to changing the structure of the bureaucracy. With the passage of time, the 
cadre-based structure of bureaucracy became a standard along with the work 
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routines and administrative procedures, thus making the whole system resilient 
and averse to change. One may argue that the colonial era bureaucratic structure 
may have persisted just because it provided an efficient system of governance. 
This argument, however, does not hold much ground on closer scrutiny. The cadre-
based structure introduces a wedge between various functional groups in terms of 
relative power, professional expertise, perks and privileges, and horizontal 
mobility of the staff, all to the detriment of equality of opportunity and upward 
mobility of professionals. Take, for example, the District Management Group 
(DMG), which enjoys a coveted status in the civil bureaucracy because of its 
powers and prestige. The possession of status and power allows organizational 
coalitions to actively pursue their interests and acquire resources to maintain their 
status and privileges in the future (Salancik and Pfeffer 1977). 
This group dominates the top jobs in the bureaucratic hierarchy and members of 
this group enjoy faster career progression while bureaucrats in other cadres 
stagnate (Kardar 2006). The superior treatment of one cadre to the disadvantage 
of others vitiates the administrative environment with inter-cadre rivalries that 
affect the performance of the bureaucrats. It is precisely because of these problems 
in the cadre-based system that one of the earliest reports on civil service reforms 
recommended the unification of all cadres in the civil service (Islam 1989). R. 
Egger prepared the report in 1953 under the auspices of the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), but it was not implemented because of 
strong opposition from the bureaucracy (Islam 1989). 
Furthermore, organizations are composed of individuals who form a cohort, which 
is not fixed over time because of the continuous turnover of employees as new 
employees replace the older ones. In this scenario, a key mechanism for the 
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persistence of organizational imprints is the inter-generational transmission of 
institutionalized rules norms, values, and attitudes within an organization. How 
does this process happen? How do new employees adopt the norms, values and 
attitudes of their predecessors? The first point to note here is that the transmission 
of rules and acts across individuals depends on the degree of institutionalization 
which determines the extent to which the rules or acts are unique to the individual 
or are objective facts that can be transferred to other individuals. As a matter of 
fact, the two mechanisms are interlinked and reinforce each other: the higher the 
degree of institutionalization the easier is the transmission; and the more effective 
the transmission, the more will be the degree of institutionalization (Zucker 1991). 
The rules or acts that are highly institutionalized can easily be transmitted across 
individuals as the transmitting individual can simply communicate the 
institutionalized rules as objective facts and the receiving individual takes them as 
an accurate depiction of the objective fact. Similarly, acts performed by an 
individual occupying an office are by definition institutionalized and are taken as 
facts-of-life. When an individual occupies a post s/he tends to view actions as 
objective and as continuing over time across different holders of the post. 
Moreover, a post enhances the inter-subjective knowledge of appropriate action 
thus ensuring continuity of action across different holders of the position. Even if 
the organizational traits are not highly institutionalized, some degree of 
transmission across individuals is still possible through individual influence. These 
transmission mechanisms thus ensure that the imprints are carried across 
overlapping cohorts of employees who vary over a period of time. 
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2.7  Bygones are seldom bygones: discussion 
and some remarks  
In this section we summarize the key insights we gained from this exploratory 
analysis. 
Bureaucracies in many countries around the world are synonymous with 
inefficiencies and incompetence with bureaucratic actors striving to protect their 
own interests often at the expense of quality of governance and efficacy of public 
policies. Moreover, bureaucracies often fail to adapt to changing circumstances, 
and efforts to reform are frequently met with strong resistance from vested 
interests who have a stake in perpetuating the system.   
Against this backdrop, taking the bureaucracy in Pakistan as a case study and using 
the theory of organizational imprinting as a framework of analysis, this chapter 
has explored how the institutional context, mainly the economic environment and 
founders’ inclinations, shaped the bureaucratic structure, mode of governance and 
economic policies.  
Second, it has identified the underlying constraints and incentives that have 
contributed to the persistence of bureaucratic features particularly bureaucratic 
power and corruption. 
An attempt has also been made to show that the historical and institutional context 
prevailing at the time of founding of the bureaucracy left several imprints in terms 
of its structure and power, culture of rent-seeking, patron-client relationships as a 
mode of governance, and interventionist economic policies. Given the pressing 
governance challenges at the time, the colonial regime needed a powerful 
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organization that could ensure internal security and stability for the smooth 
collection of revenues.  
The cadre-based structure of the bureaucracy was thus designed to provide an 
effective centre of governing power that could perform complex administrative 
tasks. In addition, the patron-client relationships with local elites proved a 
convenient mode of governance to consolidate colonial rule, and such 
relationships inevitably spawned a culture of rent-seeking. Moreover, the model 
of development and interventionist policies led by the public sector and pursued 
by the bureaucracy were dictated by the prevailing economic environment 
characterized by an under-developed economy and a dominance of foreign owned 
monopolies, both of which meant a dominant role of the state in the economy 
including the protection of monopolies through extensive regulation. 
Once the bureaucracy acquired specific traits in line with the dictates of the 
environment, forces of inertia and institutionalization came into play and they 
contributed to their persistence over time. Accustomed to power and an 
authoritative style of governance, the bureaucracy strived to perpetuate its power 
through either forging alliances with other centres of power or through efforts to 
undermine the political process. Once a pattern of authority was established, it 
gained social acceptance and legitimacy through the institutionalization of power 
relations, and consequently the bureaucracy remained a dominant player with 
significant power over administrative functions including the design and 
implementation of economic policies and programs.  
The bureaucratic power also gave rise to rent-seeking as powerful actors used their 
control over policies and resources as instruments of rent-seeking. As a social 
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behaviour, corruption showed a tendency to become institutionalized as a shared 
norm and an objective and external fact, which is resistant to change. Corruption 
also thrived as the bureaucracy, learning from the organizational memory, 
continued with the patron-client relationships as a mode of governance based on 
its success in the colonial era. Similarly, the inclination towards a state-led model 
of development and interventionist economic policies persisted as a shared belief 
reinforced by powerful vested interests that stood to gain from such policies and 
programs which offered possibilities for rent-seeking. 
Furthermore, imprinting can work at various levels of organization. For example, 
administrative procedures, rules of conduct and regulatory policies can all be 
determined by initial conditions and may persist over time. To this day, Pakistan’s 
bureaucracy follows the same practice of evaluating officials’ performance 
through annual confidential reports that was in vogue during the colonial period.  
However, it needs to be emphasized that imprinting implies persistence and not 
permanence; and that imprinting of certain bureaucratic attributes does not imply 
that bureaucratic reforms are impossible. For bureaucratic reforms to be 
successful, a strong political will is needed along with the adoption of mechanisms 
and incentives that can unleash forces of change from within the bureaucracy. Such 
mechanisms may include modern training programs for officials at all levels of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy, a competitive compensation package for bureaucrats to 
attract the best talent, and adoption of modern monitoring and evaluation systems. 
A sustained effort to reform and modernize the bureaucracy can help in breaking 
away from the past and in setting up an organization that adapts to changing 
environments. However, such reform efforts must be informed by a complete 
understanding of underlying factors that give rise to imprinting in the first place. 
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The greatest challenge to current and future reform efforts will be dismantling 
‘rules of the game’ that past imprints have preserved as a colonial legacy.  
To sum up, the study has broadly surveyed the historical mechanisms and 
processes and to identified their effects on the contemporary structures, strategies 
and technologies of the bureaucratic organization. The case study of bureaucracy 
in Pakistan, a descendent of the British colonial era civil service in India, provided 
a means for an in-depth examination of the processes and mechanisms underlying 
the persistence of specific attributes in bureaucratic organisations. The study has 
identified the triggers of bureaucratic rigidity with the help of the experience of 
Pakistani bureaucracy, which has not essentially changed since its inception. The 
study has also provided an account of how certain practices during the colonial era 
of the Indian subcontinent led to unintended consequences in the form of 
bureaucratic power, corruption and control over economic policies after changes 
in the external environment (post-independence).  
The analysis in this chapter was exploratory. These macro-level insights set the 
ground to investigate the behaviour of bureaucrats in the following chapters of the 
dissertation where public choice framework of utility-maximizing individuals 
acting strategically within the institutional contexts is used as an analytical 
approach. Following these macro-level insights, we next investigate the micro-
level behaviour of individuals.  
In the next chapter (chapter 3) of this dissertation, we will explicitly incorporate 
these institutionalized factors in the policy choice of the bureaucrats. The aim is to 
underpin the role that these imprints play in the policy choices of the bureaucrats 
in traditional neo classical models. 
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Chapter 3 
Inertia and Policy Choice: The 
Imprints of the Bureaucrat10 

3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has provided a historical account to shed light on 
bureaucratic features shaped by the institutional context. Also, an investigation is 
made to explain the persistence of specific features in the bureaucracy. While this 
approach provides a macro level institutional context, the behaviour of 
organizational actors also becomes imprinted with these context factors at the 
micro level (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Marquis and Tilcsik 2013; Powell 1991).  
Since William Niskanen’s pioneering works (1968; 1975) on the economic 
implications of bureaucratic agenda control over public policies, a growing body 
of literature in the realms of political science and economics has focused on the 
decisive role of bureaucrats for public policy (see Bendor 1988; Gill 1995; and 
Gailmard and Patty 2012 for excellent surveys of this literature). The core insight 
of these studies is that a bureaucrat can to a large degree live out his own policy 
preferences, with possibly detrimental consequences for society (Aberbach, 
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Putnam and Rockman 1981; Aberbach and Rockman 2000). While these studies 
have recognized the role of policy preferences of bureaucrats (Gailmard and Patty 
2012), these models are silent about the impact of the historical, institutional and 
organizational context on the emergence of public policy preferences of 
bureaucrats. However, the study of history, institutions and organization is 
important as individual preferences and choices cannot be understood without 
taking these context variables into account (Friedland and Alford 1991; Powell 
1991; Kelman and Hong 2014).  
In this chapter, we consider two originally different streams of literature to obtain 
a richer and more nuanced picture of bureaucratic behaviour. First, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, the theory of organizational imprinting postulates that history 
matters in shaping organizational strategies and policies and that initial conditions 
can trigger organizational rigidity and inertia. In particular, the theory can explain 
how policy rigidity may arise due to bureaucrats’ own policy predilections driven 
by their initial choices and economic or psychological switching costs (Staw 1976; 
Powell 1991; Perkmann and Spicer 2014). Second, public choice theory in the 
tradition of Niskanen (1968) posits that self-interested and powerful bureaucrats 
have a preference for higher budgets and use their power to maximize their budget, 
resulting in outcomes that are sub-optimal from a social point of view. Insights 
from these two strands of literature are synthesised in a unified framework and the 
question is examined of how bureaucratic inertia impacts the choice of public 
policies focusing in particular on the economic efficiency of public policy 
outcomes. The proposed framework shows how initial conditions of bureaucratic 
organization have a lasting impact on the self-interested decision-making of 
bureaucrats. Taking the decisive role of organizational imprinting into account for 
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bureaucratic decision making is an important step to better evaluate reform 
proposals for bureaucracies. The chapter determines the categories, which have to 
be put on the agenda, if organizational imprinting of bureaucracies is taken as 
seriously as the figure of the selfish budget-maximizing bureaucrat. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, we briefly account for the 
research gap by proving the literature review in the area (section 3.2). Then a link 
is made to the concept of imprinting and how it can be aligned with economic 
research on bureaucracy (section 3.3). After this preparation section 3.4 presents a 
status quo framework, which captures the role of inertia in a model of budget 
maximization. Section 3.5 concludes and suggests some insights for policy 
making. 
3.2 Bureaucracy: from rational legal 
authority to a policy agency  
The literature on public bureaucracy embraces today a wide spectrum of 
disciplines such as public administration, organization theory, political science, 
sociology and economics. The scientific enquiry into public bureaucracy dates 
back to Max Weber’s conceptualization of public bureaucracy as a professional, 
rule-based and efficient organization, where bureaucrats are seen as technocrats 
executing a legal order (Weber 1922). Weber provided a normative framework for 
public bureaucracy in a double sense. The proposed bureaucratic rules and 
processes should lead to an efficient bureaucratic outcome, but the interlinkage 
with the legal system also provides legitimacy, establishing a bond between 
government and citizens. Furthermore, the bureaucrats should serve with loyalty, 
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obedience and impartiality and follow well-defined rules and administrative 
procedures to effectively deliver their functional responsibilities (Weber 1914).  
“Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of 
administrative organization, that is, the monocratic variety is, from a purely 
technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and 
is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority 
over human beings” (Weber 1914). 
While the Weber’s model of bureaucracy provides a normative framework for the 
bureaucratic organization, bureaucracies in many countries around the world 
remain far from Weber’s ideal and are routinely lambasted for the authoritative 
style of governance, corruption, incompetence and inefficiency (Olsen  2008; Dixit 
2012). What is more, despite frequent calls for reforms, the bureaucracies continue 
to retain these characteristics, and fail to adapt to changing circumstances (Olsen 
2008). 
Hence, subsequent research on bureaucracy became largely detached from the 
normative legal aspects of bureaucracy and gave weight to positive analyses. 
Public management and organization theory emphasized institutional design, staff 
relationships, hierarchical structures, and procedures of public administration 
(March and Simon 1958;Wilson 1989;Simon 1997). Political science concentrated 
on questions of political control of bureaucracies and the conjunctions between 
legislature and bureaucracy (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; Moe 1995). 
Most of the studies from public administration, organization theory or political 
science focus mainly on the categorization and delineation of problems rather than 
providing a coherent theoretical frame for understanding bureaucracies’ role in 
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public policy (Moe 1995). The literature on public bureaucracy in the field of 
economics adopts a more rigorous approach to studying bureaucratic behaviour by 
emphasizing the rational actor model. But as a result, those models are quite often 
very narrow, dismissing large parts of the situational context and organizational 
dynamics. Nevertheless, for our purposes it is reasonable to start our literature 
review with the basic economic model of bureaucracy and then to mark step-by-
step the attempts to fill pivotal research gaps. 
3.2.1 Policy delegation  
Most of the literature in political science focuses on the questions of policy 
delegation and political control of the bureaucracy. Studies on policy delegation 
have typically used spatial models in which principals choose agents for the 
delegation of policies. When agents are fully informed and face no uncertainty in 
policy implementation, the politicians tend to delegate policy to an agent whose 
policy preferences are closest to those of the politicians – the so called ‘ally 
principle’ (Bendor et. al. 2001; Gailmard 2002; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; 
Huber and McCarty 2004) 
Other studies, however, argue that the ally principle does not hold in a variety of 
situations. For instance, if policy implementation by the bureaucrats is influenced 
by the interest groups, politicians may be inclined to delegate policy to bureaucrats 
whose preferences diverge from those of the politicians but who work actively to 
negate the influence of the interest groups (Bertelli and Feldman 2007).  
In a recent contribution, Warren (2012) shows that the ally principle may be 
violated in a situation where the internal dynamic of the legislature may lead to 
delegation of policy to non-allied bureaucrats to preclude any particular branch of 
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the legislature from directly controlling the bureaucracy. Other studies on policy 
delegation explore how the delegation of policy-making power creates incentives 
for the bureaucrats to enhance their professional expertise (see, for example, 
Aghion and Tirole 1997; Bawn 1995; and Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). 
Policy delegation to the bureaucrats may encourage acquisition of information and 
professional expertise, which can influence public policy outcomes. This has been 
elaborated by Stephenson (2007) who explores the implications of policy 
delegation in a setting with decision costs and endogenous bureaucratic expertise. 
The study analyses the impact of changes in costs associated with adopting a new 
regulatory policy on bureaucratic incentives to acquire information on the potential 
consequences of the new policy. By explicitly focusing on decision costs, the study 
departs from earlier works, which focus on bureaucratic discretion as an important 
instrument to influence policy-making by the bureaucrats. It is argued that the 
control of bureaucratic discretion is not necessarily the most effective strategy in 
public policy oversight. As a matter of fact, politicians can more effectively 
influence policy-making by the bureaucrats by making policy choices more or less 
costly through enactment costs. It is shown that the presence of enactment costs 
presents an incentive for the bureaucrats to acquire expertise but the ultimate 
impact depends on whether or not the decision maker is uninformed. In the case 
where an uninformed decision maker prefers to retain the status quo, an increase 
in enactment costs will decrease agency expertise. However, an increase in 
enactment costs would contribute to an enhancement in agency expertise when 
new policy is adopted by the uninformed decision maker. The analysis highlights 
the need take into account the interplay between oversight mechanisms and 
bureaucratic expertise in issues of public policy delegation. More recent research 
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in the realm of bureaucratic politics has emphasized the notion of transactional 
authority that encompasses both formal and informal arrangements for the 
delegation of policy-making powers as well as ensuring agency compliance 
(Carpenter and Krause 2015). 
It is argued that the traditional concept of authority in bureaucratic politics that is 
rooted in the formal authority of the principal is incomplete in view of its exclusive 
focus on formal institutional mechanisms. Such mechanisms ignore the agency’s 
power to shape the terms of the contract with the principal through lobbying or 
direct involvement in drafting legislation. The concept of transactional authority 
which is based on bargaining and mutual exchange between the agency and the 
principal can be helpful in better understanding bureaucratic politics in the area of 
public policy delegation. 
3.2.2 Budget maximization models of 
bureaucracy  
Economic models of bureaucracy trace their origin to Niskanen’s seminal work, 
which provides a formal model of bureaucracy to explore the interaction of 
legislation and bureaucracy in determining budgetary allocations (Niskanen 1968). 
The bureaucracy knows the legislators’ demand function for public services and 
exploits its monopoly power to extract the maximum budget from the legislator. 
 In economic parlance, this is akin to perfect price discrimination by the 
bureaucracy leading to the extraction of the maximum price (budget) that 
politicians are willing to pay for public services (output) produced by bureaucracy. 
In particular, the bureaucracy is assumed to offer take-it-or-leave-it proposals to 
the legislator, which binds the latter to a choice between accepting the 
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bureaucracy’s preferred level of output or to get no output at all. Since the 
legislators are willing to pay as long as the marginal benefit of a bureau’s output 
is positive, the monopolistic bureau produces past the point where marginal costs 
are equal to marginal benefits. As a result, the bureau’s output and budget exceed 
the socially optimal level leading to economic inefficiency.  
Several studies have extended Niskanen’s budget maximization framework to 
incorporate more nuanced approaches for modelling the budgetary allocations, 
emphasizing in particular the discretionary powers of bureaucracy (see, for 
example, Breton and Wintrobe 1975; Romer and Rosenthal 1978; Mackay and 
Weaver 1981; Miller and Moe 1983; Conybeare 1984; Bendor, Taylor, and Van 
Gaalen 1985; and Bendor and Moe 1985, 1986). In an influential contribution, 
Migue and Belanger (1974) develop a model of bureaucratic discretion and argue 
that bureaucrats maximize their budget leeway, defined as the total budget less the 
cost of production of the bureau’s output. It is shown that the equilibrium output 
may range from the level of a profit-maximizing monopolist to that of an output-
maximizing bureau, depending on the bureaucrat’s utility from productive and 
non-productive spending. In any case the budget of a bureau is too large and the 
output is not produced at the minimum cost. 
Niskanen (1975) develops a framework that focuses on specific institutional 
mechanisms for the legislative control of bureaucracy, including majority rule 
decision-making, committee review, vote-maximizing behaviour of politicians 
and legislative discretion. For the background of those institutional features the 
bureau’s output and budget positively depend on the marginal effect of the 
bureau’s output on the bureaucrat’s rewards. In the absence of any legislative 
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control, the bureau would produce an optimal level of output from the legislators’ 
point of view but at a sub-optimal higher cost level (see also Bendor 1988). 
3.2.3 Agenda setting power of bureaucracy  
Romer and Rosenthal (1978) focus on the agenda setting powers of bureaucracy 
that take the form of an all-or-nothing or all-or-status-quo ultimatum, where a 
representative legislator has an ideal reference point for the budget with symmetric 
preferences. Symmetric preferences around the ideal budget imply that the utility 
of the median legislator would decline at the same rate when a lower or higher 
budget is appropriated. In this setting, the bureaucrat proposes a level of budget to 
the legislator who either accepts the offer or else the budget reverts to zero or the 
status quo prevails. Since the legislator is assumed to be equally averse to under 
or over spending, he would prefer a budget that is close to twice as big as his ideal 
budget. Thus, it is very likely that a sub-optimal high budget will be determined. 
Furthermore, high demand interest groups may be better able to influence the 
bureaus agenda than moderate demand interest groups, which amplifies the 
bureaucrats demand for sub-optimal high budgets. Interestingly, however, an 
imposition of those budgetary proposals may result in welfare improvement, 
compared to an even more inefficient status quo. Mackay and Weaver (1981) 
differentiate between substitutable and complementary public services provided 
by bureaus in an extended framework that incorporates multiple agencies with 
multiple agendas. In the case where bureaucratic agencies produce substitutable 
services, an agency that is able to offer a take-it-or-leave-it type of proposal is 
better off in terms of its budgetary allocation as compared with an agency that gets 
it budget on a competitive basis. However, if bureaus produce complementary 
services, then the agenda-setting powers of one agency can benefit the other 
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agency in terms of the size of its budget. Extending the framework for multiple 
agencies brings forth some further insight. For example, an increase in one 
agency’s reversion level of budget leads to a reduction in its expected budget while 
the budget of the other agency is enlarged. The reversion level of budget is defined 
as the level that will prevail in the absence of an agreement on the new budget. 
This is because as the reversion level of budget moves closer to the agenda setting 
budget, legislators have an incentive to choose the former and allocate the 
difference to the other agency.  
Most notably, in a major departure from most of the earlier studies that consider 
budget-maximizing bureaus producing a single output, Mackay and Weaver 
develop a model of a multi activity agenda-setting bureau. For example, a 
municipal corporation provides multiple services including police, fire, and 
sanitation services. The citizen-voter sets the budget to maximize its utility while 
the bureau controls the budgetary mix. The control over the budgetary mix gives 
a bureau the effective control over the desired budget of the citizen-voter, and 
hence the bureau gets power to manipulate the budgetary outlays. For instance, a 
school board may strategically alter the budgetary allocation between “academics” 
and “athletics” so as to induce voters to support an increase in the school budget. 
As a result, while there may be efficiency gains (economies of scale) from having 
a single bureau that produces a variety of outputs, these gains need to be weighed 
against potential losses resulting from the monopoly power of the bureau.  
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3.2.4 Role of interest groups  
Bendor and Moe (1985) develop a framework in which interest groups interact 
with the legislator and bureaucracy to determine budgetary outlays in a setting that 
incorporates adaptive rather than optimizing behaviour. The bureaucratic agency 
is concerned with its budget, the legislator is interested in re-election, and different 
interest groups may either benefit or lose from the output of bureaucracy. Interest 
groups play a critical role in driving agency relationships by influencing the 
legislator through their votes with the latter affecting the bureaucracy through 
budgetary allocations and oversight mechanisms. The equilibrium configuration 
in this set-up is generally not socially optimal and is characterized by a too low 
level of public services that benefits corporations over consumers because of the 
relative strength of the former in influencing public policy. A key insight is that 
bureaucratic inertia has a beneficial impact because it counteracts the bureaucratic 
tendency to seek higher budgets from which certain interest groups profit at the 
expense of the public. 
To sum up, the literature about the role of bureaucracy in public policy covers a 
wide spectrum of issues ranging from budgetary allocations to efficiency of the 
bureaucracy and from agenda control powers to the design of oversight 
mechanisms. The literature has greatly enhanced the understanding of the 
bureaucracy’s peculiar role for public policy and budget spending. However, 
despite the richness and breadth of these studies, some important gaps remain. For 
example, while the studies highlight the legislative-bureaucratic interaction for the 
determination of public policies, questions such as the distribution of power within 
the bureaucracy and its implications for the choice and implementation of public 
policies have received less attention. Also, most of the literature ignores the 
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institutional environment, which shapes the incentives and constraints faced by 
bureaucrats. Specifically, little attention has been paid in the literature to explore 
how bureaucratic preferences over public policies are determined by the historical 
and institutional context and how such policies may persist through the forces of 
institutionalization and inertia.  
3.3 Organizational imprinting meets rational 
actor model of bureaucracy 
As discussed in chapter 2, the theory of organizational imprinting has received a 
great deal of attention in organizational research (for an overview see Marquis and 
Tilcsik 2013). The theory provides a conceptual framework for understanding not 
only the genesis of organizational forms and strategies but it also gives an 
explanation why organizations exhibit inertial tendencies in their policies and 
strategies. There are two features, which mark this theory (Johnson 2007). First, it 
refers to the process through which economic, social and institutional factors shape 
or imprint organizational forms. The second feature embodied in the idea of 
imprinting is the tendency of various organizational structures and processes to 
persist over time (Hannan and Freeman 1984; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
The insights from the theory of organizational imprinting shed light on how the 
external environment (including economic, social and political institutions) shapes 
a bureaucracy’s organizational form, policies and routines at both macro and micro 
levels. At the macro level, it is argued that organizations exhibit a tendency to 
become ‘isomorphic’ with the external environment to avoid uncertainty and to 
gain legitimacy. Reflecting further on this theme, Carroll and Hannan (2004) argue 
that the viability of particular organizational forms is dictated by the broader social 
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and institutional context, which is ‘mapped’ onto the organization leaving a lasting 
imprint on key organizational features. Besides influencing the type of 
organization and its form at the macro level, the external environment can also 
have deep influence on the various micro level characteristics of an organization 
including management practices, policy orientation, intra-organizational 
distribution of power, and other social attributes such as work ethics, and 
organizational norms and values. Similarly, while the individual organizational 
actors can themselves be imprinted in terms of their work habits, beliefs, and 
preferences, they can also be a source of imprints on organizational building blocks 
as well as on other individuals. For example, individuals, particularly the first 
incumbents of an organization, may imprint a particular position within an 
organization through their social and educational background, experience and 
skills, leaving a defining stamp that will continue to shape the behaviour of future 
entrants (Burton and Beckman 2007). 
3.3.1 Inertia and policy preferences 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue that once organizations adopt specific forms, 
strategies and practices, it is difficult and costly to dismantle these due to the 
irreversibility of investments. More specifically, the persistence of various 
organizational features can be attributed to three powerful and complementary 
forces. First, forces of inertia play a major role in the persistence of organizational 
features and strategies. Second, institutionalization of norms, beliefs and practices 
contributes to the persistence and reproduction of organizational attributes. Third, 
other traditionalizing forces including vested interests may perpetuate the existing 
organizational structures and policies. It needs to be emphasized that these forces 
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are not mutually exclusive and may either work alone or in tandem to induce 
persistence of various characteristics and policies of an organization. 
The forces that contribute to inertia may be internal and/or external to the 
organization (Hannan and Freeman 1984; see also Kaplan and Henderson 2005). 
In the chapter, we use the notion of imprinting as internal to the organization. 
There are several internal factors that can lead to inertia. For example, an 
organization may have incurred sunk costs in its systems, work methods, and 
personnel training which may compel the organization to adhere to its original 
structures and processes. Similarly, the dynamics of political coalitions within an 
organization may prevent change in policies and modes of operations. Another 
important force that is internal to organization and contributes to inertia is the 
tendency for established practices and policies to become generally accepted 
normative standards and hence difficult to change. Among the external factors that 
can lead to inertia are regulations that govern the activities of an organization, 
inter-organizational relations, and the threat of losing legitimacy in response to 
radical change.  
3.3.2 The institutionalization of policies   
A multi-disciplinary literature under the rubric of ‘new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis’ draws on economic, social and cultural explanations for 
institutionalization and hence the persistence of various organizational strategies 
and policies. Meyer and Rowan (1991) delineate the institutionalization processes 
through which organizational traits and behaviours get a rule-like status and 
become embedded in social thought and action. Organizations tend to incorporate 
these institutionalized rules in their structures, in order to acquire resources and 
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secure legitimacy, which raise the survival chances of the organization. 
Consequently, Jepperson (1991) conceives the process of institutionalization as a 
social pattern that aims at reproduction and retention. Seen in this light, institutions 
reproduce themselves not primarily by success in the market but by ‘self-activating 
social processes’ that contribute to the persistence of organizational 
characteristics. Powell (1991) takes a broader view of institutional reproduction 
and highlights four avenues of institutional reproduction including the exercise of 
power, complex inter-dependencies, taken-for-granted assumptions, and path-
dependent development processes. Organizational characteristics may persist 
through the active efforts of individuals who have the power to control 
organizational processes and who have an interest in maintaining the system. 
Organizational routines and processes may also persist due to organizational 
interdependencies that create complex linkages making it difficult to change one 
aspect without disturbing the whole “reaction chain”. Similarly, organizational 
routines can persist as taken-for-granted rules, which become accepted practice. 
Finally, institutional arrangements may become long lasting due to path-
dependence that makes such arrangements increasingly viable due to increasing 
returns and positive feedback mechanisms. 
The foregoing insights suggest that the policy preferences of bureaucracy can be 
shaped by economic, social and institutional context factors that define the 
operational scope, policies and capabilities of bureaucratic organization. For 
example, the economic environment is believed to strongly influence various 
organizational attributes including operational scope, management principles and 
business strategies (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). As a result, if a bureaucratic 
organization strives to achieve a fit with its external environment, it acquires 
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specific attributes that range from organizational hardware such as technological 
apparatus and human resources to the software of organizations such as attitudes, 
habits and beliefs. With the passage of time, such organizational characteristics 
become embedded in the organizational culture and tend to persist because of 
forces of institutionalization and inertia. For example, once a particular policy or 
strategy becomes a shared norm in a bureaucracy, it has the tendency to become 
an institutionalized act or what Zucker (1991) refers to as “socially constructed 
reality” which is resistant to change because it is viewed as an objective and 
external fact assuming a taken-for-granted character. Furthermore, the 
bureaucracy may exhibit inertial tendencies in its policies and programs because 
of familiarity with the mode of operations, habituation through accumulated 
experience, design of organizational building blocks and technical and 
professional orientation of the organizational actors, all of which imply economic 
and psychological switching costs. 
In the following we will link the theory of imprinting with the choice model of 
Masatlioglu and Ok (2014). Thereby it is important to emphasize that we employ 
Masatlioglu's and Ok’s model not as a direct entry point into analysing 
bureaucratic inertia but rather as a vehicle to rigorously explicate the sociological 
concept of organizational imprinting. The model is particularly suited to our 
context because it allows formalization of inertia in terms of costs faced by 
individual actors. This makes it possible to connect the concept of organizational 
imprinting with a welfare analysis. 
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3.4 A formal analysis of imprinting and 
budget maximization 
To formalize how the notion of organizational imprinting can lead to inertia and 
impact on the behaviour of bureaucrats we build on a choice framework proposed 
by Masatlioglu and Ok (2014). This framework allows us to study bureaucratic 
inertia in more detail.  
To begin with, let ܪ be a set of finite states of the world. For simplicity, we assume 
that there are only two states11 of the world, the initial state ݄଴ and the current state 
݄ଵ.  
ܪ ൌ ሼ݄଴ǡ ݄ଵሽ        (1) 
A given state of the world captures the economic, social and institutional 
environment, which determines the set of policies or strategies feasible in that state 
of the world. With reference to the theory of organizational imprinting, this is 
consistent with the notion that organizational strategies depend on context factors 
of the institutional environment. The dependence of the feasible set on the state of 
the world is captured by the following correspondence: 
߮ǣܪ ՜ ܶ      (2) 
Where ܶ is a compact metric space. Let ܭ א ܶ be the feasible set in the initial state 
of the world, i.e. ܭ ൌ ߮ሺ݄଴ሻǤ Also let ܺ א ܶ be the feasible set in the current state 
of the world, i.e. ܺ ൌ ߮ሺ݄ଵሻ. It is assumed that both ܭ and ܺ are compact sets. 

ͳͳThe objective here is to capture the dependence of the feasible set on initial conditions as implied 
by imprinting and not to incorporate the positive feedback loops inherent in path dependence.  
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Consider first the individual choice problem of a bureaucrat in the initial state of 
the world. It is assumed that in the initial state, the individual choice is constrained 
only by the feasible set corresponding to the initial state of the world. This set-up 
is in line with the theory of organizational imprinting, which postulates that 
organizational actors are particularly malleable and open to adopting strategies that 
are in consonance with the institutional environment in the initial state. Thus, in 
the initial state the bureaucrat chooses a strategy ݇଴ א ܭ which is maximal in the 
feasible set, i.e. 
ܷሺ݇଴ሻ ൒ ܷሺ݇ሻ for all ݇ א ܭ    (3) 
According to organizational imprinting, ݇଴ א ܭ  can be thought of as a viable 
strategy dictated by the institutional environment in the initial state of the world. 
Once the initial environment has imprinted a strategy it tends to persist due to the 
forces of institutionalization and inertia. In other words, even when the 
institutional environment changes (the current state of the world), the initial choice 
of strategy may still be a preferred option. Also, the initial choice may alter the 
feasible choices in the current state of the world, consistent with the notion of path 
dependence, which underscores the fact that initial choices may restrict future 
options (Arthur 1989; Powell 1991) 
Step 1: Modelling choice set with status quo bias 
These ideas can be formalized in terms of the Masatlioglu-Ok framework as 
follows. Consider the set of feasible choices in the current state of the world ܺ. 
Since maintaining the status quo or keeping the default position is always an 
option, it is assumed that ݇଴ א ܺǤ  A bureaucrat whose initial choice is ݇଴ 
maximizes his utility subject to a constraint imposed by his initial selection. One 
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may think of the constraint as an individual psychological barrier (Masatlioglu and 
Ok 2014), a cognitive routine shared in a group (Nelson and Winter 1982) or as an 
institutional logic that governs the behaviour of whole populations in a field 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Thus, if the individual chooses ݔ א ܺ  when his 
feasible set in the current state of the world is conditioned by his initial choice, this 
implies that “ݔ is appealing from the perspective of ݇଴̶, i.e. 
ܷሺݔሻ ൒ ܷሺݕሻ for every ݕ א ܺ  that is appealing from the perspective of ݇଴. 
The basic idea here is that the initial choice ݇଴ limits the individual choices in the 
current state of the world. For example, once an initial choice is made, it can define 
an institutional logic or a ‘mission’ that shapes future choices. In the extreme case 
that the individual choice in the current state is limited to only ݇଴  the initial 
policies and strategies will persist unchanged. More importantly, it may also be 
possible that the presence of the default option imposes a constraint that eliminates 
some choices that may be strictly better than the default option. This is consistent 
with insights from organizational imprinting and path dependent processes which 
highlight the fact that organizational actors may choose sub-optimal policies or 
strategies because of inertia resulting from economic and psychological switching 
costs (see for example Arthur 1989; Staw 1976). These ideas can be made more 
precise in terms of the choice framework developed by Masatlioglu and Ok (2014; 
2005). In particular, they derive a utility function and a choice set that is 
constrained by the initial choice of the individual. Let ߂ denote an object that does 
not belong to ܺǤ The symbol ߪ denotes a member of the set ܺڂሼ߂}. Let ߗ௑ be 
the set of all non-empty closed subsets of ܺ. The choice problem is a list (ܵǡ ߪሻ 
where ܵ א ߗ௑ and either ߪ א ܵ or ߪ ൌ ߂. The set of all choice problems is denoted 
by ܥሺܺሻǤ 
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The choice problem without an initial reference point or status quo option is a list 
ሺܵǡ οሻ for any ܵ א ߗ௑. On the other hand, given any ݇଴ א ܺ and ܵ א ߗ௑ with ݇଴ א
ܵ, the choice problem ሺܵǡ ݇଴) is called a choice problem with a status quo or initial 
endowment or default option. The set of all such problems is denoted as ܥ௦௤ሺܺሻǡ 
which summarizes the choices faced by a decision maker who is currently 
endowed with or has a default option ݇଴. Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) show that if 
the choice correspondence ܥሺܺሻ satisfies the specified axioms, then there exists a 
continuous utility function ܷǣܺ ՜ Թ and a closed-valued self-correspondence12 ܳ 
on ܺ such that: 
ሺܵǡ ߂ሻ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ ܷሺܵሻ                          (4) 
ܿሺܵǡ ݇଴ሻ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ ܷሺܵځܳሺ݇଴ሻሻ for every ሺܵǡ ݇଴ሻ א ܥ௦௤(X)       (5) 
Equations (4) and (5) summarize the choice model which can now be used for 
understanding the choices of bureaucrats with or without an initial reference point 
or status quo option. Suppose that (4) and (5) hold for any choice problem ሺܵǡ ߪሻ א
ܥሺܺሻǤ  
A bureaucrat without an initial reference point simply maximizes his utility in the 
feasible set as indicated in equation (4). More specifically, his choice solves the 
following maximization problem: 
ܯܽݔܷሺ߱ሻݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐݐ݋߱ א ܵ             (6) 
In the presence of an initial reference point or status quo option ሺܵǡ ݇଴ሻ , the 
individual uses a psychological constraint set ܳሺ݇଴ሻ  to eliminate all feasible 
alternatives that do not belong to this constraint set, i.e. the agent identifies the set 

ͳʹThis apparatus is needed to formalize the status quo bias in the model.
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ܵځܳሺ݇଴ሻ. This set consists of all feasible options that are superior to the initial 
reference point of the decision maker, i.e. if ݇ א ܳሺ݇଴ሻ, then his initial reference 
point would not preclude a switch from ݇଴ to ݇Ǥ Clearly, if ݇ א ܵ ת ܳሺ݇଴ሻ, then ݇ 
satisfies both the feasibility constraint (ܵ) as well as the psychological constraint 
induced by the initial choice of the agent (ܳሺ݇଴ሻሻ. 
Once the set ܵ ת ܳሺ݇଴ሻ is determined, the agent simply maximizes his utility 
among alternatives that satisfy both the feasibility and psychological constraints. 
In the extreme case, if ݇଴ is the only element in both ܳሺ݇଴ሻ and ܵ, the bureaucrat 
stays with his initial choice. On the other hand, if there are other alternatives in 
ܵ ת ܳሺ݇଴ሻ then his choice is determined by solving the following problem: 
ܯܽݔܷሺ߱ሻݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐݐ݋߱ א ܵ ת ܳሺ݇଴ሻ   (7) 
It is important to emphasize that there may be feasible alternatives outside the set 
ܳሺ݇଴ሻ  that may provide strictly higher utility than ݇଴ . This is because these 
elements are omitted by the psychological constraint induced by the initial choice 
݇଴ (the imprint). Consequently, there may be alternatives that are superior to ݇଴ 
but are not chosen when ݇଴ was selected in the initial state. This accords with 
organizational research, which posits that initial choices may preclude future 
options including those that are superior to the initial choice (Powell 1991; Sarah 
and Henderson 2005). 
The above analysis formalizes the choice problem of an individual bureaucrat 
when he is facing a psychological constraint. As discussed in chapter 2, these 
constraints may arise from imprinting and path dependent processes, which give 
rise to economic and psychological switching costs that contribute to inertia. There 
may be other factors that can lead to economic and/or psychological switching 
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cost.  For example, Boyer and Robert (2006) argue that agents’ reluctance to 
change some projects despite the fact that more effective and profitable projects 
are available can be traced to career concerns such as bonuses and promotions that 
are often linked to successful completion of the projects. In this case, bureaucrats 
would be reluctant to change their initial choices resulting in inertia. Moreover, 
from the perspective of population ecology, Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue 
that organizations attain higher levels of reliability and accountability through 
stable structures and routines and consequently in an effort to achieve stability 
change may be resisted, resulting in inertia.  
Another channel through which stability of status quo and inertia may emerge is 
cooperation in groups resulting from informal contracts not to introduce any 
organizational innovation. The recent work of Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and 
others show that cooperation in groups is stable if there are a sufficient number of 
people who impose social punishment on deviators such as expulsion from the 
group. In essence, the evolutionary argument is that groups with altruistic 
punishers survive because they are self-stabilizing (Boyd et al, 2003). Whatever 
the source of economic and/or psychological switching costs, such costs constrain 
the behaviour of agents by making change costly thus contributing to inertial 
tendencies. In the absence of such costs, the agent behaviour conforms to the 
standard rational choice paradigm as demonstrated by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). 
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Step 2: Applications to budget maximization  
In the next step the framework can be employed to explore how bureaucratic policy 
choices that are driven by the historical and institutional context can impact upon 
economic efficiency and social welfare. To that end we focus on the role of 
bureaucrats in the budgetary process along the lines of Niskanen (1968) and 
Mackay and Weaver (1983), and combine it with our framework. The model is a 
simple extension of Niskanen type budget maximizing framework along the lines 
of Mackay and Weaver (1983). The basic idea is that a representative citizen-voter 
chooses the overall size of the budget to maximize his utility while the allocation 
of the budget to different publicly provided goods and services is decided by a 
representative bureaucrat. This separation of the policy-making powers is in line 
with the literature on policy delegation and bureaucratic discretion in public 
policies (Gailmard 2002). According to this literature, delegation of public policy 
and discretionary powers of the bureaucracy are often necessitated by the latter’s 
implementation capacity, information advantage and professional expertise. 
It is important to emphasize here that Niskanen’s model is a useful starting point 
for investigating the economic implications of bureaucratic policy preferences and 
resulting inertia for at least three reasons. First, it allows focusing squarely on the 
public budget, which is the single, most economic policy instrument in which all 
the actors including citizens and bureaucrats have a significant stake. It is through 
a public budget that a government executes its development plan for the welfare 
of the citizens through provision of various public goods. On the other hand, 
bureaucrats are interested in maximizing their budget because their success is tied 
to the amount of resources under their control. Second, the model is well suited for 
the incorporation of bureaucratic preferences over budgetary allocation policy, 
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which may be driven by the organizational dynamic. For example, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, a bureaucracy that is geared to follow the public sector led 
growth and development paradigm may have a bias towards spending on public 
infrastructure as a key driver of economic growth. Third, the model enables a 
mapping of public policy choices to budgetary resources taking into account 
bureaucratic inertia that is formalized in terms of switching costs associated with 
a change in the preferred policy stance. This juxtaposition of benefits and costs of 
switching budgetary allocation policy brings to the fore the trade-offs a bureaucrat 
faces between budget maximization and utility loss emanating from shifts in 
budgetary allocation policy. 
In particular, we consider a setting in which a representative bureaucrat controls 
the budgetary allocation policy while the overall budget is set by a representative 
citizen-voter (Epstein and O’Halloran 1994; Volden 2002).  
Assume that there are two publicly provided goods and services ܤଵ and ܤଶ. With 
their prices normalized at unity, ܤଵ and ܤଶ represent the expenditure (budget). Let 
ܤ denote the total budget and let ݇ א ሾͲǡͳሿ be the share of the total budget for ܤଵ, 
and ሺͳ െ ݇ሻ be the share of the total expenditure for ܤଶ.  
Then: 
ܤଵ ൌ ݇ܤ; and ܤଶ ൌ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܤ    (8) 
The representative bureaucrat controls the budgetary allocation policy ݇ and hence 
his feasible set is ܭ ൌ ሾͲǡ ͳሿ. It is assumed that in both states of the world, the 
bureaucrat chooses a budgetary allocation from this feasible set, i.e.  
߮ǣܪ ՜ ሾͲǡ ͳሿ       (9) 
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In the initial state13  the bureaucrat’s choice is free from any reference dependence 
or imprinting. Hence in the initial state the bureaucrat’s choice is maximizing his 
utility according to (3) and he chooses a budgetary allocation policy ݇଴ א ܭ that 
is maximal in the feasible set.  
In the current state of the world, the bureaucrat’s choice of budgetary allocation 
policy and the total budget is determined as follows. Consider a representative 
citizen-voter whose utility ߶ሺǤ ሻis defined by private consumption (ܥሻ and two 
publicly provided services (ܤଵܽ݊݀ܤଶሻ. The citizen-voter receives an income (ܻሻ 
and pays a lump sum tax (ܶ), which finances the provision of public goods and 
services by the bureaucrat. The citizen-voter’s optimization problem is thus: 
݉ܽݔ߶ ൌ ߶ሺܥǡ ܤଵǡ ܤଶሻ                (10) 
Subject to: 
ܻ ൌ ܥ ൅ ܶ       (11) 
ܶ ൌ ܤଵ ൅ ܤଶ ൌ ܤ      (12) 
Plugging (11) and (12) in (10) and using (8), the derived utility function of the 
citizen-voter can be specified as a function of the budgetary allocation policy ሺ݇ሻ 
and the size of the budget ሺܤሻ: 
ܷሺ݇ǡ ܤሻ ൌ ߶ሺܻ െ ܤǡ ݇ܤǡ ሺͳ െ ሻܤሻ   (13) 

ͳ͵It is imperative to mention that this model is an application of the framework developed earlier 
to the budget maximization problem. 
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The optimization problem of the representative citizen-voter is thus to choose the 
size of the budget ܤ to maximize his utility given income (ܻሻand the budgetary 
allocation ሺ݇ሻǣ 
݉ܽݔ஻ܷሺ݇ǡ ܤሻ ൌ ߶ሺܻ െ ܤǡ ݇ܤǡ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܤሻ   (14) 
The optimal budget level for the citizen-voter, given the budgetary allocation ሺ݇ሻ, 
can be defined as: 
ܤሺ݇ሻ ൌ ܽݎ݃Ǥ݉ܽݔ஻ܷሺ݇ǡ ܤሻ     (15) 
To work out the closed form solutions while keeping the analysis tractable, it is 
assumed that the utility function of the citizen-voter is quasi-linear in private 
consumption and additively separable in the two types of public goods and 
services. Specifically14: 
ܷሺ݇ǡ ܤሻ ൌ ܻ െ ܤ ൅ ሺ݇ܤሻభమ ൅ ൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܤ൯
భ
మ   (16) 
Step 3: Choice of Sub-Optimal Strategies in the Presence of Inertia 
 The bureaucrat’s choice in the current state is conditioned by his initial choice of 
the budgetary mix according to ݇଴ . As argued in the previous section, once a 
particular strategy is chosen, it tends to become entrenched and resists change due 
to the phenomenon of imprinting. It is thus assumed that a bureaucrat faces 
economic and psychological costs of switching his strategy resulting in disutility 
for the case of deviation from his default option. On the other hand, a bureaucrat 
may benefit from a change of his budgetary allocation mix, if larger budgetary 

ͳͶWithout losing generality, for analytical tractability and to get non-trivial closed form solution, 
we have used square root functional forms. 

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resources accompany it. Thus, the utility function of the representative bureaucrat 
can be defined as: 
ܸሺ݇ሻ ൌ ߙሺܤሺ݇ሻሻ െ ߛሺ݇ െ ݇଴ሻଶ    (17) 
The first term on the right-hand side captures the utility derived from the budget 
while the second term is the disutility that results from changing the initial strategy. 
The parameters ߙ ൐ Ͳ and ߛ ൐ Ͳ capture the relative importance of the budget 
and the initial budgetary mix policy with regard to the optimization problem of the 
bureaucrat, where ߛ is a measure for the level of bureaucratic inertia indicating the 
degree of bureaucratic resistance to change the initial strategy15. 
Note that, ߙ ൐ Ͳ is consistent with the assumption that ሺሻ is increasing in the 
level of budget. If Ƚ ൌ ͳ and ɀ ൌ Ͳ, then the problem reduces to simple budget 
maximization by the bureaucrat. In this case, the model features the budget-
maximizing paradigm followed by Niskanen (1968, 1975), Romer and Rosenthal 
(1978), Denzau and Mackay (1976, 1980) and Mackay and Weaver (1983). 
Given his initial strategy the bureaucrat’s feasible set in the current state of the 
world can be defined as follows: 
ܳሺ݇଴ሻ ൌ ൛݇ א ܭǣ ܸሺ݇ሻ ൒ ܸሺ݇଴ሻ ൌ ߙ൫ܤሺ݇଴ሻ൯ൟ  (18) 
This set identifies all the budgetary mix policies in the feasible set that are better 
than the initial strategy ݇଴ . Therefore, the bureaucrat’s optimal choice of the 
budgetary mix in the current state is simply: 
݇ ൌ ܽݎ݃Ǥ݉ܽݔ௞ܸሺ݇ሻ for every ݇ א ܳሺ݇଴ሻ ؿ ܭ  (19) 

ͳͷWithout loss of generality,  ߙcan be normalized to one.
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It can be seen from equations (17) and (18) that the feasible set depends on the 
optimal budget levels chosen by the citizen-voter as well as the parameters ߙ and 
ߛ. To identify this set, the model is solved to derive the optimum values of the size 
of budget and the budgetary mix policy ሺܤכǡ ݇כሻ based on first order conditions 
pertaining to (15) and (19) (see the appendix 3 for a detailed solution). The solution 
can be depicted in the following diagram16 for the case when ݇଴ ൐ ݇כ. 
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Figure: 3.1  
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ͳ͸The curves in the diagram are drawn for ߙ ൌ ͳߛ ൌ ͳ. Futhermore, ܸሺ݇ሻ is implicit in the 
diagram, it is the difference between the two curves. 
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The curve ሼߙሺܤሺ݇ሻሻǣ ܷ஻ሺ݇ǡ ܤሻ ൌ Ͳሽ  plots the first order condition of utility 
maximization by the citizen-voter (see equation A3). The socially optimal budget 
level and budgetary mix policyሺܤכǡ ݇כ) solves the optimization problem of the 
citizen-voter (see the appendix 3 for details). Notice that ݇כ is also the budget 
maximizing level of the bureaucrat in the absence of bureaucratic inertia (see 
equation A6). However, when the bureaucrat’s behaviour is constrained by his 
initial choice, the choice of the budgetary allocation policy will be ෠݇ , which 
maximizes his utility (the distance between the two curves) and at which point the 
slopes of the two curves are equalized indicating that the marginal benefit of a 
policy change is equal to marginal cost. The feasible set induced by the 
psychological constraint of bureaucrats can be identified as: 
ܳሺ݇଴ሻ ൌ ൛݇ א ܭǣ ෠݇ ൑ ݇ ൑ ݇଴ൟ    (20) 
Now consider the case when the preferred budgetary allocation for a public good 
is less than the socially optimal level i.e. ݇଴ ൏ ݇כ. In this case, the first order-
condition for utility maximization by the bureaucrat implies that the slopes of the 
two curves are positive and equalized at the optimal policy chosen by the 
bureaucrat ෠݇ (see equation A5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 


ͳͳͷ

 
 
     B, C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: 3.2  
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that if the preferred budgetary allocation of the 
bureaucrat for a given public good is higher (lower) than the socially optimal level 
that public good would be over-provided (under-provided) as compared with the 
socially optimal level. 
This set demonstrates how institutional and psychological constraints compel 
bureaucrats to eliminate alternative policies that may be superior to their initial 
choice in the absence of inertia. It can be seen from the diagram that there are 
feasible alternatives to the left of ෠݇ that will provide higher budgetary resources to 
the bureaucrat. However, these options are excluded from the feasible set that has 
݇଴ ݇כ ൌ ͲǤͷ 
ሼߙሺܤሺ݇ሻሻǣ ܷ஻ሺ݇ǡ ܤሻ ൌ Ͳሽ
ߛሺ݇ െ ݇଴ሻଶ
ሺܤכǡ ݇כሻ
෠݇
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
imprinted the initial policy choice as a reference point or initial endowment. In the 
extreme case, if ߛ is very much larger then ܳሺ݇଴ሻ ൌ ሼ݇଴ሽ implies that the initial 
policy choice is the only feasible option. The curve plotting ߛሺ݇ െ ݇଴ሻଶ becomes 
steeper and the feasible set gets narrower with an increase in ߛ.This situation can 
happen if the marginal cost of switching the policy exceeds the marginal benefit 
and the initial policy choice becomes locked-in. The term ߙሺܤሺ݇ሻሻ acts as what 
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) refer to as a “utility pump” which can induce the 
bureaucrat to deviate from his initial policy option. However, if ߛ is very large 
then this “utility pump” is not sufficient to trigger a policy shift and the bureaucrat 
is better off at his initial policy option ݇଴  with a maximum utility ሺ݇ሻ ൌ
ߙሺܤሺ݇଴ሻሻ. Thus, it becomes clear that the presence of inertia alters the optimizing 
choices of the bureaucrat in a significant way. The following proposition 
summarizes this finding. 
Proposition 1: The presence of inertia induces bureaucrats to make non-optimal 
choices despite the availability of superior alternatives in the choice-set. Moreover, 
the choice of sub-optimal strategies emerges as a rational response to institutional 
and psychological constraints imposed by imprinting.  
This result demonstrates how initial imprints contribute to a lock-in of strategies 
of bureaucrats. More specifically, the repetitive choice of ෠݇ is optimal from the 
bureaucrat’s point of view in the presence of inertia. However, this choice is sub-
optimal in the sense that a higher level of budget could have been achieved in the 
absence of inertia. As argued in the previous section, a particular policy stance 
becomes a shared belief and leads individuals to consider other policy options as 
improper. In a similar vein, Meyer and Rowan (1991) argue that organizational 
policies and strategies tend to be highly institutionalized and hence are considered 
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as legitimate regardless of their impact on outcomes. Furthermore, organizational 
strategies persist due to their taken-for-granted characteristics, which make the 
former self-sustaining.   
Proposition 2: In the case of inertia a utility maximizing bureaucrat will over 
(under) provide public services depending on the initially chosen budgetary mix. 
As a result there will be persistent social welfare losses. 
The fact that bureaucrats tend to choose sub-optimal policy mixes has social 
welfare implications, too. The foregoing analysis shows that psychological 
constraints induced by initial choices make superior policy choices at later stages 
unfeasible. For example, if the initial choice involves more spending for one type 
of public service, the presence of inertia induces bureaucrats to allocate more 
resources to this service also in the future, even when the demand of the citizen-
voter dictates less provision. Consequently, the bureaucrat’s choice of the 
budgetary policy mix will often result in allocative inefficiency. 
It can be seen from Figure 3.1 that ෠݇ is not the optimal budget mix. The intuition 
of this result is simple. A bureaucrat has only an incentive to change his strategy 
as long as the marginal utility from getting an additional unit of budget exceeds 
the marginal cost of a policy change. But the presence of inertia prevents the 
bureaucrat from achieving a budget strategy, which maximizes his utility in the 
choice-set.  
While the result of social welfare loss through over-production of public services 
is in line with the budget-maximization hypothesis of Niskanen (1968), the 
underlying logic here is very different. For example, in Niskanen’s model, the 
budget-maximizing bureaucrat has an incentive to extract the maximum budget 
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that politicians are willing to provide, resulting in over-production of public 
services. In our case the welfare loss does not necessarily result from the 
bureaucrats’ motive of over-production, but from inertia that hinders bureaucrats 
from adapting their individual strategies as well as to adapt to social preferences. 
Therefore, in our model under-production of public services can be a persistent 
phenomenon leading to social welfare losses. 
Proposition 3: The choice of a budget and policy mix without inertia can coincide 
with the socially optimal budget allocation ሺ݇כሻ, if the policy preferences between 
the bureaucrat and the citizen-voter are aligned. However, in the presence of inertia 
only a socially sub-optimal allocation of the budget ( ෠݇) can be attained17.  
An interesting implication of our model is that one could assume a situation 
without inertia, when utility maximizing bureaucrats strive for budget 
maximization. In those cases, it is recommendable to look for governance 
structures and monitoring devices that bind the bureaucrat to the preferences of 
citizen-voters. And indeed, large parts of the literature in the tradition of Niskanen 
are concerned with institutional designs that prevent bureaucrats from budget 
maximization. If we put that a step further we could imagine a world where budget-
maximization is effectively prevented and the policy preferences between citizen-
voters and bureaucrats are aligned. The social optimum of public services would 
be attained.  

ͳ͹One may question whether the choice of budgetary allocation by a bureaucrat in the presence of 
inertia could coincide with socially optimal allocation. However, this is not possible in our model 
as long as the choice problem is meaningful in the sense that the initial allocation differs from the 
optimal allocation. To see this, notice that when inertia is present (ߛ ൐ Ͳሻ, the first order condition 
of the bureaucrat’s optimization problem will never hold at the socially optimal allocation (see 
equation A5) unless the initial allocation happens to be equal to socially optimal allocation which 
is highly unlikely.   
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However, in a world of inertia the policy recommendation to look for institutions 
that prevent budget maximization becomes more facetted. A first issue to be taken 
into account is the fact that even with a perfect incentive alignment between 
citizen-voters and bureaucrats’ over-production of public services may take place. 
That means institutional designs that are perfect to prevent budget-maximization 
can be blunt to prevent over-production caused by inertia. This leads to a second 
issue: Taking the existence of bureaucratic inertia seriously leads to the insight that 
the institutional design of bureaucracies has to distinguish between two design 
types. First, which is targeted at overcoming inertia and the second targeted against 
the opportunistic behaviour of bureaucrats. That brings us to a third issue, the 
interplay between bureaucratic inertia and the budget maximization behaviour of 
bureaucrats. The relation between the two can be antagonistic. That means while 
the budget maximization behaviour of bureaucrats pulls the provision of public 
services towards over-production, bureaucratic inertia may induce under-
production by restricting the bureaucrat’s choice set. As a result the amount of a 
public service actually provided can be relatively close to the preferences of the 
citizen-voter, although there is no incentive alignment between the bureaucrat and 
the citizen-voters. For that background in practical cases it is important to 
investigate very thoroughly from which trigger bureaucratic inefficiency stems. 
Only then can an appropriate antidote be chosen. In some (antagonistic) cases the 
policy recommendation might be even to make no reforms at all.  
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3.5 Inertia and policy choices of bureaucrats: 
some conclusions 
This chapter has provided a fresh perspective on the role of bureaucracy as a key 
player in budgetary processes. We show that organizational and institutional 
constraints embedded in initial policy choices fundamentally alter subsequent 
policy choices of bureaucracies. The chapter has analysed how policy preferences 
of bureaucrats result in inertia and policy rigidity. In particular, we develop a 
theoretical framework that synthesizes insights from the theory of organizational 
imprinting with budget-maximization in the tradition of Niskanen. It becomes 
apparent that budget-maximization strategies are nested in early imprints of 
bureaucracy. Imprints of the past define the arena in which budget-maximization 
takes place, and they have a decisive effect on the individual behaviour of 
bureaucrats. As a result policy reforms towards better bureaucratic control must 
distinguish clearly between measures targeted at the individual behaviour of 
bureaucrats and the imprinted institutional environment.  
This finding is in line with research on organizational imprinting, which argues 
that organizational actors may be stuck with initial policy choices, which may lead 
to persistent inefficiencies. To be sure, there is a significant body of literature in 
political science that has analysed the problem of bureaucratic drift and the 
challenges it poses for the political control of bureaucracy (see, for example, 
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; Macey 1992; Calvert, McCubbins and 
Weingast 1989; and Epstein and Halloran 1994; Gailmard and Patty 2007; Clinton 
et al 2012). According to this literature bureaucrats are driven by their policy 
preferences, and in the absence of effective oversight, they tend to adopt policies 
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that deviate from the preferences of citizens and/or politicians. While those studies 
have focused on the question of how to devise mechanisms to control bureaucratic 
drift, little attention has been given to the underlying causes of bureaucratic drift. 
Thus our analysis adds to the political science literature in terms of identifying 
inertia as a potential cause of bureaucratic drift. More specifically, imprinting of 
budgetary allocations takes place independently of the efficacy of any control 
mechanisms against budget maximization.  
Thus, bureaucratic drift can be triggered even in cases when there is no budget 
maximization (as described by Niskanen) at all. This is an important result for two 
reasons: First, any institutional design targeted at the over-production of public 
services through bureaucracy must first analyse whether it is indeed budget 
maximization or bureaucratic inertia which is causing the over-production. Only 
if it is indeed budget maximization, then improved monitoring devices against the 
opportunism of bureaucrats can lead to welfare improvement. Second, 
bureaucratic inertia can run counter to budget maximization. Early imprints of 
bureaucracy may actually constrain profligate bureaucrats. But the opposite could 
also be the case. Imprints may lead to budget allocations, which are persistently 
too low. In those cases policies against budget maximization may even have a 
detrimental effect on social welfare by further reducing the amount of public 
services supplied. As a result, one has to be careful and has to look very 
specifically into each single case of presumed budget misallocations before steps 
are taken against it. While this is a rather broad policy implication, it has a very 
practical relevance. The OECD and World Bank regularly publish reports 
targeting “good governance” for public bureaucracies or state-owned enterprises 
(see for example OECD 2005, 2014; World Bank 2012?). Identifying principles 
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of “good governance” is a valuable goal in itself, but for the background of our 
study one may wonder about the effectiveness of those principles, if they have to 
“compete” with the imprinted policy stances of bureaucrats. Or, to put it more 
generally, our research underscores the relevance of path dependent organizational 
configurations for the assessment of the performance of public administrations 
(see also Kelman and Hong 2014; and O’Toole and Meier 2015). 
Our contribution has aimed at a better theoretical understanding of bureaucratic 
budget allocations and has not provided empirical evidence yet. However, it is 
possible to sketch out what those empirical studies would have to deal with, in 
order to identify the magnitude of bureaucratic imprinting. First of all, the legal-
institutional status of bureaucracy vis-à-vis government, legislature and judiciary 
would have to be assessed. The role of bureaucracy is strongest in parliamentary 
style democracies such as the United Kingdom where the legislature has a limited 
role in modifying the budgetary proposals of the executive (Posner and Park 2007). 
The situation is somewhat different in other countries such as France, Italy and 
The Netherlands where the legislator can amend or reject budgetary proposals of 
the bureaucracy but lack the power to independently formulate the budget. In the 
U.S. style presidential system the legislature plays a much stronger role in the 
budgetary process through budgetary oversight committees. In developing 
countries the bureaucracy often wields significant power in determining budgetary 
allocations not least because of a lack of legislative capacity to deal effectively 
with technicalities of the budgetary process.  
More generally, it is commonly observed that the role of the bureaucracy in the 
budgetary process is often reinforced by the delegation of policy-making authority 
to the bureaucrats owing to their professional and technical expertise (Schick 
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2002). Thus, the socio-legal context of bureaucracies may vary a lot between 
countries and may trigger certain patterns of imprinting. From those patterns of 
imprinting in conjunction with socio-legal boundary conditions it would then be 
possible to derive tailored policy recommendations for reforms of bureaucracy.  
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Chapter 4 
 Identity Driven Policy Choices of 
Bureaucrats: A Game Theoretic 
Analysis18 

4.1 Introduction 
Since Max Weber’s seminal piece on public bureaucracy it is acknowledged that 
the social identity of public bureaucracies plays an important role for bureaucratic 
decision-making. The blueprint of his analysis was the Prussian bureaucracy that 
worked like a machine where the single bureaucrat conceived himself as a sort of 
gear wheel propelling the machinery towards the goals of bureaucracy set by the 
Prussian legislator and the German Kaiser. What Weber and others have not 
explored is that different stakeholders in the hierarchy of bureaucracy may have 
distinct identities that interact with each other and that may impinge on the 
individual preferences. This rather complex picture of bureaucracy raises the 
question of how the notion of identity can be analytically seized and conceptually 
be integrated into economic research on bureaucracy. 

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Ǥ . I gratefully 
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and Dictatorship 2017 (University of Munster, Germany) and from the participants in The Future 
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In standard principle agent models of bureaucracy, scant attention is paid to the 
complexity of organizational structure of bureaucracies and the dynamics of non-
monetary goals of bureaucrats in the course of formulating and implementing 
public policy (Simon 1947; Perrow 1986; West 1997). That is, neither the 
imprinting process of identity nor identity itself has become an explicit topic in the 
principal agent literature on bureaucracy so far.   
In recent years the notion of social identity has given rise to a rich debate in 
economics (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Wichardt 2008; Chen and Li 2009; 
Benjamin et al.  2010; Kranton et al.  2013). The focus has been, for instance, on 
the desire of individuals to conform with shared norms in society (Benabou and 
Tirole 2006), the cognitive aspects of norms (Horst, Kermin and Teschl  2007), or 
the sense of belonging (R. Akerlof  2009). A common denominator of these 
research routes is the ambition to find more valid explanations of actual decision 
making when social context and cognitive stances matter.  
Adding to this stream of research the chapter aims at investigating the impact of 
identity driven preferences of bureaucrats on public policy outcomes, when it is 
assumed that a bureaucratic organization comprises different levels of 
administration. For that background, we model the policy outcome of a 
bureaucracy, when it is assumed that there are differences of identity-based 
preferences between bureaucrats at the policymaking level and bureaucrats at the 
policy implementation level.  
The chapter proposes a theoretical framework to explain policy drift (a bureau 
deviation from the policy goal of the legislator) where identity moderates the 
principle-agent relation between the legislator and the bureaucratic organization.  
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The model reveals the subtle interaction between these two groups of players in a 
bureaucracy and how this interaction shapes the structure and size of budgetary 
allocations. Conceptually we build on the public choice tradition of modelling 
bureaucracies by insights, which fall broadly into the study of organizational 
behaviour.  
More specifically, the chapter analyses the impact of mission orientation in 
bureaucracies, taking into account statutory distribution of powers and functional 
responsibilities of agents across different layers of bureaucratic organization. It is 
assumed that a bureaucracy consists of two vertically distinct layers:  
1) A superior who allocates the budget to the different public goods on offer and 
who identifies with the higher-level goals of the bureaucracy (insider identity) 
2) A subordinate who executes the allocation policy of the superior and is only 
driven by his private interests, without identifying himself with the organizational 
goals (outsider identity)  
Furthermore, it is assumed that there is strategic interaction between the legislator 
and bureaucracy. The model set-up highlights the possibility of trade-offs between 
individual and organizational goals and provides a more realistic approach for the 
analysis of bureaucracies (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005, 2010).  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, we briefly account for the 
need to give more focus on matters of organizational behaviour in the economic 
analysis of bureaucracy (section 4.2). Then a link is made to the concept of identity 
and how it can be aligned with economic research on bureaucracy (section 4.3). 
Section 4.4 provides a detailed literature review pertinent to the present study. 
Thus prepared, section 4.5 presents a game theoretic framework, which captures 
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the strategic interaction among players in a model of bureaucratic hierarchy, taking 
into account the different identities of agents in a bureaucratic setting. Section 4.6 
discusses some general remarks to the analysis. Finally, section 4.7 concludes and 
hints to some insights for policy making. 
4.2 Bureaucracies as complex organizational 
structures 
Principal agent models are widely used to understand the relationship between 
bureaucrats and politicians. In its simplest form bureaucrats aim at maximizing 
output while politicians want to allocate more budget to their constituencies, in 
order to increase their chance of being re-elected. From a welfare point of view 
these two different objective functions lead to an inefficient quantity and structure 
of the bureaucratic output (Niskanen 1971; Miller and Moe 1983; Gailmard and 
Petty 2012).  
With few exceptions, these models largely consider that all bureaucrats in the 
organization have identical goals. However, bureaucracy as an organization is 
comprised of multiple agents with quite different political convictions and 
individual goals (e.g., Downs 1967; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; Dalton 
et. al. 1980, Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Dunleavy 1991). Some bureaucrats are 
driven by mission orientations and are in full support of policies that promote 
organizational objectives. Similarly, for some bureaucrats their personal goals take 
primacy over their organizational objectives (Simon 1947; Quirk 1981; Perrow 
1986;  Kelman 1987; Eisner 1992; West 1997). 
More specially, some bureaucrats may identify themselves with the goals of the 
bureaucracy more than others, facing a trade-off between their individual goals 
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and the goals of the bureaucracy (Waterman, Rouse and Wright 1998). The issue 
becomes even more facetted, if one takes into account that policies are formally 
promulgated by the hierarchy of bureaucracy, which structurally safeguards the 
organizational goal against possible opportunism on the part of individual 
bureaucrats (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983; Tirole 1986; Crémer 1993). For that 
background, a complex research field unfolds, in which bureaucratic behaviour is 
determined by bureaucratic hierarchy, the preferences of the various players and 
organizational norms. The interplay of these factors creates various trade-offs and 
makes the analysis of bureaucratic decision-making quite demanding.  
However, those budget-maximizing models have been challenged because of their 
neglect of possible non-pecuniary motivations of bureaucrats such as norms, 
identities and public sector ethos or motivation (e.g., Dixit 2002; Buelens and 
Broeck 2007; Gains and John 2010). Similarly, Brehm and Gates (1997) argue that 
there is a need to go beyond the pecuniary motivation of bureaucrats and to 
consider non-pecuniary preferences that are driven by solidarity considerations 
and group pressure. Despite these calls for bringing in non-pecuniary factors to the 
analysis of bureaucrats’ policy choices, very little concrete work has been 
accomplished so far to get a conceptual framework, which aligns the incumbent 
economic models of bureaucracy with the challenges from behavioural science. 
With a few exceptions of models that assume bureaucrats to be bounded rational, 
almost all models of bureaucracy consider bureaucrats as rational actors (Gailmard 
and Patty 2007; Krause and O’Connell 2012; Carpenter and Krause 2012).  
However, a bureaucrat is part of (sometimes large) organizations and he gets 
accustomed and exposed to certain perceptions and preferences of the 
organization. Hence, he acts not only as a rational actor on his own account but 
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also as an encultured actor, whose perception of a supposed “good policy” is 
deeply influenced by the social context that he is part of (see, e.g. Hoff and Stiglitz 
2016). He learns of what is seen in-house as a good public policy and how this 
translates into certain budgetary allocations. In this sense his budgetary 
preferences are based on narratives, norms and identities prevalent in an 
organization. Subsequently he chooses specific budget allocations through the lens 
of his organizational social context. According to March’s (1999) logic of 
appropriateness, decision-making is identity fulfilment, and not an achievement of 
optimal results in the presence of restrictions. This is consistent with the view that 
an organization is a form of formalized social system where one considers it as 
essentially to comply with organizational goals to be considered as a member of 
the organization (Arrow 1994; Davis, 2003, 2006, 2007). 
According to the concept of identity introduced by Akerlof and Kranton (2010), 
utility functions are not fixed. They are rather affected by the situational context 
in which identities play out. For example, a bureaucrat who is newly recruited has 
less inclination towards identifying himself with the organizational goals than the 
superior who has spent a longer period in the organization and who is established 
among his peers. Thus, the decisions of agents in a bureaucracy do not only depend 
on the maximization calculus of their individual utility functions but also on the 
degree of identification with organizational goals. That is, identity emerges apart 
from individual utility functions, but interacts with individual utility functions for 
the background of the situational context. Consequently, Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000, 717) describe the effect of identity on utility functions as a new type of 
externality, which can be principally integrated into economic analysis. 
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4.3 Bureaucracies as containers of identity 
The concept of identity is not new. Psychologists and sociologists have elaborated 
on it for decades. Identity comprises all kinds of qualities and values that are 
associated with a person, organization or larger group as society, culture or nation. 
Identity is the self-image that a person or group has of itself. It is the belief-system 
or the fundamental norms that guide us and which may prevent us from doing 
things, which we would do if we had another identity (Davis 2011). Religious 
identity may serve as an example. A Christian who believes in the texts of 
Christianity, but does not live up to the Christian standards will feel ashamed 
(Akerlof 2007, 8).  
The new impulse of the works of Akerlof (2007) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 
2005, 2010) is that they fall into the broader class of models that seek to 
complement conventional economic analysis with cogent reasoning from other 
disciplines in order to draw a more complete picture of human decision making. 
The Akerlof concept of identity aspires for a conceptual integration between 
economics on the one hand and a behavioural finding that has ample empirical 
evidence (but as yet is not well explained in economics) on the other hand.  
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) develop the concept of identity by using the notion of 
situation-specific norms, which are the blueprints or scripts that people have 
internalized and which tell them how to behave in a specific situation. More 
specifically, the term identity is used to describe a person’s “social category” 
(Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini 2007) as well as his “self-image” (Turner et al. 
1987). Identity captures how people “feel about themselves as well as how those 
feelings depend upon their actions” (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, p. 719). If a 
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person’s identity enters a utility function, the person will capture utility gains from 
a behaviour that is in line with the established identity, and the person will 
experience disutility in case the behaviour deviates from what is dictated by 
identity.  
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) illustrate the concept of identity by a simple model, 
focusing in particular on the interaction between identity and work incentives. It 
is assumed that a worker who identifies himself as part of the organization derives 
utility by acting in the best interests of the organization and loses utility if he does 
not work in the best interests of the organization. In addition, the worker draws 
utility from his wage income and experiences disutility from his work effort. 
Thereby it is assumed that workers can have two different identities: He can be an 
insider who acts in the interests of the organization, or he can be an outsider who 
does not identify with the organization and who is more interested in pursuing his 
own goals. It can be shown that in the case of an insider, the identification with the 
organization reduces the wage differential that is needed to maintain enough 
incentives for high work efforts. This simply follows from the fact that an insider 
worker maximizes his utility by exerting a high level of effort towards achieving 
the goals of the organization. The model demonstrates not only the interaction of 
identity and wage incentives, but also more generally that identity affects the 
choice set of decision-makers.  
As emphasized by Akerlof and Kranton (2005), the concept of identity is 
particularly relevant in case of public administrations, as for example military 
organizations. The ideal soldier, having an insider identity, is taken as a mission 
oriented and sharply differentiated character embodying “masculine makeup and 
ethos” (Akerlof and Kranton 2010, p. 45). The soldier has a sharp corporate-like 
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identity, signified by his strict observance of the rules and professional execution 
of orders in the chain of command. The soldier works in the best interests of the 
organization and his rewards consist of both his monetary income as well as his 
satisfaction from acting in line with his organizational identity. Military 
organizations actively use the promotion of identity as a strategic tool in their 
training programs to motivate soldiers to pursue military ideals. Besides the 
military organization, civilian workplaces also use worker identity as a motivation 
device. This is particularly important in situations where work effort is 
unobservable and monitoring is costly. In such situations worker identity can be 
instrumental in encouraging a high level of effort. Besides the example of soldiers, 
physicians in a hospital may serve as an example. 
Going beyond motivational issues, it can be argued that public bureaucracies have 
a distinct identity of their own which is instrumental in influencing their policy 
choices. First, like the military, public bureaucracy is an organization with well-
defined operational procedures and a vertical chain of command. Bureaucrats are 
career-oriented civil servants who are provided with professional training 
(including examinations) at least at the early stages of their career. Bureaucrats are 
also inculcated in a sense of mission and they have clear organizational goals in 
terms of public policies and public sector programs. Like other organizational 
actors, bureaucrats are likely to develop their distinct identities in terms of their 
policy goals, modes of implementation and other aspects of public policies. As a 
result, some bureaucrats have an insider identity, i.e. they are driven by their 
mission orientation and they are in full support of policies that promote the 
organizational objectives. Similarly, some bureaucrats have an outsider identity, 
their personal goals taking primacy over organizational objectives.  
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4.4 The agency of bureaucracy – a literature 
review 
A significant body of literature explores the role of bureaucracy in public policy 
from a multi-disciplinary angle19. Within this diverse literature there is a broad 
consensus about that politicians need specialists to execute their policies. Hence, 
politicians delegate certain policies to bureaus. In order to minimize monitoring 
and transaction costs politicians allocate prefixed budgets to the bureaus for which 
a specific output is expected in return (e.g. Weingast and Marshall 1988). 
However, there is an inherent tension between political control and the de facto 
autonomy of bureaucracy (Berry 1979, 1984; Rourke 1984). This tension and the 
effects of it are subject to different theoretical explanations. In the following we 
will briefly sketch out some of the generic approaches that can be found in that 
research field and we will indicate the relevance of taking identity into account for 
a proper understanding of bureaucracy. 
4.4.1 Agency of policy delegation 
Principal agent models are widely used to understand the relationship between 
bureaucrats and politicians (Moe 1982; Wood and Waterman 1994; Mitnick 1986; 
Vachrish 2004; Gailmard and Patty 2012; Lane 2013). In these models the agent 
(bureaucrat) leverages his discretion in order to increase the size of the budget, 
which results in private benefits for him but sub-optimal outcomes from a welfare 
point of view (Niskanen, 1968, 1971, 1991). In such models, the problem of policy 

ͳͻSee for example, Niskanen 1971, Miller and Moe 1983, Bendor and Meirowitz 2004, Bendor, 
Taylor and Van Gaalen 1987b. 
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drift arises due to uncertainty and information asymmetry, which are inherent in 
the principal-agent relation (Weingast 1984; Moe 1987).  
The benefit of delegating authority to an agent is that it reduces the principal’s 
costs to acquire relevant information and skills to fulfil a specific task. However, 
this comes at a price, because the agent may abuse his informational advantage to 
the detriment of the principal (Aghion and Tirole 1997). This is because principals 
and agents may have a divergence of goals. But, even if bureaucrats and politicians 
have the same goal, bureaucrats are likely to shirk and to produce output at higher 
costs (Mitnick 1986). In a nutshell, the informational advantage and expertise 
gives bureaucracy power that can be used to manipulate the quantity and quality 
of output (Niskanen 1971).  
Principals are interested in both, the comparative advantage of employing a 
specialized agent on the one hand and having a cheap technology for monitoring 
the agent on the other hand (Mitnick 1986). This set-up leads to so-called 
principal-supervisor-agent (P-S-A) models. Tirole (1986) presents a P-S-A model 
where a principal assigns the task of monitoring an agent to a supervisor. This 
structure resembles a generic form of bureaucratic organization. In this setting, it 
can happen that the supervisor colludes with the agent due to side transfers by the 
agent. It comes not as a surprise that the collusion produces inefficiencies to the 
detriment of the principal. The potential collusion increases the cost of operating 
the hierarchy (Laffont and Tirole1986) by producing large diseconomies of scale 
as each layer involved increases the extracted rent (McAfee and McMillan 1995). 
Thereby the propensity for collusion becomes stronger, the longer the relation 
between the agent and the supervisor endures (Tirole 1986). This already hints at 
the idea of identity, when a supervisor’s view coincides either with the policy goal 
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of the principal or he is more interested in rent extracting for his own purposes in 
coalition with the agent.  
However, neither the imprinting process of identity nor identity itself has become 
an explicit topic in the principal agent literature on bureaucracy so far. 
4.4.2 The institutional theory of policy 
delegation 
Often it is simply assumed that principal agent models are realistic approximations 
of behaviour in organizations and that there is a simple dyadic relationship 
between bureaucrats and politicians. Not much attention has been given to a better 
understanding, why there are goal conflicts between principals and agents in the 
first place and what the dynamics of those goal conflicts are (Moe 1982, 1983, 
Perrow 1986; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004).  
Indeed, bureaucrats have, due to their specific skills, inherent advantages over 
politicians, especially if it is about the implementation of policies. They have a 
good understanding of the organizational procedures and other technicalities of 
bureaucracy; hence they can manipulate the output of bureaucracy to their 
advantage (Miller and Moe 1983; Niskanen 1971). However, from a more 
dynamic perspective another element enters the picture. Politicians aim at policies 
according to their ideology in the political spectrum. In order to implement their 
policy they must win elections, but in democracies they must fear that they will 
not be re-elected and that their policies will be superseded by their successors from 
another party. Thus, durable property rights do not exist in the political market 
(Moe 1983; Segal and Whinston 2010) and politicians must think about other 
vehicles to safeguard their policy stance once they are in office. One of those 
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vehicles is to delegate policies to bureaus not for efficiency considerations but 
rather to make sure for the time when they are no longer in office that their rivals 
cannot easily change the policy. To reach that goal bureaucracies may get extra 
powers and be shielded through administrative independence against political 
influence. As a result, powerful bureaucracies emerge which are imprinted with 
their founders’ identity but leave ample room for the actual bureaucrat to live out 
his own preferences and identity (Moe 1990). In summary, it is fair to say that the 
institutional theory of policy delegation points to important aspects of bureaucracy 
that are not easily captured by agency models. Moreover, the institutional theory 
of policy delegation addresses the problem of how politicians may safeguard their 
identity over time through the means of bureaucracy, giving at the same time 
bureaucrats a great leeway to live out their own identity (Bertelli and Feldmann 
2006). 
4.4.3 The coalition framework of 
bureaucracies  
A bureaucracy does not consist of homogenous individuals with the same goals, 
preferences and identities leading to a monolithic bureaucracy. Rather there are 
different people with very different goals inhabiting a bureaucracy (Simon 1947; 
Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Jo and Rothenberg 2014). Furthermore, the 
bureaucracy as an organization has its own policy goal and some agents identify 
with that goal and others do not. Hence, there can be a divergence of goals within 
an organization (Eisner 1992; Quirk 1981; Kelman 1987). The difference of policy 
goals can be due to differences in the job status of individuals within an 
organization, but also different ideological perceptions may play a role 
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(Waterman, Wright, and Rouse 1994). The presence of multiple agents and 
multiple principals with conflicting goals makes the analysis of a bureaucracy 
rather complicated. Therefore it has been argued that it is much more appropriate 
to assume coalition frameworks rather than traditional principal agent frameworks 
for the analysis of bureaucracies (March and Olsen 1984). 
Efficiency considerations may play a role in coalition building, but not necessarily. 
This strand of literature coincides largely with the so-called “behavioural theory 
of the firm” which regards itself as an alternative to neo-classical approaches of 
the firm.  
The coalition framework has been blamed of being not explicit enough about how 
a certain policy goal becomes stabilized in a bureaucracy over time and how a 
bureaucracy can stabilize itself as a corporate actor (Waterman and Meier 1998; 
Cohen 2012; Howlett 2009). But the coalition framework clearly points to the fact 
that bureaucracies have an internal structure built by people who share identities 
with each other (or not) and who engage with each other (or not) to pursue their 
goals in groups (Howlett 2002).  
4.4.4 Identity as non-monetary reward 
The basic principal agent model considers a generic goal conflict between 
bureaucracy and legislature. The notion of goal conflict, however, gets blurred 
when bureaucratic structure is taken into account. For example, if the legislature 
delegates a policy to the bureaucracy, multiple agents within the bureaucracy may 
have different functional tasks as well as different individual policy goals, making 
the overall goal conflict between legislation and bureaucracy less predictable. 
Furthermore, standard agency models of bureaucracy are challenged because of 
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the non-pecuniary motives of bureaucrats, which embody norms, culture, or the 
idea of public sector ethos (Perry and Wise 1990; Breham and Gates 1999; Meier 
and O’Toole 2006; Buelens and Broeck 2007). This underscores the need for 
extending agency models by incorporating organizational features as well as to 
take into account the identity of bureaucrats. 
From an agency perspective, a bureaucrat’s utility is a function of his income that 
he receives from the principal in the form of a budget. At the same time, he gets 
disutility from the effort that he puts in on behalf of the principal administering the 
budget. However, if the bureaucrat’s policy preferences are endogenous, he gets 
utility from performing the task, and in that case the principal can even pay out a 
smaller budget to reach the policy goal. This is in line with Prendergast (2007) 
who argues that bureaucrats can have an intrinsic motivation in carrying out 
policies. Intrinsic motivation is related to, for example, finding sense in work, 
idealistic stances, or professionalism (Wilson 1989; Dewatripont, Jewitt, Tirole 
1999) all of which lower the necessary budget. The flipside is that when the policy 
preferences of the principal and the agent diverge, then the principal has to control 
the policy drift not only by pecuniary incentives or tighter oversight mechanisms 
but also by influencing and changing the identity of the bureaucrat.  
The notion of identity provides not only a plausible explanation for the 
effectiveness of non-monetary incentives in organizations, but also a sort of tub 
for the behavioural stances of bureaucrats, which make them deviate from 
opportunism. As a result, identity is a label for the strong binding forces of social 
networking in organizations, which have to be taken into account when a deeper 
analysis of bureaucratic decision-making is desired.  
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In the following we will elaborate on a formal model of bureaucracy that 
incorporates identity into an agency framework. This way it will become possible 
to reconcile the standard economic agency framework of bureaucracy with 
behavioural approaches for the explanation of bureaucratic decision making.  
4.5 An agency model of bureaucracy with 
identity 
In this section we develop a benchmark model for studying more deeply 
bureaucratic behaviour in an organizational hierarchy. In the model, it is assumed 
that bureaucrats aim at their individual advantage but have different identities. 
Bureaucrats may have a stance of identifying themselves with the goal of the 
bureaucracies and derive utility from this identification. Or, they may not identify 
themselves with the goal of the bureaucracy and gain utility only from pursuing 
strategies for their own benefit. Because both types of bureaucrats are tied together 
in the vertical hierarchy of bureaucracy, the interaction of both types of bureaucrats 
leads to non-trivial outcomes of bureaucratic behaviour. 
Before we formally set up the model, it is important to emphasize that we treat the 
identity of the bureaucrat as exogenously given. An endogenous treatment of 
identity would require formalizing the myriad sources of identity that have been 
highlighted in the literature, and this would make the model intractable. For 
example, a number of studies in the realms of behavioural economics have 
explored the factors that can give rise to the identity of agents. Davies (2006) 
argues that identity is formed with the confluence of four dimensions of self, 
namely self-centred welfare, self-welfare goal, self-goal choice and commitment. 
Whereas self-centred welfare pertains to an individual’s own satisfaction, a self-
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welfare goal permits an individual’s satisfaction (utility) to depend on other 
individuals’ satisfaction. The self-goal choice allows the incorporation of non-self-
welfare objectives such as welfare of the society, community or an organization. 
Individual commitment, on the other hand, implies that individual choice may be 
driven by values and objectives of the individuals regardless of any personal gain 
or loss. According to Benabou and Tirole (2006), individuals may invest in 
developing certain understandings of themselves and a desire to retain these 
images for themselves and for others. Identity and group norms may also emerge 
when individuals are driven by norms that evolve to maintain a sense of belonging 
and when they desire confirmation of their beliefs (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 
While different factors may give rise to identity, it is malleable and can change by 
inculcating ethos and values in specifically designed programs (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2005). For example military training is designed to alter the identities of 
the recruits so that they conform to the organizational goals of the military. 
Similarly, training programs for civil servants aim at developing their affinity with 
the organization so that they follow certain group norms that can form part of their 
identity. The model developed below incorporates the notion of identity in a way 
that it is not tied to any specific source of identity but is rather flexible enough to 
capture different interpretations of identity as long as the analysis is based on 
identity-augmented utility function as discussed below.       
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a. Model set-up 
The model consists of three players: A legislator who is the principal and two 
bureaucrats (labelled 1 and 2) who represent a boss-subordinate pair in a vertical 
hierarchy. Let ܳ א Թାା denote a composite good provided by the bureaucracy. 
The composite good can be thought of as encompassing all the goods and services 
publicly provided by the bureaucracy such as health, education, or physical 
infrastructure. For simplicity, we assume that the composite good comprises only 
two types of publicly provided goods and services ܳ௔ and ܳ௕. Let ݇ be the share 
of ܳ௔ in composite output, i.e. ܳ௔ ൌ ݇ܳ. Similarly, let ሺͳ െ ݇ሻ be the share of ܳ௕ 
in composite output, i.e. ܳ௕ ൌ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳ . The variable ݇ א ሾͲǡͳሿ  can be thus 
thought of as representing a single dimension policy space capturing budgetary 
allocation policy.  
The bureaucracy uses prefixed budgetary resources ሺܤሻ for the production of the 
composite good. The aggregate production technology for the production of the 
composite good is defined by the following cost function: 
ܶܥ ൌ ߦሺܳሻ         (1) 
Where ܶܥ are the total costs with ߦொ ൐ Ͳ and ߦொொ ൒ Ͳ.  
The principal derives utility from the provision of the composite good and provides 
the budget ሺܤሻto the bureaucracy. The payoff of the principal can be defined as20: 
ܷ௉ሺܤǢ ݇ǡ ܳሻ ൌ ௔ܹሺ݇ܳሻ ൅ ௕ܹሺሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳሻ െ ܥሺܤሻ    (2) 

ʹͲNotice that equation (2) also implicitly defines the policy preferences of the principal towards 
the budgetary allocation policy. More specifically, maximization of (2) with respect to the 
budgetary allocation policy  will yield the policy preferences of the principal. 
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௜ܹሺǤ ሻ is the principal’s assessment of goods and services provided by the 
bureaucracy and ܥሺܤሻ is the opportunity cost of providing budgetary resources to 
the bureaucracy. It is assumed that ௜ܹᇱሺǤ ሻ ൐ Ͳ and ௜ܹᇱᇱሺǤ ሻ ൑ Ͳ for ݅ א ሼܽǡ ܾሽ and 
ܥሺܤሻ is an increasing convex function with ܥᇱሺܤሻ ൐ Ͳܥᇱᇱሺܤሻ ൒ ͲǤ   
We define the bureaucratic agency as a boss-subordinate relationship. Player 1 is 
the boss of a bureaucratic agency whereas player 2 is his subordinate. It is assumed 
that the boss sets the overall policy direction whereas the subordinate produces the 
public output in line with the policy guidelines of his boss. This setting coincides 
with the process of public policy determination in a bureaucracy where decision-
making takes place in a vertical hierarchy in which players have different statutory 
policy making powers. The higher echelons chalk out the broader strategic 
direction whereas the lower echelons then implement the policies. For example, 
the secretary of a ministry decides how much of the budget will be allocated to 
physical infrastructure and the subordinate will program it to specific 
infrastructure projects as highways and railway tracks. 
Furthermore, the boss is assumed to have an identity as an insider who is inclined 
to pursue the organizational goal of the bureaucracy. The organizational goal can 
be expressed in terms of a specific budgetary allocation policy ݇ଵ. For example, 
the bureaucracy might favour a certain development strategy that requires a 
particular level of budgetary allocation across different sectors such as physical 
infrastructure (say ܳ௔) or social sectors (say ܳ௕). A higher ݇ଵ would thus indicate 
a bureaucracy’s preference for spending more on physical infrastructure as 
compared with social sectors. Given this organizational goal, a boss with insider 
identity has an intrinsic incentive to pursue the organizational goal and thus would 
lose utility if he deviates from ݇ଵ. The utility of the boss can thus be defined as: 
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ଵܷሺ݇Ǣ ܳǡ ݇ଵሻ ൌ ଵܸ௔ሺ݇ܳሻ ൅ ଵܸ௕൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳ൯ െ ߣሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻଶ   (3) 
The boss is assumed to derive positive utility from the overall size of bureaucracy, 
as measured by the quantities of the two public goods provided ( ଵܸ௜).  But because 
of his identity as an insider, he experiences a disutility െߣሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻଶ  when he 
deviates from the organizational goal. The parameter ߣ ൐ Ͳ captures the identity 
of the boss. 
Contrary to the boss the subordinate has an outsider identity and maximizes his 
utility without regard to the organizational goal.21 The subordinate derives utility 
from the size of the bureaucracy measured in terms of the quantity of the composite 
public good. Because of his strong self-interest he derives also utility from his 
discretion over the budget, which he can use for his own purposes. The utility of 
the subordinate is defined as: 
ܷଶሺܳሻ ൌ ଶܸொሺܳሻ ൅ ଶܸௌሺሺܤ െ ߦሺܳሻሻ      (4) 
ܷଶ is the utility of the subordinate, ଶܸ௝ is the subordinate’s assigned value to the 
composite public good ሺܳሻ and ଶܸௌሺሺܤ െ ߦሺܳሻሻ is the discretion over the budget.  
It is plausible to assume asymmetric information between the legislator and the 
bureaucracy as well as within the hierarchy of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy 
has private information about its costs, which cannot be observed by the principal. 
According to (1) the total costs are given as: 
ܶܥ ൌ ߦሺܳሻ ൌ ߶ܳ        (5) 

21  It is shown in Appendix 4B that even if the subordinate also has a policy goal, the 
equilibrium is determined independently of his policy goal as long as the manager makes the policy 
choice. Hence, the assumption that the subordinate maximizes his utility without regard to 
organizational goal is not implausible. 
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߶ ൐ Ͳ are the marginal costs of production of the composite public good. ߶ is a 
random variable with a uniform probability distribution over the interval ሾܽǡ ܾሿǤ 
The subordinate knows the marginal costs whereas the boss and the principal only 
know its probability distribution. 
The equilibrium is then defined as a triplet ሺܤכǡ ݇כǡ ܳכሻ such that: 
ܤכ ൌ ܷ௉ሺܤǢ ݇כǡ ܳכሻ ൌ ௔ܹሺ݇כܳכሻ ൅ ௕ܹሺሺͳ െ ݇כሻܳכሻ െ ܥሺܤሻ (6) 
݇כ ൌ  ଵܷሺ݇Ǣ ܳכǡ ݇ଵሻ ൌ ଵܸ௔ሺ݇ܳכሻ ൅ ଵܸ௕൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳכ൯ െ ߣሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻଶ (7) 
ܳכ ൌ ܷଶሺܳǢ ܤכሻ ൌ ଶܸொሺܳሻ ൅ ଶܸௌሺሺܤכ െ ߦሺܳሻሻ   (8) 
b. Specification of functional forms 
In a next step we have to derive the functional forms of the model and to get closed 
form solutions. To work out the closed form solutions we specify the functional 
forms for the players’ valuations and accordingly the budgetary constraints. In 
particular: 
௔ܹሺ݇ܳሻ ൌ ߭ሺ݇ܳሻ        (9) 
 ௔ܹሺ݇ܳሻ is the utility that the principal derives from ܳ௔. We assume that the utility 
function is linear, implying that the principal’s marginal utility ݒ  from ܳ௔  is 
constant, if the quantity of the composite public good ሺܳሻ is raisedǤ  
௕ܹ൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳ൯ ൌ ߛ൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳ൯      (10) 
௕ܹ൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳ൯ is the utility that the principal derives from ܳ௕. Accordingly we 
assume that the utility function is linear implying that the principal’s marginal 
utility ߛ from ܳ௕ is constant, if the quantity of the composite public good ሺܳሻ is 
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raised. Since the principal assigns different values to ܳ௔ and ܳ௕ it holds that ߛ ്
ݒ.  
ܥሺܤሻ ൌ ߱ܤ         (11) 
ܥሺܤሻ are the marginal opportunity costs that the budget produces for the principal. 
The principal could spend the budget also for other projects than the composite 
public good ሺܳሻ . For example, he could pay back sovereign debts. ܥሺܤሻ  is 
considered to be a linear function of the budget B with a marginal opportunity cost 
given by ߱Ǥ 
ଵܸ௔ሺ݇ܳሻ ൌ ߙଵ௔ሺ݇ܳሻ        (12) 
 ଵܸ௔ሺ݇ܳሻ  is the utility that the boss derives from ܳ௔  if the quantity of the 
composite public good ሺܳሻ is raised. We assume that the utility function is linear; 
implying the marginal utility ߙଵ௔ from ܳ௔ is constant. 
ଵܸ௕ሺሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳሻ ൌ ߙଵ௕൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳ൯      (13) 
Accordingly ଵܸ௕൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳ൯  is the utility that the boss derives from ܳ௕  if the 
quantity of the composite public good ሺܳሻ is raised. We assume that the utility 
function is linear implying that the marginal utility of the boss ߙଵ௕  from ܳ௕  is 
constantǤ Furthermore, we assume that the marginal utilities that the boss derives 
from ܳ௔ and ܳ௕ are different (ߙଵ௔ ് ߙଵ௕). This implies that the boss values the 
two public goods differently.  
ଶܸொሺܳሻ ൌ ߤଶܳ        (14) 
 ଶܸொሺܳሻ is the utility that the subordinate derives from the composite public good 
ሺܳሻǤ  It is considered that the utility function is linear, implying that the 
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subordinate’s marginal utility ߤଶ from the composite public good is constantǤ To 
keep the model tractable it is further assumed that the subordinate only cares about 
the overall size of the bureaucracy, which is captured by the level of the composite 
output, and not the composition of the public output in terms of ܳ௔ and ܳ௕Ǥ This 
assumption is plausible, when an outsider identity is presumed and the bureaucrat 
mainly cares for the size of the budget, which he gets under control. 
ߦሺܳሻ ൌ ߶ܳ         (15) 
The total cost is a linear function of output. The more output is produced the more 
is the total cost. The linear cost function implies that the marginal cost ߶  is 
constant. 
ଶܸௌሺܤ െ ߶ܳሻ ൌ ሺܤ െ ߶ܳሻఙ; with Ͳ ൏ ߪ ൏ ͳ    (16) 
 ଶܸௌሺܤ െ ߶ܳሻ is the subordinate’s utility derived from budgetary discretion or 
slack (the amount of the budget that is not spent for the production of the public 
good, but is available for the subordinate to pursue his own goals). The slack is 
defined as the total budget ܤ  minus the cost of production ߶ܳ , and ߪ  is the 
elasticity of slack. We assume that the utility from budgetary slack has diminishing 
marginal utility (ߪ ൏ ͳሻ. This assumption is reasonable, because otherwise the 
subordinate would simply appropriate the whole budget as slack and would not 
produce public output at all. 
Finally, using the above functional forms, the payoffs of the players can be written 
as: 
ܷ௉ሺܤǢ ݇ǡ ܳሻ ൌ ߭ሺ݇ܳሻ ൅ ߛ൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳ൯ െ ߱ܤ     (17) 
ଵܷሺ݇Ǣ ܳǡ ݇ଵሻ ൌ ߙଵ௔ሺ݇ܳሻ ൅ ߙଵ௕ሺሺͳ െ ݇ሻܳሻ െ ߣሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻଶ   (18) 
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ܷଶሺܳǢ ܤሻ ൌ ߤଶܳ ൅ ሺܤ െ ߶ܳሻఙ      (19) 
c. Solution of the benchmark model 
The interaction of the principal, the boss and the subordinate can be understood as 
a sequential game. At the first stage, the principal chooses a level of the budget.  
At the second stage, the bureaucracy observes this level of budget and determines 
its output. The budgetary allocation policy is then determined in a sequential move 
sub-game. In this sub-game the boss moves first and decides the allocation policy. 
The subordinate then decides the level of the composite public good.  
The sub-game can be solved by backward induction. We assume that the budgetary 
size and the allocation of the budget have already been decided and it is up to the 
subordinate to decide how to effectively implement it given his production 
technology. In our model the best response of the subordinate will significantly 
impact the allocation decision and budgetary size at later stages of the game.  
Step 1: The optimization problem of the subordinate 
The decision problem of the subordinate writes as: 
୕ܷଶሺܳǢ ܤሻ ൌ ߤଶܳ ൅ ሺܤ െ ߶ܳሻఙ     (20) 
The solution to this problem can be written as (see appendix 4A) 
෠ܳሺܤሻ ൌ ሺͳ ߶Τ ሻܤ െ ߠሺͳ ߶ሻΤ ఎ       (21) 
Where ߠ  and ߟ  are parameters defined in terms of the marginal utility of the 
subordinate derived from the composite public good and the elasticity of the 
budgetary slack (see appendix 4A)  
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Equation (21) is the best response function of the subordinate for each budgetary 
allocation determined by the principal. It shows that an increase in the level of 
budget encourages the subordinate to increase the output of the composite public 
good. The extent of the increase depends on the productivity of the bureaucracy, 
which is the inverse of the marginal cost of production (i.e. ͳ ԄΤ ). Simply put, if a 
bureaucracy produces at low marginal cost, then an increase of budgetary 
resources translates into an over-proportional output of the composite public good, 
while high marginal costs lead to a proportionally low increase of output. This 
observation reveals that the principal as well as the boss must have an interest in 
encouraging bureaucratic efficiency through appropriate incentives at the level of 
subordinates (for this finding see also Benabou and Tirole 2003; Dixit  2002).  
Proposition 1: Along the optimal path the subordinate, according to his marginal 
productivity, increases the output of the composite public good as a response to an 
increase of budgetary resources. 
The optimal path of the subordinate (equation 21) determines precisely how the 
subordinate reacts to changes of the budget allocation to bureaucracy. For 
example, if the principal decides to enhance the budgetary allocation, then the 
subordinate observes this increase and provides more composite output in order to 
maximize his utility. The extent of the increase in composite output is directly 
proportional to the productivity of the subordinate. However, what is important 
here is that we take organizational slack into account (equation 21). Organizational 
slack allows a subordinate to spend resources disproportionately on individual 
utility enhancing expenditures, for example perks, privileges and patronage 
(Lindsay 1976; Williamson 1964). As a result organizational slack hinders a 
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bureaucracy from being efficient, when a growing budget goes into the pockets of 
subordinate bureaucrats. 
Step 2: The optimization problem of the boss 
Given the optimal response of the subordinate, we solve next the optimization 
problem of the boss, who chooses the budgetary allocation policy, in order to 
maximize his expected utility. 
୩ܧ ଵܷሺ݇Ǣ ܳǡ ݇ଵሻ ൌ ܧ ቄߙଵ௔ ቀ݇ ෠ܳሺܤሻቁ ൅ ߙଵ௕ ቀሺͳ െ ݇ሻ ෠ܳሺܤሻቁ െ ߣሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻଶቅ   
 (22) 
The solution to the maximization problem is expressed as: 
෠݇ሺܤሻ ൌ ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻ ʹߣΤ ሿሾܤܧሺͳ ߶ሻΤ െ ߠܧሺͳ ߶ሻΤ ఎሿ ൅ ݇ଵ   (23) 
ܧሺͳ ߶ሻΤ  is the expected productivity of the subordinate22 (for further details see 
appendix 4A). 
Proposition 2: The boss’ optimal choice of budgetary allocation policy depends 
on a composite of the marginal utilities derived from the composite public good, 
the identity parameter and his policy preference, taking into account the expected 
productivity of the subordinate.  
For example, along the optimal path an increase of budgetary resources would 
prompt the boss to alter his budgetary allocation policy in favour of ܳ௔ , if his 
marginal utility of ܳ௔  exceeds that of ܳ௕  and vice versa. However, the boss’ 
identity mediates this not surprising result in a non-trivial way, because the higher 
the expected marginal cost of production, the lower the expected productivity of 

ʹʹWhere ߠ ൌ ሺߤଶ ߪΤ ሻଵ ఙିଵΤ , ߟ ൌ ߪ ߪ െ ͳΤ  ሺߟ ൏ Ͳሻ and ߶ is the marginal cost of production.
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the subordinate, and so the less incentive there is for the boss to move his allocation 
policy from the point that coincides with his identity. As a result, the utility derived 
from growing public outputs might not be sufficient to induce the boss to change 
his policy ideal (for a similar argumentation see Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). Thus, 
while an increase in budgetary resources works as an incentive for the boss to 
change his budgetary allocation policy away from his ideal point, the freedom of 
the boss to adjust his policy stance is limited by his identity, which constrains the 
decisions of the boss. The stronger the identity of the boss is (a higher ߣሻ, the lower 
is the boss’ willingness to change his budgetary allocation policy, and thus the 
more budgetary resources would be required to induce him to change the 
budgetary policy. Thereby the subordinate significantly influences the allocation 
decision of the boss. If the subordinate is highly productive then this will induce 
the boss to change his budgetary allocation policy more easily and to deviate from 
his policy stance to reap the benefit of a higher public output. This result once 
more underscores the importance of including strategic interaction within a 
bureaucratic hierarchy into analyses of public policy making. The productivity of 
the subordinate not only has implications for the identity-based policy choices of 
the boss, it can also matter for the decisions of the principal. Hence a whole 
cascade of inter-related choices unfolds. A legislator may exactly know which 
policy outcomes should be achieved – such as a workable pension system or a 
reliable supply of clean water – but the legislator may be uncertain about the 
specific policy, which will achieve the objective. For example, a pension system 
might work either through private contribution to insurance schemes or through 
payments from general public revenues. But while the boss may be informed about 
specific policies to reach a certain policy goal (and hence the choice of policy may 
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be in the hands of the boss), he may not have all the relevant information about the 
appropriate technology available at the implementation level. This gives a sort of 
strategic advantage to the subordinate, and hence the latter’s productivity becomes 
crucial for the principal and the boss to get their policy stance implemented. 
However, the boss is more informed about the internal attributes of the 
bureaucracy than the principal and as a consequence he can exploit this 
informational advantage in order to leverage his agenda setting power to constrain 
the choices of the principal. This issue relates directly to one of the most prominent 
problems of political agency, namely bureaucratic drift where the bureaucracy 
pursues policies that subvert or diverge from the goals of the principal (Gailmard 
2002, Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson 2007; Horn and Shepsle 1989; Shepsle 
1992). 
Step 3: The optimization problem of the principal 
Given the optimal solutions for the provision of the composite public good and the 
decision on the budgetary allocation policy (equations 21 and 23), the principal 
chooses a level of budget to maximize his expected utility: 
୆ܧܷ௉ሺܤǢ ݇ǡ ܳሻ ൌ ܧ ቄ߭ ቀ෠݇ሺܤሻ ෠ܳሺܤሻቁ ൅ ߛ ቀ൫ͳ െ ෠݇ሺܤ൯ ෠ܳሺܤሻቁ െ ߱ܤቅ (24) 
This optimization problem can be solved to yield the optimal level of budget: 
ܤכ ൌ ߣൣሺɘ െ ߛǤ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻ െ ሺ߭ െ ߛሻǤ ݇ଵሿ ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕Τ ሻǤ ሺ߭ െ ߛሻǤ ሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶ൧ ൅
ߠǤ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻఎȀሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶ       (25) 
Backward substitution yields the equilibrium values of the budgetary allocation 
policy (݇כሻand the composite public output ܳכ . Put together, these solutions 
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define the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the benchmark model. It is 
characterized by ሺכǡ כǡ כሻ such that: 
ܤכ ൌ ߣൣሺ߱ െ ߛܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻ െ ሺ߭ െ ߛሻ݇ଵሿ ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕Τ ሻሺ߭ െ ߛሻሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶ൧ ൅
ߠܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻఎ ሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶΤ        (26) 
 
݇כ ൌ ሾ߱ െ ߛܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻሿ ሾʹሺ߭ െ ߛሻܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻሿΤ 
൅ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻߠܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻఎ ʹߣሿሾ൫ͳ െ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻ൯ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻሿΤΤ 
൅݇ଵሾሺʹܧሺͳ ߶ሻ െ ͳΤ ሻ ʹܧሺͳ ߶ሻΤΤ ሿ      (27) 
 
ܳכ ൌ ሺͳ ߶ሻሼΤ ߣൣሺɘ െ ߛܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻ െ ሺ߭ െ ߛሻ݇ଵሿ ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕Τ ሻሺെߛሻሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶ൧
൅ሾߠܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻఎ ሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶሿሽ െ ߠΤ ሺͳ ߶Τ ሻఎ     (28) 
A unique equilibrium exists if the preferences of the principal and the boss are not 
aligned for the two public goods, i.e. ሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻሺ߭ െ ߛሻ ൏ Ͳ. This is the case 
when the boss’ marginal utility from providingܳ௔is higher than the marginal 
utility derived from the provision of ܳ௕ , and if the principal’s marginal utility 
derived from ܳ௔ is lower than that derived from ܳ௕, and vice versa.  
Proposition 3: A shift in the organizational goal of the boss to allocate more 
budgetary resources to the public good ܳ௔ (an increase in ݇ଵ) induces the principal 
to allocate more (less) budget to the bureaucracy, if the principal’s marginal utility 
from ܳ௔ is greater (less) than the marginal utility from the public good ܳ௕.  
This result illustrates how the principal’s strategic reaction to a shift in the 
organizational goal of the bureaucracy is influenced by the insider identity of the 
boss. Since the principal knows the insider identity of the boss, he anticipates the 
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propensity of the boss to shift the budgetary allocation towards ܳ௔. If the principal 
also prefers a higher ܳ௔ then the principal will increase the budget. If the principal 
prefers instead a higher ܳ௕ the budget will be decreased, in order to shrink the 
leeway of the boss. This means that the fact of the principal knowing the insider 
identity of the boss does not necessarily produce an ideal outcome from the 
standpoint of the principal and may exacerbate the problem of policy drift. Or, to 
put it differently, while normally the preferences of the principal in combination 
with the preferences of the bureaucrats are assumed to play the pivotal role in 
determining the overall policy direction, here the organizational goal of the boss 
takes primacy over the budgetary allocation process. This is because the boss gives 
more weight to the organizational goal and allocates a larger or smaller budget to 
a public good than his personal preferences would dictate to him. Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000, 717) describe this effect as a new type of externality in the process 
of decision-making. This finding has a straightforward policy implication, because 
if there are trade-offs between individual preferences and a person’s identity, then 
it might be more appropriate to nudge the identity of the boss in a bureaucracy 
than to constrain the bureaucracy by law and regulations (Akerlof and Kranton 
2005, pp. 13-15). However, the question is to what extent identity is mutable. 
Corollary: A shift in the organizational goal of the boss to allocate more budgetary 
resources to ܳ௔ (an increase in ݇ଵ), would result in more (less) provision of the 
composite public good if the principal’s marginal utility fromܳ௔(e.g. physical 
infrastructure) is greater (lower) than the marginal utility from ܳ௕  (e.g. social 
sectors) 
This result is a straightforward extension of proposition 3. A shift in the 
organizational goal of the boss towards the preferences of the principal induces the 
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principal to allocate a greater budget to the bureaucracy. An increase in budgetary 
resources in turn would encourage the subordinate to produce more of the 
composite public output. On the other hand, if the organizational goal of the 
bureaucracy diverges from the preferences of the principal, the bureaucracy’s 
budget would be curtailed leading to a lower production of the composite public 
good. Apparently the insider identity of the boss is instrumental to the extent that 
it ensures the adoption of public policy by the boss in tandem with the shift of the 
organizational goal. This in turn has repercussions for the allocation of the budget 
by the principal to the bureaucracy.  
In our model policy drift stems directly from identity driven preferences of the 
boss in a bureaucratic hierarchy. This distinguishes our model from earlier 
literature, where the principal is hesitant to delegate policy authority if the policy 
goal of the bureaucracy diverges from that of the principal (Gailmard 2009). In 
contrast, in our model even when the policy goals between the bureaucracy and 
the principal diverge, policy delegation may still take place. 
Proposition 4: An increase of the opportunity cost of the budget induces the 
principal to a reduction of the budget allocation to bureaucracy leading to a lower 
provision of the composite public good. On the other hand, an increase of the 
opportunity cost of the budget prompts the boss to a change of the budgetary 
allocation policy towards more (less) allocation of budgetary resources to ܳ௔(e.g. 
physical infrastructure) if the principal’s marginal utility of physical infrastructure 
is greater (lower) than the marginal utility derived from ܳ௕ (e.g. social sectors). 
An increase of the opportunity costs of the budget forces the principal to cut the 
bureaucracy’s budget, which in turn results in a lower provision of the composite 
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public good. More importantly, an increase of the opportunity cost of the budget 
prompts the boss to change his budgetary allocation policy with regards to ܳ௔and 
ܳ௕ . The direction of this policy change, however, depends on the relative 
magnitudes of the principal’s marginal utilities from the provision of the two 
public goods. Thereby, it is important to emphasize the role of bureaucratic 
hierarchy. The boss takes into account the strategic responses of the principal as 
well as that of the subordinate. For example, if the budgetary resources are cut, the 
boss anticipates a decline in the provision of the composite public output and 
reallocates the budget in line with the preferences of the principal. 
In summary, the above analysis demonstrates how public policy is shaped by the 
interplay of the insider identity of the boss, the organizational structure of the 
bureaucracy and the preferences of the different players. The extent to which the 
identity of the bureaucracy is aligned with the goals of the principal becomes the 
key for understanding the determination of public policy in a bureaucracy. The 
game-theoretic framework presented here focuses exactly on the alignment of 
identities across different levels of bureaucracy by taking a hierarchical 
organizational structure into account as well as strategic interactions among the 
players.  
4.6 General remarks 
Some points are noteworthy with reference to the foregoing discussion.  
First, the game-theoretic framework is particularly important for examining the 
phenomenon of identity as it situates the individual within an organizational 
structure that allows strategic interaction among the players. Indeed, the notion of 
identity can only be meaningfully studied in a game-theoretic setting because it 
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allows the dependence of an agent’s utility on his identity as well as on other 
agents’ actions. Second, the analysis contributes to an enhanced understanding of 
the process of policy formulation by the bureaucracy in an environment where 
some agents may be distinguished by their distinct identities.  
Third, by linking identity with organizational structure, we provide a conceptual 
elaboration of how identity plays out in a bureaucratic hierarchy where players in 
supervisory positions have identity while players in subordinate roles have no 
identity.  
Finally, by demonstrating how the equilibrium values of the key variables are 
influenced by the interaction of identity, organizational structure and personal 
preferences of the players, we shed new light on the determinants of public policy 
in a bureaucratic organization.  
Our analysis also demonstrates how public policy responds to exogenous changes 
through the interplay of insider identity of the boss, organizational structure of the 
bureaucracy and preferences of principal and boss. It is shown that the insider 
identity of the boss is more important than his personal preferences in determining 
the policy direction. It is important to emphasize here that while identity drives the 
behaviour of the boss in important ways, it plays little role in influencing policy 
outcomes in some circumstances. For example, in a strategic setting, while the 
boss takes due cognizance of the preferences of the principal in determining public 
policy, it is the identity of the boss that underpins the principal’s decision to 
allocate more budget to the bureaucracy. On the other hand, an increase in the 
opportunity cost of the budget forces a budgetary cut regardless of the boss’ 
identity. Besides the question of how and when identity plays a significant role in 


ͳͷͺ

determining policy outcomes, the role of identity must be underscored as an 
instrument to encourage bureaucracy to follow the dictates of the principal. As the 
identity of the boss is linked to the pursuit of a specific organizational goal, the 
principal may develop effective mechanisms to influence the identity of a 
bureaucrat so that his organizational goal becomes aligned with preferences of the 
principal. In this sense, the identity of a bureaucrat can become a self-disciplining 
device that keeps him on course in the choice and implementation of public 
policies and hence reduces the likelihood of discord between principal and 
bureaucracy. 
For an illustration of how preferences of bureaucrats and their productivity interact 
and influence policy outcomes, consider a situation in which the bureaucracy is 
asked to improve the development condition in a city. It could involve improving 
the drainage system, building highways, public health sector or education. 
Bureaucracy may have a norm or mission to allocate more budgets to highways 
rather than to health and education. Let us assume for highways in the city the 
bureaucracy needs to facilitate land acquisition along with measures for anti-
encroachment. How meticulously the bureaucracy appraises each individual 
application for land acquisition represents effectiveness of policy at the 
implementation stage. The policy, even though very efficiently crafted on a 
technical level, may still prove ineffective if the bureaucracy does not invest 
sufficient effort to develop the competence to implement effectively. For example, 
if the bureaucracy were to invest low effort through insufficient staffing, or lack 
of technical support in reviewing permit applications it would be much more prone 
to erroneously grant permits when they should not have been granted or deny 
permits when they should have been granted. In both cases the policy is 
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ineffectively implemented due to lack of productivity. This example — along with 
many others in which agencies grant or deny permits, make licensing decisions, 
provide disaster relief, housing, and other government aid --- illuminates how the 
overall quality of agency operates in the model. If the Agency invests insufficient 
effort then, regardless of its policy choice, the quality of outcomes suffers through 
lack of policy precision, and overall policy outcomes would be lower than 
promised. 
In our set-up identity-driven choices of policymakers are influenced by 
bureaucracy’s productivity, which can be construed as effectiveness of policy 
implementation (Carpenter 2001). For example, a senior bureaucrat may get 
assistance from international development agencies to build a water project while 
he has preferences for highways. If boss is able to motivate those working under 
him to get the job done well in the water project, then he may be compensated for 
his utility loss (due to choice of water project instead of highway) by the enhanced 
productivity of a sub-ordinate, which yields more public output. 
It is thus clear that an agency’s productivity is crucial for the quality of policy 
outcomes as it impacts upon the choices of both boss and principal. The higher the 
level of effort invested by the agency toward implementation, the more precise are 
policy outcomes. Consequently, as agencies choose policy along some substantive 
or ideological dimension they must also effectively implement or enforce policy 
in practice (Carpenter 2001; Derthick 1990; Lipsky 1980). 
The bureaucrat’s identity also determines whether the political principal will make 
fiduciary investment23in terms of budgetary resources of the agency (Krause and 

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O’Connell 2012). Furthermore, the degree of trust by principal (politician) on 
agent (bureaucracy) will be conditioned by organizational norms of the agency. 
As Moe (1985) writes that a political principal entrusts a responsive bureaucrat 
and bestows him with authority and resources with the belief that he will pursue 
the principal’s policy goals. A bureaucrat without identity may place more weight 
on complying with the political principal’s goals and hence can attract more 
budgetary resources. Similarly, in deciding about fiduciary investments, the 
principal may rely on bureaucratic competence24, which increases the reputation 
of the agency to carry out a particular policy task (Carpenter and Krause 2012; 
Gailmard and Patty 2007). 
4.7 Identity and bureaucracy: some 
conclusions  
A bureaucracy is an organization where social norms and policy taste play an 
important role. When the legislator delegates a policy to a bureaucrat it is shaped 
not only by the preferences of the bureaucrat but also by the social norms of the 
organization. This seemingly simple set-up creates a bunch of interesting 
questions: What role does a bureaucrat’s identity play for the policy outcomes? 
What role does the internal organization of bureaucracy play for the policy 
outcome? Do all agents identify alike with the goals of bureaucracy? What are the 
trade-offs between individual and organizational goals faced by a bureaucrat who 
identifies with the organization? And what are the externalities inherent to an 

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identity augmented utility function of top echelon bureaucrats on politicians and 
low-tiered bureaucrats? 
To assess these questions we develop a principal-supervisor-agent (P-S-A) model 
of policy choice, where the legislator and bureaucrats are driven by different 
concerns. The legislator provides the budget; the top echelon bureaucrats make an 
allocation decision according to the goals of the organization, and the subordinate 
implements the policy choice.  
The chapter employs the Akerlof-Kranton concept of identity, in order to give an 
in-depth analytical description of the interaction between identity and hierarchical 
decision-making in a bureaucracy. We incorporate the notion of identity in a game-
theoretic model that emphasizes the strategic interaction among bureaucratic 
actors at different levels of the bureaucracy and the legislator for the determination 
of public policies. In particular it can be shown that the identity of the boss in a 
bureaucracy plays an important role for the determination of public policies. If the 
boss has an insider identity and is driven towards pursuing organizational goals, 
then all equilibrium outcomes of the public policy are affected, including the 
overall size of the budget, the budgetary allocation policy and the size of the 
bureaucracy. Thereby the boss’ decisions are constrained by the opportunity costs 
of budgetary resources and the marginal costs of providing the composite public 
good. Consequently, actual policy choices will only partly coincide with the policy 
ideal of the boss, but are amalgams of organizational and individual decision 
mechanisms, which are interspersed by identity. 
For that background, the chapter contributes in three dimensions to the literature. 
First, we incorporate identity as a non-pecuniary motivation in the bureaucrat’s 
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utility function in order to analyse his behaviour with regard to public policy 
choices. Second, we show that public policies are determined by the interaction of 
the various hierarchical layers of a bureaucracy.  
Third, we identify possible trade-offs between individual preferences of 
bureaucrats and the organizational identity of a bureaucracy. The inclusion of 
identity into the analysis of bureaucracy yields a more facetted picture of 
policymaking. 
Our analysis produces two main results. First, the possibility of an inefficient 
policy outcome, in terms of public good provision, is higher if the identity-based 
preferences of the high-level bureaucrat diverge from the preferred policy goal of 
the legislator. Second, bureaucrats with different roles (policymaking or 
implementation) have different individual goals and it is the interplay of these 
different goals, which determines the provision of the public good. For example, 
whereas the boss wants to adhere to his identity preferences (non-pecuniary goal) 
the subordinate wants to increase the budgetary slack (pecuniary goal). Thus, 
lawmakers should not only be cognizant of the bureaucrats’ identity, but it may be 
more appropriate to nudge the identity of the boss in a bureaucracy than to 
constrain the bureaucracy by laws and regulations, in order to reach a specific 
policy outcome (for a similar result see Akerlof and Kranton 2005, pp. 13-15) 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Policy 
Implications 

5.1 Overview 
The dissertation seeks to maintain that public bureaucracy is an organization in 
which institutional context (prevailing at the time of founding) and the 
organization’s social context play a significant role in shaping the choices of the 
bureaucrats. When the legislator delegates a policy to a bureaucrat it is shaped not 
only by the preferences of the individual bureaucrats but also by the past 
organizational structures, strategies, technologies and social norms of the 
organization.  
Legal theorists, political scholars and economists have all addressed how rational 
actors (legislators) can control the behaviour of agents to whom they delegate 
authority. However, little attention has been given to the underlying causes of 
bureaucratic drift duly taking into account organisational context. The dissertation 
has investigated the behaviour of bureaucrats by exclusively taking into account 
different types of contextual situations that influence bureaucrat’s policy choices.  
In order to understand the context of bureaucratic choices directly stemming from 
the organizational, institutional and social factors, the study encompasses two 
generic research routes, which are covered by the content of three chapters of the 
dissertation. 
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In the first research route the impact of history on present organizational structures 
is investigated with the theory of organizational imprinting. This refers to the 
process through which the economic, social and institutional factors, which 
prevailed at the time of founding, shape present organizational forms and 
attributes. More specifically, organizations tend to adopt those attributes and 
strategies that are particularly suited to reflect the institutional context at the time 
of their establishment. This institutional context is showcased in the form of 
structural rigidity of various organizational attributes over time.  
Following this line of enquiry, the chapter 2 of this dissertation provides a long-
term temporal perspective on the persistence of organizational design. More 
specifically, it has been argued that past patterns are critical to our understanding 
of how bureaucracies and their specific mode of operation become persistent over 
very long time frames. The long term view on the matter allows us to better explore 
and explain why corruption and rent-seeking continue in many bureaucracies 
although the founders of the bureaucracy have disappeared a long time ago and 
history has provided ample chances for a country to change its path.  
The study identifies the triggers of bureaucratic rigidity with the help of the 
Pakistani bureaucracy, which has not essentially changed over the last 150 years. 
The study also provides an account of how certain practices during the colonial 
era of the Indian sub-continent led to unintended consequences in the form of 
bureaucratic power, corruption and control over economic policies. 
Chapter 3 continues to follow the theory of organizational imprinting and argues 
that once the bureaucracy acquires specific characteristics in line with the dictates 
of the environment, the forces of inertia and institutionalization contribute to 
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policy rigidity/status quo bias in the decision-making of the bureaucrat. The 
chapter proposes that organizational actors may be stuck with initial policy 
choices, which may lead to persistent inefficiencies. Hence, the core attributes of 
an organization, besides influencing the type of organization and its form at the 
macro level, also have a deep influence on various micro level characteristics of 
an organization. 
The second research route aims at finding a more valid explanation of actual 
decision making when social context and cognitive stances matter. In chapter 4 of 
this dissertation, it is exemplified that a bureaucratic organization is a formalized 
social system where one considers it as essential to comply with organizational 
goals in order to be considered as a member of the organization. The notion of 
social context in the form of identity not only provides a plausible explanation for 
the effectiveness of non-monetary incentives in an organization, but also a sort of 
tub for behavioural stances of bureaucrats which make them deviate from 
opportunism. As a result identity can be understood as a label for the strong 
binding forces of social networking in organizations, which have to be taken into 
account when one seeks a deeper analysis of bureaucratic decision-making. In 
order to analytically seize the social context of the bureaucratic organization the 
notion of identity is conceptually integrated into the decision calculus of the 
bureaucrat. More explicitly, the term identity is used to describe a bureaucrat’s 
“social category” as well as his “self-image”. In the proposed analysis a bureaucrat 
captures utility gains from behaving in a manner, which is in line with the 
established identity, and he experiences disutility when the behaviour deviates 
from what is dictated by identity.  
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It is important to mention that the term “preferences” in the third and fourth 
chapters refers to choices, which are influenced by the organizational imprinting 
or the social norms of the organization. These choices are introduced in the form 
of inertial-preferences and identity-driven preferences in the decision calculus of 
the bureaucrats. However, the term ‘preferences’ in this study is not meant to refer 
to mental states behind choices, those mental states including assessments of social 
norms, the valuation of inertial imprinting are beyond the scope of the study. The 
focus has been rather on exploring the contextual factors that produce diverse 
choices in particular settings. Furthermore, there is no simple contrast between 
“rationality” and context-oriented choices in our analysis. Individual rationality is 
influenced by the organizational imprinting and social norms, over which 
individual agents have little or no control.  
An understanding of the organizational context of policy choices bears a great deal 
on the design of effective policies to change bureaucratic behaviour. In particular, 
the analyses of the inertial and identity-driven choices point out that many well-
known anomalies in the behaviour of bureaucrats are best explained with reference 
to contextual framework. These contextual factors can either help to produce 
socially optimal choices or force policy choices that are non-optimal from a social 
point of view. Consequently, policy interventions in the form of information 
campaigns, persuasion, training, economic incentives, or legal coercion might be 
necessary to enable bureaucrats to change contextual choices. However, when 
these contextual factors are facilitating optimal choices, no policy intervention is 
required, rather the focus should be to streamline the system in order for 
bureaucrats to act according to these contextual factors. Thus for the policy 
analysis it should be explored, first, how contextual factors play a part in 
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determining choices; especially whether the social or institutional factors promote 
or hinder socially optimal choice. The next step of policy analysis should be to see 
whether the inertial tendency, imprinting and identity oriented choices can be 
obstacles to the efficient provision of public goods, and whether something might 
be done to change them, even if agents are making “simple choices,” and whether 
or not there is “harm to others” for example social welfare loss in the form of 
inefficient provision of public goods. 
In the next section we spell out the main findings of the research and discuss their 
policy implications. 
5.2 Imprinting and bureaucracy 
Chapter 2 discusses that to meet the pressing governance challenges at the time, 
the British laid the foundations of a strong and powerful bureaucracy. At the time 
of independence, Pakistan established the Civil Service of Pakistan that was 
essentially a descendent of the Indian Civil Service ‘in law as well as in spirit’. 
The analysis shows that the historical and institutional context prevailing at the 
time of founding of the bureaucracy left several imprints in terms of its structure 
and power, culture of rent-seeking, and patron-client relationships as a mode of 
governance. Given pressing governance challenges at that time, the colonial 
regime needed a powerful organization that could ensure internal security and 
stability for the smooth collection of revenues. The cadre- based structure of the 
bureaucracy was thus designed to provide an effective centre of governing power 
that could perform complex administrative tasks. In addition the patron-client 
relationships with local elites proved a convenient mode of governance to 


ͳ͸ͻ

consolidate colonial rule, and such relationships inevitably spawned a culture of 
rent-seeking.  
Once the bureaucracy had acquired specific traits in line with the dictates of the 
environment, forces of inertia and institutionalization came into play that 
contributed to their persistence over time. Accustomed to power and an 
authoritative style of governance, the bureaucracy strived to perpetuate its power 
through either forging alliances with other centres of power or through efforts to 
undermine the political process. When a pattern of authority had been established, 
it gained social acceptance and legitimacy through institutionalization of power 
relations, and consequently the bureaucracy remained a dominant player with 
significant clout over administrative functions including the design and 
implementation of economic policies and programs. The bureaucratic power also 
gave rise to rent-seeking as powerful actors used their control over policies and 
resources as instruments to their own advantage. Along the same lines corruption 
showed a tendency to become institutionalized as a shared norm and an objective 
and external fact, which is resistant to change. Corruption also thrived as the 
bureaucracy, learning from the organizational memory, continued with the patron-
client relationships as a mode of governance based on its success in the colonial 
era.  
While centred on Pakistan, the approach and arguments we outline provide 
insights into some common dilemmas of post-colonial bureaucracies. For instance, 
policies for fighting corruption in post-colonial societies are rarely informed by a 
study of colonial structures that have persisted after independence. Rather the 
focus has been on administrative and procedural methods instead of addressing 
perverse incentives embedded in the historical evolution of administrative culture. 
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Before the enactment of procedural laws, one needs to understand the historical 
roots of corruption. Countries like Pakistan have failed in their reform efforts by 
relying on existing mechanisms based on administrative rules and procedures 
rather than tackling the deep-seated incentives for corruption. Hence, there is a 
need for new thinking on administrative structures as well as bureaucratic attitudes 
to effectively address corruption. Such innovations require fresh observation, and 
a theoretical framework quite different from the neo-classical economic 
framework that has dominated corruption reform efforts.  
5.3 Legal implications of the imprinting 
analysis: the case of Pakistan 
To this effect, our analysis provides key insights into the internal structure of a 
bureaucratic system inherited from the colonial masters, revealing a distinctive 
stamp of historical legacy on present bureaucratic forms including incentives for 
corruption. As shown in chapter 2, the culture of rent-seeking and patron-client 
relationships as a mode of governance in the British administrative system was 
successful as these conformed to the institutional demands of the time. 
Furthermore, accustomed to power and authoritative style of governance, 
bureaucracy remained a dominant player even after independence, with significant 
clout over administrative functions including the design and implementation of 
economic policies and programs. Similarly, the success of the organization in the 
colonial era led the post-independence bureaucracy to stick to the same structure 
in terms of mode of governance. The excessive power over economic resources by 
these unelected public officials eventually legitimized corruption as a shared norm. 
This understanding of the dynamics of bureaucratic power and control and the 
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institutional mechanisms through which they are generated and sustained is central 
to fighting corruption. 
In Pakistan three institutions namely, Establishment Division, Federal Public 
Service Tribunal and Federal Public Service Commission, are responsible for the 
efficiency and discipline of the federal public servants. The internal accountability 
process is the responsibility of the Establishment Division (federal) and the 
Services and General Administration Departments (provincial), both staffed by 
members of the bureaucracy enforcing the efficiency and discipline rules on their 
peers with a mandate to enforce minor and major penalties. The external 
accountability authorities require the court of law to determine violations of the 
penal and criminal procedure code on the basis of the Evidence Act, which is the 
law governing evidence in the law courts of Pakistan. However, both internal and 
external accountability mechanisms are often weakened as decisions are evacuated 
on technical considerations of evidence not meeting the requirements of the 
Evidence Act and the judicial process. The Judicial process of accountability 
cannot begin for higher officials without the consent/approval of the bureaucracy 
itself.  
Since independence in 1947, dozens of administrative measures have been taken 
to tackle corruption in bureaucracy in Pakistan. When a bureaucrat is found to be 
involved in corruption, under the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) of 
1999, along with efficiency and disciplinary rules of 1973, he is charged with 
“misconduct”. He can also be charged under section 9 (a) (4) of the National 
Accountability Ordinance (NAO) under which a person is considered involved in 
corruption or corrupt practices if he “misuses his authority so as to gain any benefit 
or favour for him or any other person, or renders or attempts to render or wilfully 


ͳ͹ʹ

fails to exercise his authority to prevent the grant, or rendition of any undue benefit 
or favour which he could have prevented by exercising his authority”.  
Also patron client relationships are described as misconduct as defined under 
Government Servants (E&D) Rules of 1973 and Government Servants (conduct) 
Rules of 1964 for bringing political or other outside influence directly or indirectly 
to bear on the government or any officer in respect of appointment, promotion, 
transfer, punishment, retirement, etc.  
 The president in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan is required to 
appoint a Supreme Court judge to hold an inquiry into such matters. If the judge 
finds a bureaucrat guilty of misconduct (as held by the apex court) or is incapable 
of properly performing his duty, the president will remove him from office.  
As far as the government is concerned, it cannot take action against bureaucrats 
since they enjoy protection under Article 209 of the Constitution, which says civil 
servants are permanent government employees and thus cannot be removed by any 
politician, except for filing a reference in the Supreme Judicial Council. 
To sum up, the government’s anti-corruption approach has been mainly 
prosecutorial, involving the criminalization, investigation and prosecution of 
corrupt behaviour as a special offence. Little attention has been devoted to 
understanding the underlying institutional determinants of corruption, which is 
important for designing an effective anti-corruption strategy. That’s the core 
reason that, although administrative initiatives have been introduced repeatedly 
over decades, levels of corruption have actually increased in the bureaucracy.  
Over the years, some 34 federal and provincial institutions have been created with 
a variety of control mandates to ensure the efficiency, responsibility and 
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accountability of the administrative agencies. To strengthen efforts to curb 
corruption, the government enacted the Ehtesab Ordinance and established the 
National Accountability Bureau (NAB), which is currently the supreme anti-
corruption agency in the country. However, NAB remains mired in controversy 
due to politicization and its failure to catch top bureaucrats and politicians involved 
in corruption. 
The failure of efforts to control corruption can be understood in the light of our 
analysis in chapter 2, which shows that corruption thrives on discretionary powers 
of the bureaucracy that facilitate their rent-seeking motives. A key policy lesson is 
that a system of governance where power and corruption have been 
institutionalized cannot be dismantled by administrative procedures alone. What 
is needed is a holistic approach towards fighting corruption based on a complete 
understanding of the institutional environment, which creates incentives for 
corruption in the first place. In this context, policies should aim at minimizing 
bureaucratic discretion while at the same time ensuring the smooth functioning of 
the bureaucracy. Putting in place transparent guidelines for bureaucratic conduct 
coupled with strict enforcement of accountability mechanisms can be instrumental 
in controlling corruption. Furthermore, education and training programs can be 
effective in influencing the behaviour of bureaucrats. In particular, anti-corruption 
programs in the bureaucracy may target fresh recruits to inculcate values of 
honesty and integrity. As shown in chapter 2, in the formative years individuals in 
an organization are more flexible and hence can be ‘imprinted’ by honest work 
ethics that can help the organization break away from the past. For example, new 
entrants to Pakistan’s civil service are provided with training at the time of their 
induction into the service. The training program is aimed at educating the trainees 
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about Pakistan’s socio-economic structure, demographics, and public 
administration methods. The curriculum of the training program may include at 
least one course on work ethos and social values that can be helpful in creating a 
sense of civic and honest behaviour among public servants.  
Some other measures such as increases in salaries to partially accommodate for 
loss in income originating from corrupt practices, as well as a combination of 
administrative measures and appeals to conscience can result in a reduction of 
corrupt behaviour. For example, providing for strong internal administrative 
accountability and vigilance in systems and procedures with strict compliance can 
help to reduce corruption. Similarly, introducing mandatory disclosure and 
transparency requirements, including the application of information 
communications technology to all appropriate processes and procedures and 
treating any failure on this count as a criminal offence can be helpful in reducing 
corruption. Also, a system of promotions based on merit rather than rigid 
procedural requirements can be effective in giving administrative control to honest 
civil servants. 
To sum up, some important policy lessons emerge from this analysis.  
First, bureaucratic power and corruption are intertwined and thus policies should 
aim to curb bureaucratic power so as to minimize bureaucratic discretion without 
compromising their functional responsibilities and work efficiency. This could be 
achieved by laying out clear and transparent rules and guidelines for bureaucratic 
conduct as well as strict enforcement of bureaucratic accountability to minimize 
the chances of malfeasance.  
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Second, policy interventions to fight corruption need to control the malaise of rent-
seeking by reforming the regulatory apparatus so that bureaucracy is weaned away 
from patron-client relationships to a system of governance based on public service 
delivery. The Pakistan government has taken steps in that direction. For example, 
the government has curtailed the role of bureaucracy in major economic sectors 
including energy and telecoms and appointed independent regulatory agencies 
such as National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) and Pakistan 
Telecommunication Authority (PTA). Such initiatives are expected to keep 
important businesses out of the bureaucratic reach thus minimizing rent-seeking 
opportunities.  
Finally, the civil service reform programs in developing economies, often 
supported by the donor agencies, must be designed while keeping in view the 
historical and institutional context that plays a pivotal role in shaping bureaucratic 
behaviour. Indeed, past experience has shown that civil service reforms have 
largely failed, not least because of the neglect of the local context in the design of 
the reforms. Failure to take due cognizance of the context factors seriously impairs 
the effectiveness of policy instruments designed to control corruption in the public 
sector. In Pakistan for example, the World Bank launched the Public Sector 
Capacity Building Project in 2004 with the aim of improving the system of 
governance through civil service reforms. However, it is widely believed that 
despite such donor supported efforts, civil service reforms in Pakistan have not 
yielded the desired results, due mainly to the absence of a ‘home-grown’ reforms 
program that takes into account the local institutional context.  
The foregoing discussion underscores a key point of this research, that roots of 
corruption go deeper than is generally realized by researchers and policymakers. 
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Consequently, anti-corruption policies need to be based on a thorough 
understanding of the historical and institutional factors, which shape attitudes 
towards corruption. Most of the earlier literature on corruption focuses on the 
financial incentives of bureaucrats to indulge in rent-seeking behaviour and 
consequently their recommendations are restricted to devising schemes for 
monetary compensation. In contrast, our research has derived some important 
policy implications that aim to target the institutional drivers of corruption so as to 
improve the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. 
5.4 Lessons from inertia and policy rigidity 
analysis  
The notion of initial imprinting reinforces assumptions in the classic delegation 
models that agency preferences and incentives may be set when the agency is 
created.  Following this line of enquiry, chapter 3 of the dissertation analysed how 
imprinting results in inertia and policy rigidity.  
In particular, the study develops a theoretical framework that synthesizes insights 
from the theory of organisational imprinting with budget-maximization in the 
tradition of Niskanen. The proposed framework shows that organisational and 
institutional constraints embedded in initial policy choices, fundamentally alter 
subsequent policy choices of bureaucracies and this is consequential for voters' 
utility from policy outcomes.  
Furthermore, the results illustrate how status-quo bias might lead to further 
budgetary inefficiencies in the budgetary bargaining model, or how it might lead 
to more socially desirable budget allocations even when bureaucrats have 
preferences that diverge from those of a representative voter or legislator.  
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The study reveals that a bureaucrat in rational choice models not only maximizes 
budget but also minimizes psychological cost due to imprinted policy preferences 
dictated by organizational past trajectories. Hence welfare loss occurs not just 
because bureaucrats engage in budget-maximizing behaviour, but also potentially 
due to the cost incurred in moving from an initial policy to a new policy (i.e., 
inertia). These results also lend an analytical perspective to inertia as a cause of 
bureaucratic drift and its consequences in terms of social welfare. Therefore, it 
becomes apparent that imprints of the past have a decisive effect on the individual 
behaviour of bureaucrats. 
In the following, we spell out some key policy implications of our analysis that 
investigated the inertial preferences of bureaucrats in public policy due to strong 
imprints. 
 An understanding of inertial policy choices bears a great deal on devising effective 
policy to change bureaucratic behaviour.  
First it should be explored whether institutional factors are an ingredient in the 
policy choice of bureaucrat. The next step of policy analysis should aim to see 
whether the inertial tendency and imprinting result in inefficient provision of 
public goods. In terms of bureaucracy’s role in the provision of public goods and 
services, policies that aim to check over-production of public goods and services 
must be based on proper identification of the source of over-production i.e. 
whether over-production is driven by budget maximization or is it driven by 
bureaucratic inertia towards certain policies which are inefficient? Policies that 
target monitoring of bureaucrats against their opportunistic behaviour can be 
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welfare improving only when over-provision of public goods is driven by budget 
maximizing behaviour.  
Second, it is also critical to understand that policy inertia can run counter to budget 
maximization as early imprints of the bureaucracy may actually constrain 
bureaucrats in their effort to maximize budget. On the flip side, imprints may also 
lead to budget allocations to the bureaucracy, which are persistently too low and 
result in under-production of public goods. In developing countries, for instance, 
the bureaucracy often holds the power to determine budgetary allocations due 
mainly to lack of legislative capacity to deal effectively with the technicalities of 
the budgetary process.  
Third, while bureaucratic preferences can be inertial, it does not follow that such 
preferences necessarily result in welfare loss. The inertial policies of bureaucracy 
can be welfare improving when political parties are polarized, when bureaucratic 
preferences were successful in the past, and when the political interests change 
relatively rapidly.  
Furthermore, an understanding of such patterns of imprinting combined with 
socio-legal boundary conditions is essential to develop tailored policy 
recommendations for reforms of bureaucracy. To illustrate, Pakistan has faced the 
problem of persistently high fiscal deficits, as budget-maximizing bureaucrats tend 
to expand their development budgets while revenues fail to keep up owing to a 
narrow tax base. Bureaucratic preferences towards high development spending 
may cause policy rigidity and bureaucrats may be reluctant to control their 
expenditures resulting in the persistence of fiscal deficits. To control this problem, 
Pakistan, like many other countries, has enacted the Fiscal Responsibility Law that 
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restricts the bureaucrats to maintain their budget deficits below 4 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP). This law has put pressure on bureaucracy to bring its 
spending in line with growth in revenues to maintain a level of fiscal deficit 
permissible by law. Yet there are instances when fiscal deficit exceeds the limit 
imposed by the law. In this context, the law can be made more effective by 
curtailing discretionary powers of the bureaucrats which enable them to often 
overspend in pursuit of their preferred budgetary allocations as pointed out by our 
analysis.   
5.5 Policy implications of bureaucratic 
identity analysis 
Chapter 4 incorporated identity as a non-pecuniary motivation in the bureaucrat’s 
utility function in order to analyse his behaviour with regard to public policy 
choices. We show that public policies are determined by the interaction of the 
various hierarchical layers of a bureaucracy. The study identified possible trade-
offs between individual preferences of bureaucrats and the organizational identity 
of a bureaucracy to yield a more facetted picture of policymaking. 
Our analysis produces two main results. First, the possibility of an inefficient 
policy outcome, in terms of public goods provision, is higher if the identity-based 
preferences of the high-level bureaucrat diverge from the preferred policy goal of 
the legislator. Second, bureaucrats with different roles (policy-making or 
implementation) have different individual goals and it is the interplay of these 
different goals that determines the provision of the public goods. For example, 
whereas the boss (higher echelon) wants to adhere to his identity preferences (non-
pecuniary goal) the subordinate (lower echelon) wants to increase the budgetary 


ͳͺͲ

slack (pecuniary goal). Thus, lawmakers should not only be cognizant of the 
bureaucrats’ identity, but it may be more appropriate to nudge the identity of the 
boss in a bureaucracy than to constrain the bureaucracy by laws and regulations, 
in order to reach a specific policy outcome. 
An obvious question is to what extent identity is mutable? While pecuniary 
incentives can be devised to change the behaviour of employees and their 
productive efforts, how much will it cost to change the identity of agents? One 
policy instrument is training and development programs aimed at inculcating 
values and norms in an agency and this may not cost much as public sector 
employees are likely to be more receptive to such training programs in view of 
their long-term affiliation with the organization. Similarly, the cost of inculcating 
identity will be lower for agents higher in the hierarchy of public organizations 
since such employees become attached to the organization due to their long service 
and thus are more likely to internalize the values of the organization. The training 
and learning programs can be developed using insights from studies on social 
determinants of behaviour which show that individuals can be nudged to control 
decision biases and social influences.  
Another important mechanism through which the legislator can ensure the 
effective implementation of his policies is the selection of bureaucrats. The two 
most popular selection mechanisms are meritocratic selection and partisan 
selection. It is apparent that partisan selection will bring bureaucrats ideologically 
closer to the principal’s ideal policy choices. However, bureaucrats thus selected 
may lack expertise and training. As a result the provision of public goods may 
deviate considerably from what the legislator would have expected. On the other 
hand, bureaucrats selected in a meritocratic system typically have a higher level of 
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policy expertise and ensure policy continuity because of their permanent positions 
in office. To the extent that policy drift depends on the productivity of the 
subordinates at the implementation level, a meritocratic system may be preferred 
as expert bureaucrats at the top level are better able to increase and to monitor the 
productivity of the subordinate.  
Finally, there is a trade-off between enacting laws to control the behaviour of 
bureaucrats at the implementation level on the one hand and using nudging as a 
vehicle to influence the behaviour of the higher echelon bureaucrats to control the 
problem of policy drift on the other. It can be more effective to change or amplify 
the identity of higher-level bureaucrats and to make their behaviour conform to the 
political goals of the legislator than to build-up a tight regulatory environment, 
which becomes circumvented by smart bureaucrats.  
The premise that identity is central to bureaucratic decision-making has important 
implications for the design of contracts in principal agent relationships.  
The contractual agreement of policy delegation from the political principal to the 
agent (bureaucrat) must be informed by behavioural considerations including the 
social identity of the bureaucrat. This may involve explicit recognition of non-
pecuniary motivation as a possible cause of policy drift, as is the tradition in 
contract theory of private agency. As identity is an important source of worker’s 
motivation in public sectors, its omission in contracts would lead to inefficient 
policy outcomes. Furthermore, explicit recognition of identity will allow the 
legislature to deal with the moral hazard problem that may stem from the non-
pecuniary motivation of bureaucrats. 
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To conclude, this research has provided an institutional perspective on the policy 
choices of bureaucrats focusing in particular on three aspects. First, the research 
has provided a historically embedded explanation for the persistence of 
bureaucratic attributes such administrative structures, control of power and rent-
seeking motives. Second, we have dealt with the issues of bureaucratic inertia and 
policy rigidity in a theoretical setting that incorporates the role of switching costs 
emanating from institutionalized norms. Third, the role of bureaucratic identity has 
been highlighted in strategic decision making by bureaucrats at different levels of 
bureaucratic hierarchy.  
Our research can add value in guiding reforms in administrative laws that govern 
bureaucratic behaviour, especially in context of Pakistan. To illustrate, consider 
the Administrative Procedures Act, which plays a key role in Pakistan 
administrative law as a legal instrument to keep checks on the decisions and 
actions of bureaucrats. Interestingly, the role of procedural rules, which provide 
the means to control bureaucratic inefficiency and drift, has rarely been 
investigated, to check whether these laws address all types of economic slack 
created by bureaucrats. In particular, our finding that bureaucrat’s decision-
making is influenced by a complex interplay of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives can be helpful in the design of appropriate administrative laws and 
procedures to control bureaucratic behaviour so as to ensure bureaucratic 
efficiency and accountability. For example, to incentivize bureaucratic efficiency, 
administrative rules may not only provide monetary rewards for individual 
performance but also recognize and acknowledge team performance in groups that 
identify with organizational goals. Such non-pecuniary incentives can be 
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instrumental in motivating bureaucrats to achieve efficiency in public service 
delivery. 
There are at least four areas where the insights of this research can be applied 
especially in the context of Pakistan’s bureaucracy.  
First, the Federal Public Service Commission (FPS), which is responsible for 
laying out the administrative structure of the bureaucracy, may seek to revamp the 
cadre-based structure of the bureaucracy through an Act of Parliament. In this 
context, it is essential also to pay due attention to educating the bureaucrats 
regarding the need for restructuring the bureaucracy to achieve the larger 
development goals of the nation. Such awareness programs can be instrumental in 
changing attitudes towards reforms and developing away from imprints of the past. 
Second, laws to control corruption (section 5.3) must be informed by the 
institutional context which gives rise to corruption in the first place. Without 
calibrating such laws to reflect the institutional factors discussed in the study, 
corruption is likely to persist despite the enactment of laws to curb corruption.   
Third, there is a need to devise institutional mechanisms to formalize the 
interaction between legislature and bureaucracy especially for the budget making 
process. One such mechanism could be the establishment of a high level budgetary 
committee, comprising both bureaucrats and legislators, with the task to develop 
budgetary allocation proposals to be included in the Finance Bill. This measure 
could be helpful in aligning the preferences of the bureaucrats with those of the 
politicians, thus improving social welfare.  
Finally, the Efficiency and Discipline Rules 1973, which set out detailed 
administrative laws and procedures to govern the conduct of bureaucrats need to 
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be amended to devise a system of promotion on the basis of merit rather than 
seniority alone. A focus on merit would ensure that bureaucrats having a strong 
identity with the organization are promoted to higher policymaking levels thus 
ensuring better policy outcomes. 
5.6 Future research  
Future research can proceed in two broad directions, theoretical and empirical. 
There are several areas in which theoretical research can make important 
contributions. First, the analysis of agency burrowing suggests that theories of the 
bureaucracies should focus more explicitly on institutional and social constraints. 
Our analysis of policy choices in this context focused on the bureaucrats keeping 
preferences of the legislator exogenous. An important area of research is thus to 
endogenize the preferences of the legislator to investigate how these preferences 
are formed and what are the factors that could influence such preferences. This 
research could come up with interesting propositions on legislative policy 
preferences highlighting, for instance, political economy and legal considerations 
as well as political incentives to promote a certain policy choice in bureaucracy.  
Second, theoretical research can focus on developing a more elaborate dynamic 
optimizing framework to study state-dependent preferences of bureaucrats in a 
dynamic setting. In a dynamic framework, the states of nature are explicitly 
connected with the time dimension, which facilitates the study of how policies 
evolve over time. This research can provide interesting insights on the comparative 
dynamics of changes in policy in response to exogenous changes in institutional 
and social contexts. 
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Third, the economic analysis of identity (chapter 4) has the potential to be extended 
to shed light on a wide array of important administrative issues that may emerge 
in public and private organizational settings. Our model embeds identity in a 
framework that incorporates many features common to models of bureaucratic 
politics, such as preference divergence, specialization, and policy delegation. The 
main predictions related to identity driven preferences, policy choice, and the 
technological environment of the bureaucracy can be applied to gain a better 
understanding of the policy setting environments in which non-pecuniary 
motivations of agents are given due consideration. It thus appears that targeting 
identity can be an important mechanism to achieve the legal and administrative 
compliance of agents in policy delegation settings. Research can explore the ways 
in which identity can be targeted focusing in particular on monetary incentives, 
administrative laws, and training and peer pressure. Similarly, future research can 
explore the applicability of identity economics to complex contracting situations 
involving legislative and executive branches of the government. Research in this 
area can produce useful insights on how identity economics can be deployed in 
programs to reform the bureaucracy. 
On the empirical front, research can aim to test the key predictions of the 
theoretical models presented in this dissertation. This research can proceed in two 
directions. First, the role of imprinting can be tested using simple differential 
equations that link past choices with the present ones. This analysis can be helpful 
in identifying temporal causal mechanisms that underpin the persistence of 
organizational attributes. Second, empirical research may be based on a survey of 
the perceptions of bureaucrats.  For this purpose, a survey may be conducted to 
collect primary data on key variables such as individual profiles including policy 
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preferences, drivers of individual motivation, monetary incentives, incentives for 
teamwork, and administrative procedures. A simple econometric model can be 
used to assess how policy preferences of bureaucrats are formed in terms of their 
monetary incentives and administrative procedures. Similarly, the role of identity 
can be investigated by looking at the interplay of drivers of individual motivation 
and incentives for teamwork.  
The empirical analysis can also be conducted at cross-country level to take into 
account the diversity in socio-legal and institutional contexts of bureaucracies 
across different countries.  
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Appendix: Chapter 2 
 
The survey was conducted among the six most senior ranks of bureaucrats from 
BPS-17 to BPS-22. The data were collected from eight occupational groups 
namely District Management Group (DMG), Pakistan Administration Service 
(PAS), Information, Income Tax, Office Management Group (OMG), Pakistan 
Audit and Accounts, and Pakistan Railways. 
As a first step, a list of 200 CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan) officers was collected 
and compiled with email addresses. Before initiating the survey, the list was 
updated with the help of a research team in Pakistan. This was a very challenging 
task to trace all the civil servants through emails, as many respondents were not 
prepared to answer. However with repeated contact we were able to collect 141 
questionnaires with complete answers. One team of two members was formulated 
and trained through many sessions to carry out this task. By sending a team in 
person fifty percent of the questionnaires were collected. The team tried its level 
best to ensure maximum response; team visits were followed up by repeated emails 
from the author’s side. It was the outcome of repeated reminders that many 
responses were received over a period of two months. Visits were arranged to 
capture a realistic reflection from civil servants in one to one sittings. Email 
responses constitute 50 percent of the total responses. 
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Method followed 
A total of 141 responses (71 percent of the questionnaire sent) were collected. 
Among the respondents 36 (25 percent) were females and 105 (75 percent) were 
male civil servants. The range of age of respondent is 25 to 63 with the mean age 
of 43 years. Basic pay scale-wise feedback shows that maximum response came 
in from BPS-17 (22%) followed by BPS-18 (21%), BPS-19 (16%) and BPS-21 
(15 %). The least response was recorded for BPS-22 (10%), which is the highest 
hierarchical level in the civil services in Pakistan, and it was very difficult to 
approach these officers. Overall, we were able to get a very representative number 
of responses from each grade of officers. Mean tenure for BPS-17 officers was 4 
years, followed by 10 years for BPS-18, 18 years for BPS-19, 22 years for BPS-
20, 31 years for BPS-21 and 34 years for BPS-22. The respondents were 75% 
male; were on average 43 years of age (SD =11.27); had worked, on average for 
17.5 years with their current organization (SD = 11.41); and were in their current 
position for 3.46 years (SD = 2.1). As for their educational background, 17% had 
Bachelor level education, 55% had a Master’s degree whereas 20% had an MPhil 
degree. 
Survey Variables  
Total participants 141 
Age  
Gender 
Highest Education Level 
Current Designation  
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Time since joined the service 
Time in current scale 
Occupational group  
Organisational identity graphic scale (1 item) 
Organisation identity verbal scale (6 items) 
Competitive psychological climate (4 items) 
Public service Motivation (40 items) 
PSM 1– Attraction to policy making (5 items) 
PSM 2 - Commitment to Public interest (7 items) 
PSM 3 – Social Justice (5 items) 
PSM 4 – Civic Duty (7 items) 
PSM 5 – Compassion (8 items) 
PSM 6 – Self Sacrifice ( 8 items) 
Performance pay ( 3 items) 
Development experience ( 4 items) 
Procedural justice (7 items) 
Distributive justice (4 items) 
Distinctiveness ( 4 items) 
Turnover intension (4 items) 
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Scales Used 
o Social identification graphic scale ( Shamir et al. 2000) 
o Organizational Identification verbal Scale (Mael and Alderks 1993) 
o Competitive Psychological Climate (Brown et al., 1998) 
o Public Service Motivation Items by Subscale   (James L. Perry 1996) 
o Performance-Pay (Deckop et al., 1999) 
o Developmental experiences (Wayne et al, AMJ 1997) 
o Justice scale Colquitt (2001) 
o Turnover intention (Jaros 1997 cf. Meyer et al., 1993) 
Survey items (76 items) 
Likert Scale (Response was provided on a five point scale ranging from agree to 
disagree). 
OID verbal scale (6 items) 
o When someone criticizes (Bureaucracy), it feels like a personal insult 
o I am very interested in what others think about (Bureaucracy) 
o When I talk about this Bureaucracy, I usually say ‘‘we’’ rather than 
‘‘they.’’ 
o This organization’s successes are my successes. 
o When someone praises Bureaucracy, it feels like a personal compliment 
o If a story in the media criticized Bureaucracy, I would feel embarrassed 
Competitive Psychological Climate (4 items) 
o My supervisor frequently compares my results with those of other officers 
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o The amount of recognition you get in bureaucracy depends on how your 
performance compares to that of other bureaucrats 
o Everybody is concerned with finishing tasks that give them best 
recognition among seniors 
o My co-workers frequently compare their results with mine 
Attraction to Policy-Making (5 items)  
o Politics is a dirty word. 
o I respect public officials who can turn a good idea into law. 
o Ethical behaviour of public officials is as important as competence 
o The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me. 
o I don't care much for politicians.  
Commitment to the Public Interest (7 items) 
o People may talk about the public interest, but they are really concerned 
only about their self-interest.  
o It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going on in my 
community. 
o I unselfishly contribute to my community. 
o Meaningful public service is very important to me 
o I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole 
community even if it harmed my interests 
o An official's obligation to the public should always come before loyalty to 
superiors. 
o I consider public service my civic duty 
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Social Justice (5 items)  
o I believe that there are many public causes worth championing. 
o I do not believe that government can do much to make society fairer.  
o If any group does not share in the prosperity of our society, then we are all 
worse off. 
o I am willing to use every ounce of my energy to make the world a more 
just place. 
o I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if it means I will be 
ridiculed. 
Civic Duty (7 items)   
o When public officials take an oath of office, I believe they accept 
obligations not expected of other citizens. 
o I am willing to go great lengths to fulfil my obligations to my country. 
o Public service is one of the highest forms of citizenship. 
o I believe everyone has a moral commitment to civic affairs no matter how 
busy they are 
o I have an obligation to look after those less well off. 
o To me, the phrase "duty, honour, and country" stirs deeply felt emotions. 
o It is my responsibility to help solve problems arising from inter-
dependencies among people. 
Compassion (8 items)  
o I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged.  
o Most social programs are too vital to do without 
o It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress. 
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o To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others 
o I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don't know personally 
o I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one 
another. 
o I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the 
first step to help themselves. 
o There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly support 
Self-Sacrifice (8 items)  
o Making a difference in society means more to me than personal 
achievements 
o I believe in putting duty before self 
o Doing well financially is definitely more important to me than doing good 
deeds 
o Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself 
o Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for 
it 
o I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it 
o I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone 
else 
o I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society 
Five point Likert Scale (Not at all__ to a large extent) 
Performance-Pay (3 items) 
o Increased productivity means higher pay for employees 
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o My individual performance actually has little impact on any incentive pay 
award 
o My performance actually has little impact on my salary 
Developmental experiences (4 items) 
o In the positions that I have held with my company, I have often been given 
additional challenging assignments 
o In the positions that I have held with my company, I have often been 
assigned projects that enabled me to develop and strengthen new skills 
o Besides formal training and development opportunities, my manager has 
helped develop my skills by providing me with challenging job 
assignments 
o Regardless of my organization’s policy on training and development, to 
what extent have your managers made a substantial investment in you by 
providing formal training and development opportunities 
Justice scale  
The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at your evaluation and 
salary. (Change “outcome” in “evaluation and salary”). 
Procedural justice (7 items) 
o Have you been able to express your views and feelings during those 
procedures? 
o Have you had influence over the (outcome) arrived at by those procedures? 
o Have those procedures been applied consistently? 
o Have those procedures been free of bias? 
o Have those procedures been based on accurate information? 
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o Have you been able to appeal the (outcome) arrived at by those procedures? 
o Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards 
Distributive justice (4 items) 
o Does your (outcome) reflect the effort you have put into your work? 
o Does your (outcome) reflect the effort you have put into your work? 
o Is your (outcome) appropriate for the work you have completed? 
o Does your (outcome) reflect what you have contributed to the 
organization? 
o Is your (outcome) justified, given your performance?  
 Three -point scale (none, some, and many). 
Distinctiveness (4 items) 
Indicate to what extent you have in your department each of the following 
o Special slogans 
o Special nicknames 
o Special rituals 
o Special jargon 
Turnover intention (4 items) 
o How often you think about quitting this organization  
o How likely it was that you would search for a position with another 
employer  
o How likely it was that you would leave the organization in the next ten 
years 
o How often you regret for selectin 
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Measures 
Unless noted otherwise, all items were answered on 5-point Likert scales (1 = 
completely disagree to 5 = completely agree). We measured organizational 
identification with the social identification graphic scale based on the work of 
Shamir et al. (2000) and organizational identification verbal scale with the six 
items based on the work of Mael and Alderks (1993). Competitive Psychological 
Climate was measured with four items based on the work of Brown et al. (1998).  
Public Service Motivation was measured with 40 items based on James L. Perry 
(1996), while Performance-Pay was measured with three items based on the work 
of Deckop et al. (1999). Developmental experience was measured with four items 
based on the work of (Wayne et al, AMJ 1997). We measured Justice Scale with 
11 items based on the work of the Colquitt (2001) while turnover intention was 
measured with the four items based on the work of Jaros (1997) and Meyer et al. 
(1993). 
Correlations 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, means, and standard deviations for all measures are 
presented in table 2A. 
Hypotheses Testing 
We tested the relationship between Hierarchical level and all other items with 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. For details see tables 2B and 2C. 
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 Mean  SD Number of 
observations  
Scale used 
1.Organisation identity  
3.5095 81128 140 
 
1-5 
2.Competative 
psychological 
environment  
3.1321 .96216 140 
 
1-5 
3. Attraction to policy 
making 3.4657 .50475 137 
 
1-5 
4. - Commitment to 
Public interest 3.6187 .46191 139 
 
1-5 
5. Social Justice 
3.7333 .56689 138 
 
1-5 
6.Civic Duty 
3.9837 .51210 140 
 
1-5 
7. Compassion 
3.4158 .38569 138 
 
1-5 
8.Self Sacrifice 
3.8291 .53355 139 
 
1-5 
9. Performance pay 
2.6407 .85734 141 
 
1-5 
10. Development 
experience 3.4184 1.46522 141 
 
1-5 
11. Procedural justice 
2.6899 1.09182 135 
 
1-5 
12. Distributive justice 
3.0255 1.25524 137 
1-5 
13. Distinctiveness 
1.6773 .48600 141 
1-3 
14. Turnover intension  
1.6206 .52321 141 
1-3 
15.Gender                                    
1.744 
     .437                           
141 
Male 
Female 
 
16.Hirarcical level                            
3.1206 
      1.67                           
141 
1-6 
17.Tenure   17.5        11.41                           
141 
# of years 
 
ǣʹ
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Survey response  
 
Level of significance  
1- Organization identity  Strongly significant  p.000 
2-Competitive psychological 
environment  
Significant  p.041 
3- Attraction to policy making Not significant  p.103 
4- Commitment to Public interest Strongly significant p.000 
5- Social Justice Strongly significant p.001 
6- Civic Duty Strongly significant p.001 
7- Compassion Not significant  p.498 
8- Self Sacrifice Strongly significant p.000 
9- Performance pay Significant  p.011 
10-Development experience Significant  p.002 
 11-Procedural justice Strongly significant p.000 
12- Distributive justice Strongly significant p.000 
 13- Distinctiveness Not significant  p.223 
 14- Turnover intension  Significant  p.002 
 
Table: 2C 
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Appendix: Chapter 3 
                           Mathematical Derivations 
Optimization Problem of a Citizen-voter with Policy Delegation 
஻ܷሺ݇ǡ ܤሻ ൌ ܻ െ ܤ ൅ ሺ݇ܤሻଵȀଶ ൅ ሺሺͳ െ ݇ሻܤሻଵȀଶ   (A1) 
Let ܤሺ݇ሻ be the optimal level of budget given budgetary allocation policy ݇Ǥ Then 
ܤሺ݇ሻ solves the following first order condition: 
ܷ஻ ൌ െͳ ൅ ቀଵଶቁ Ǥ ሺ݇ܤሻ
ିభమǤ ݇ ൅ ቀଵଶቁ Ǥ ൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻܤ൯
ିభమǤ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻ ൌ Ͳ  (A2) 
Straightforward algebraic manipulation yields: 
ܤሺ݇ሻ ൌ ଵସ ൅
ଵ
ଶ Ǥ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଶሻଵȀଶ       (A3) 
Optimization Problem of the Bureaucrat 
The bureaucrat maximizes the following utility function: 
௞ܸሺ݇ሻ ൌ ߙ൫ܤሺ݇ሻ൯ െ ߛሺ݇ െ ݇଴ሻଶ     (A4) 
The first order condition is given by: 
௞ܸ ൌ ߙǤ ܤ௞ሺ݇ሻ െ ʹߛሺ݇ െ ݇଴ሻ ൌ Ͳ      (A5) 
Notice that in the absence of inertia (ߛ ൌ Ͳሻ, the first order condition reduces to ܤ௞ ൌ
Ͳ which implies from (A3) that: 
ܤ௞ ൌ ଵସ Ǥ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଶሻିଵȀଶǤ ሺͳ െ ʹ݇ሻ ൌ Ͳ      (A6) 

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Solving (A6) (assuming interior solution) yields the optimal value of ݇כ ൌ ͳȀʹ at 
which the bureaucrat’s utility is maximized without inertia. In other words, the 
bureaucrat’s budget is also maximized at ݇כ ൌ ͳȀʹ in the absence of inertia. 
If inertia is present (ߛ ൐ Ͳሻ, then the first order condition (A5) implies that  ܤ௞ሺ݇ሻ ൐
ሺ൏ሻͲ if      ݇ െ ݇଴ ൐ ሺ൏ሻͲ. If ݇଴ ൐ ݇כ then ܤ௞ሺ݇ሻ ൏ Ͳ, and the optimal budgetary 
mix with inertia ( ෠݇) is greater than the optimal budgetary mix policy without inertia 
ሺ݇כሻ (see Figure 1). If ݇଴ ൏ ݇כ then ܤ௞ሺ݇ሻ ൐ Ͳ and the optimal budgetary mix policy 
in the presence of inertia ሺ ෠݇ሻ is less than the optimal budgetary mix policy without 
inertia ሺ݇כሻ. 
Socially Optimal Budget and Allocation Policy 
The optimal size of budget and budgetary allocation policy ሺܤכǡ ݇כሻ simultaneously 
maximizes the utility of the citizen-voter. That is, ሺܤכǡ ݇כሻ solves (A2) and the 
following first order condition: 
ܷ௞ ൌ ଵଶ ሺ݇ܤሻ
ିభమ െ ଵଶ ሺሺͳ െ ݇ሻܤሻ
ିభమ ൌ Ͳ     (A7) 
Solving (A2) and (A7) gives the socially optimal ሺܤכǡ ݇כሻ ൌ ሺͲǤͷǡ ͲǤͷሻ. 
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Appendix: Chapter 4 (A) 
Mathematical derivations 
Optimization problem of the subordinate 
୕ܷଶሺܳሻ ൌ ߤଶǤ ܳ ൅ ሺܤ െ ߶Ǥܳሻఙ      (A1) 
Let ෠ܳሺܤሻ be the optimal level of the composite public good given a fixed level of 
budget. Then ෠ܳሺܤሻ solves the following first order condition: 
߲ܷଶ ߲ܳ ൌΤ ߤଶ െ ߪ߶ሺܤ െ ߶ܳሻఙିଵ ൌ Ͳ     (A2) 
Straightforward algebraic manipulation yields: 
෠ܳሺܤሻ ൌ ܤǤ ሺͳ ߶ሻ െ ߠǤ ሺͳ ߶ሻΤ ఎΤ       (A3) 
Where ߠ ൌ ሺߤଶ ߪΤ ሻଵ ఙିଵΤ , ߟ ൌ ߪ ߪ െ ͳΤ  ሺߟ ൏ Ͳሻ and ߶ is the marginal cost of 
production. It can be easily seen from (A3) that the partial derivative of ෠ܳሺܤሻ with 
respect to ܤ is: 
෠ܳ஻ ൌ ͳ ߶Τ          (A4) 
Since the marginal costs are random, the expected value of ෠ܳሺܤሻ can be written as: 
ܧ ෠ܳሺܤሻ ൌ ܤǤ ܧሺͳ ߶ሻ െ ߠǤ ܧሺͳ ߶ሻΤ ఎΤ       (A5) 
It is assumed that ߶ is uniformly distributed over the interval ሾܽǡ ܾሿ א Թାା. So the 
expected values can be computed as: 
ܧሺͳ ߶ሻ ൌ ͳ ሺܾ െ ܽሻ ׬ ሺͳ ߶Τ௕௔ΤΤ ሻ݀߶ ൌ ሾͳ ሺܾ െ ܽሻΤ ሿሾ ܾ െ  ܽሿ  (A6) 
Similarly: 
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ܧ ሺͳ ߶ሻఎ ൌ ͳ ሺܾ െ ܽሻ ׬ ሺͳ ߶ሻΤ ఎ௕௔ΤΤ ݀߶ ൌ ሾͳ ሺܾ െ ܽሻΤ Ǥ ሺͳ െ ߟሻሿሾܾଵିఎ െ ܽଵିఎሿ (A7) 
Optimization problem of the boss 
Given ෠ܳሺܤሻ the boss maximizes the following expected payoff function: 
୩ܧ ଵܷሺ݇Ǣ ܳǡ ݇ଵሻ ൌ ܧ ቄߙଵ௔Ǥ ቀ݇Ǥ ෠ܳሺܤሻቁ ൅ ߙଵ௕Ǥ ቀሺͳ െ ݇ሻǤ ෠ܳሺܤሻቁ െ ߣǤ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻଶቅ (A8) 
Taking expectations, the above problem can be written as: 
୩ܧ ଵܷሺ݇Ǣ ܳǡ ݇ଵሻ ൌ ߙଵ௔Ǥ ቀ݇Ǥ ܧ ෠ܳሺܤሻቁ ൅ ߙଵ௕Ǥ ቀሺͳ െ ݇ሻǤ ܧ ෠ܳሺܤሻቁ െ ߣǤ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻଶ  (A9) 
Let ෠݇ሺܤሻ the optimal budgetary allocation policy. Then it solves the following first 
order condition: 
߲ܧ ଵܷ ߲݇ ൌΤ ߙଵ௔Ǥ ܧ ෠ܳሺܤሻ െ ߙଵ௕Ǥ ܧ ෠ܳሺܤሻ െ ʹߣǤ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻ ൌ Ͳ  (A10) 
The above equation can be solved as: 
෠݇ሺܤሻ ൌ ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻ ʹߣΤ ሿǤ ܧ ෠ܳሺܤሻ ൅ ݇ଵ     (A11) 
Substituting for ܧ ෠ܳሺܤ) from (A5), equation (A11) can be solved as: 
෠݇ሺܤሻ ൌ ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻ ʹߣΤ ሿǤ ሾܧሺͳ ߶ሻǤ ܤ െ ߠǤ ܧሺͳ ߶ΤΤ ሻఎሿ ൅ ݇ଵ  (A12) 
From (A12), the partial derivative of ෠݇ሺܤሻ with respect to ܤ can be computed as: 
෠݇஻ ൌ ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻ ʹߣሿǤ ܧሺΤ ͳ ߶Τ ሻ      (A13) 
Optimization problem of the principal 
Given the solutions for the composite public good and the budgetary allocation policy 
in the bureaucratic sub-game, the optimization problem of the principal can be set up 
as follows: 
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୆ܧܷ௉ሺܤǢ ݇ǡ ܳሻ ൌ ܧ ቄ߭Ǥ ቀ ෠݇ሺܤሻǤ ෠ܳሺܤሻቁ ൅ ߛǤ ቀ൫ͳ െ ෠݇ሺܤ൯Ǥ ෠ܳሺܤሻቁ െ ߱Ǥ ܤቅ (A14) 
The optimal level of budget ܤכ solves the following first order condition: 
߲ܧܷ௉ ߲ܤΤ ൌ ܧ ቄ߭Ǥ ൣ ෠݇ሺܤሻǤ ෠ܳ஻ ൅ ෠ܳሺܤሻǤ ෠݇஻൧ ൅ ߛǤ ቂቀͳ െ ෠݇ሺܤሻቁ Ǥ ෠ܳ஻ െ ෠ܳሺܤሻǤ ෠݇஻ቃ െ
߱ቅ ൌ Ͳ         (A15) 
Proposition 3 
Using equations A4, A5, A12, and A13, equation (A15) can be solved for equilibrium 
ܤכ as follows: 
ܤכ ൌ ߣൣሺɘ െ ߛǤ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻ െ ሺ߭ െ ߛሻǤ ݇ଵሿ ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕Τ ሻǤ ሺ߭ െ ߛሻǤ ሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶ൧
൅ߠǤ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻఎ ሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶΤ        (A16) 
 
Substitution of (A16) in (A3) yields: 
ܳכ ൌ ሺͳ ߶ሻΤ ߣሼൣሺɘ െ ߛǤ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻ െ ሺ߭ െ ߛሻǤ ݇ଵሿ ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕Τ ሻǤ ሺ߭ െ ߛሻǤ ሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶ൧
൅ሾߠǤ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻఎ ሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶሿሽ െ ߠǤΤ ሺͳ ߶Τ ሻఎ     (A17) 
Similarly, substituting (A16) in (A12) yields: 
݇כ ൌ ሾ߱ െ ߛǤ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻሿ ሾʹሺ߭ െ ߛሻǤ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻሿΤ 
൅ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻߠǤ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻఎ ʹߣሿሾ൫ͳ െ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻ൯ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ ሻሿΤΤ 
൅݇ଵǤ ሾሺʹǤ ܧሺͳ ߶ሻ െ ͳΤ ሻ ʹǤ ܧሺͳ ߶ሻΤΤ ሿ      (A18 
 
 
 

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Existence of equilibrium 
We assume that the players’ pay-off functions are twice continuously differentiable. To 
verify the existence of an equilibrium, the second order conditions of each player can 
be checked as follows. Differentiating (A2) with respect to ܳ: 
߲ଶܷଶ ߲ܳଶ ൌ ߶Ǥ ߪǤ ሺߪ െ ͳሻǤ ሺܤ െ ߶Ǥ ܳሻఙିଶΤ ൏ Ͳǡ Ͳ ൏ ߪ ൏ ͳ  (A19) 
Similarly, differentiating (A10) with respect to ݇ǣ 
߲ଶܧ ଵܷ ߲݇ଶ ൌ െʹΤ ߣ ൏ Ͳǡ ߣ ൐ ͲǤ     (A20) 
Finally, differentiating (A15) with respect to ܤ yields: 
߲ଶܧܷ௉ ߲ܤଶ ൌ ሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻǤ ሺ߭ െ ߛሻǤ ሺܧሺͳ ׎Τ ሻሻଶ ߣΤΤ     (A21) 
The above expression will be negative if: 
ሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻǤ ሺ߭ െ ߛሻ ൏ Ͳ       (A22) 
We assume that this condition is satisfied, and hence a perfect Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium exists. To see its implications, notice that the first term in the above 
expression measures the difference between the marginal utilities of the two public 
goods to the boss, while the second term measures the marginal utilities of the two 
public goods for the principal. In essence, the negativity of the above expression implies 
that there is a difference between the preferences of the boss and the legislator with 
regard to the two types of public goods.  
Proposition 4 
This follows from using the derivative of (A16) with respect to ݇ଵ: 

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߲ܤכ ߲݇ଵΤ ൌ െߣሺ߭ െ ߛሻ ሺݒ െ ߛሻǤ ሺߙଵ௔Τ െ ߙଵ௕ሻǤ ሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶ   (A23) 
The denominator is negative by assumption. Thus the above expression is ൐ ሺ൏ሻͲ as 
߭ ൐ ሺ൏ሻߛ implying an increase (decrease) in the budget as long as ߭ ൐ ሺ൏ሻߛ. 
Corollary 
This result follows from (A17) with respect to ݇ଵǣ 
߲ܳכ ߲݇ଵΤ ൌ െߣሺ߭ െ ߛሻ ሺݒ െ ߛሻǤ ሺߙଵ௔Τ െ ߙଵ௕ሻǤ ሺͳ ߶ሻǤΤ ሺܧሺͳ ߶ሻሻΤ ଶ  (A24) 
As the denominator is negative, the above expression is ൐ ሺ൏ሻͲ  as ߭ ൐ ሺ൏ሻߛ 
implying an increase (decrease) in the composite public output as long as ߭ ൐ ሺ൏ሻߛ. 
Proposition 5 
It is straightforward to see from equations (A16) and (A17) that ߲ܳכ ߲߱ ൏ ͲΤ  and 
߲ܤכ ߲߱Τ ൏ Ͳ holds. Differentiating (A18) with respect to ߱ yields: 
߲݇כ ߲߱Τ ൌ ͳ ʹǤ ሺݒ െ ߛሻǤΤ ܧሺͳ ߶Τ )      (A25) 
Since the sign of ߲݇כ ߲߱Τ  depends on the sign of ሺݒ െ ߛሻ . If ߭ ൐ ሺ൏ሻߛ  it yields 
߲݇כ ߲߱Τ ൐ ሺ൏ሻͲǤ 
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Appendix: Chapter 4 (B) 
Modeling the subordinate’s policy preferences and identity 
We set up a game-theoretic model in which the subordinate also has policy preferences 
which are embedded in his identity. We show that even if the subordinate has his own 
identity stance, this will have no impact on the equilibrium values as long as the boss 
controls the allocation policy. For analytical tractability we draw our attention to a 2-
person simultaneous move game in which the budget of the bureaucracy is treated as 
exogenously given.  
The boss is assumed to derive utility from the two public goods on offer and has an 
insider identity. He pursues the organizational goal ݇ଵ. The utility function of the boss 
can be written as: 
ଵܷሺ݇Ǣ ܳǡ ݇ଵሻ ൌ ߙଵ௔Ǥ ሺ݇Ǥ ܳሻ ൅ ߙଵ௕Ǥ ሺሺͳ െ ݇ሻǤ ܳሻ െ ߣǤ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻଶ  (B1) 
The subordinate’s utility function also depends on the two public goods. His identity is 
captured by the identity parameter ߩ and his organizational goal ݇ଶ. The subordinate as 
the implementer of the policy derives utility from budgetary slack25. The utility function 
of the subordinate can be specified as: 
ܷଶሺܳǢ ݇ǡ ܤǡ ݇ଶሻ ൌ ߤଶ௔Ǥ ሺ݇Ǥ ܳሻ ൅ ߤଶ௕Ǥ ൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻǤ ܳ൯ െ ߩǤ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଶሻଶ 
൅ܽǤ ሺܤ െ ߶Ǥ ܳሻ െ ܾǤ ሺܤ െ ߶Ǥܳሻଶ     (B2) 
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ʹͷFor simplicity utility from budgetary slack is assumed to be quadratic.


 ʹͲͻ
The two players play a simultaneous move game in which the boss chooses the 
budgetary allocation policy ݇ while the subordinate chooses the size of the composite 
public good ܳ. Both players have their own identities ݇ଵ and ݇ଶ.  
Nash Equilibrium 
A Nash equilibrium of the game can be defined as a pair ሺ݇כǡ ܳכሻ such that: 
݇כ ൌ  ଵܷሺ݇Ǣ ܳכǡ ݇ଵሻ ൌ ߙଵ௔Ǥ ሺ݇Ǥ ܳכሻ ൅ ߙଵ௕Ǥ ൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻǤ ܳכ൯ 
െߣǤ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻଶ        (B3) 
ܳכ ൌ ܷଶሺܳǢ ݇כǡ ܤǡ ݇ଶሻ ൌ ߤଶ௔Ǥ ሺ݇כǤ ܳሻ ൅ ߤଶ௕Ǥ ൫ሺͳ െ ݇כሻǤ ܳ൯ 
െߩǤ ሺ݇כ െ ݇ଶሻଶ ൅ ܽǤ ሺܤ െ ߶Ǥ ܳሻ െ ܾǤ ሺܤ െ ߶Ǥܳሻଶ   (B4) 
To derive the Nash equilibrium the following optimization problems need to be 
solved: 
Optimization problem of the boss 
The boss chooses the budgetary allocation policy that maximizes his utility. 
୩ ଵܷሺ݇Ǣ ܳǡ ݇ଵሻ ൌ ߙଵ௔Ǥ ሺ݇Ǥ ܳሻ ൅ ߙଵ௕Ǥ ൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻǤ ܳ൯ െ ߣǤ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻଶ (B5) 
The optimal budgetary allocation policy solves the following first order condition: 
߲ ଵܷ ߲݇ ൌΤ ሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻǤ ܳ െ ʹߣǤ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଵሻ ൌ Ͳ    (B6) 
The above equation can be solved as: 
݇ ൌ ሾሺߙଵ௔ െ ߙଵ௕ሻ ʹߣΤ ሿǤ ܳ ൅ ݇ଵ      (B7) 
Equation (B7) shows that the best response of the boss depends on the level of the 
composite public good as well as his organizational goal. Any change of the 
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organizational goal will be translated to an equivalent change in the budgetary 
allocation policy. The best response of the boss to changes in the level of the composite 
output depends on the relative marginal utilities of the boss from the two public goods. 
An increase in the level of composite output will prompt the boss to increase the 
budgetary allocation towards ܳ௔ or (ܳ௕) if the boss’ marginal utility from ܳ௔ is greater 
(less) than that of ܳ௕.  
Optimization problem of the subordinate 
The subordinate chooses the level of composite public good that maximizes his 
utility: 
୕ܷଶሺܳǢ ݇ǡ ܤǡ ݇ଶሻ ൌ ߤଶ௔Ǥ ሺ݇Ǥ ܳሻ ൅ ߤଶ௕Ǥ ൫ሺͳ െ ݇ሻǤ ܳ൯ െ ߩǤ ሺ݇ െ ݇ଶሻଶ 
൅ܽǤ ሺܤ െ ߶Ǥ ܳሻ െ ܾǤ ሺܤ െ ߶Ǥܳሻଶ     (B8) 
The optimal level of the composite output solves the following first order condition:  
߲ܷଶ ߲ܳ ൌΤ ߤଶ௔Ǥ ݇ ൅ ߤଶ௕Ǥ ሺͳ െ ݇ሻ െ ܽ߶ ൅ ʹܾ߶Ǥ ሺܤ െ ߶ܳሻ ൌ Ͳ  (B9) 
Straightforward algebraic manipulation yields: 
ܳ ൌ ሺߤଶ௕ െ ܽ߶ሻ ʹܾ߶ଶΤ ൅ ሾሺߤଶ௔ െ ߤଶ௕ሻ ʹܾ߶ଶΤ ሿǤ ݇ ൅ ሺͳ ߶ሻǤ ܤΤ   (B10) 
Equation (B10) reveals that the best response of the subordinate depends on the 
budgetary allocation policy and the level of budget. Thereby the identity of the 
subordinate plays no role for determining the optimal choice of the composite output. 
This is because the subordinate takes the budgetary allocation policy as given while 
maximizing his utility. Therefore, the optimal response of the subordinate is determined 
independently of his organizational goal. Second, an increase in the budgetary 
allocation policy towards ܳ௔ will induce an increase in the level of composite output 


 ʹͳͳ
as long as the marginal utility of the subordinate from ܳ௔  exceeds that from ܳ௕ . 
Otherwise, an increase of the budgetary allocation policy towards ܳ௔  will lead to a 
lower level of composite public output. An increase of the level of budget will lead to 
an increase of the level of the composite public output along the optimal path of the 
subordinate. 
The equilibrium values of the budgetary allocation policy and the composite public 
output can be derived from solving equations (B7) and (B10) for ݇כ and ܳכ. While 
these detailed derivations can be solved, some observations can be made already 
without having the explicit solutions. For example, the equilibrium values will depend 
on the level of the budget of the bureaucracy and the organizational goal of the boss. 
How the equilibrium values will respond to changes of the variables depends on the 
relative magnitudes of the marginal utilities of the boss and the subordinate for the two 
types of public goods.  
 
 
 
  


 ʹͳʹ
 
                 References 
Aberbach, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman. 2000. In the Web of Politics: Three 
Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive. Washington DC: Brookings Institution. 
Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman. 1981. Bureaucrats and 
Politicians in Western Democracies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Acemoglu, Daron , Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2001a.  The Colonial 
Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. The American 
Economic Review 91 (5): 1369–401. 
Acemoglu, Daron , Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2001b. Institutions and 
Economic Development. Mimeographed. 
Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of 
Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business. 
Acemoglu, Daron. 2012. Institutions, Political Economy and Growth. Available at 
http://www-2.iies.su.se/Nobel2012/Presentations/Acemoglu.pdf. Accessed on 
September 5, 2014.  
Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole. 1997. Formal and Real Authority in 
Organizations. The Journal of Political Economy 105 (1): 1-29. 
Ahmad, Muneer. 1964. The Civil Servant in Pakistan. Pakistan Publishing: Karachi. 
Aidt, Toke S. 2003. Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey. The Economic 
Journal 113 (491): 632-652. 


 ʹͳ͵
Akerlof, George A. 2007. The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics. 
Presidential Address. American Economic Association, Chicago, IL. 
Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton. 2000. Economics and Identity. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (3): 715-753. 
Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton. 2005. Identity and the Economics of 
Organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (1): 9-32. 
Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton. 2010. Identity Economics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Akerlof, Robert J. 2009. A Theory of Social Motivation. Chapter 1 in “Essays in 
Organizational Economics”. PhD Thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
Alavi, Haque. 1973. The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
In K. Gough and  H. Sharma (Eds.), Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia:145-
160. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Alchian , Armen A. and Harold Demsetz. 1972. Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization. The American Economic Review 62(5) : 777-795. 
Ali, Imran and Adeel Malik. 2009. The Political Economy of Industrial Development 
in Pakistan: A Long-Term Perspective. Lahore Journal of Economics 14 (September): 
29-50. 
Anderson, James H. and Cheryl W. Gray. 2007. Policies and Corruption Outcomes. In 
Anti-corruption in Transition 3. Who is Succeeding and Why: 43-72. Washington 
DC: The World Bank. 


 ʹͳͶ
Angeles, Luis and Kyriakos C. Neanidis. 2011. Colonialism, Elite Formation and 
Corruption.  Working Paper University of Glasgow. 
Arnold, David. 1983. White Colonization and Labor in Nineteenth Century India.     
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 11 (2): 133-158 
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1994. Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. 
American Economic Review 84 (2): 1-9. 
Arthur, Brian W.  1989. Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-In by 
Historical Events. Economic Journal 99 (394): 116-131. 
Asthana, Anand. 2012. De-centralization and Corruption Revisited: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment. Public Administration and Development 32 (1): 27-37. 
Baltaci, Mustafa and Serdar Yilmaz. 2006. Keeping an Eye on Sub-national 
Governments: Internal Control and Audit at Local Level. Washington DC: The World 
Bank. 
Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer , 2005.  History, Institutions, and Economic 
Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. The American 
Economic Review 95 (4):  1190-1213.  
Bardhan, Pranab. 1997. Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. Journal of 
Economic Literature 35 (3): 1320-1346. 
Barnard, Chester I. 1938. The Functions of the Executive. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA. 
Baron, James N., Michael T. Hannan, and M. Diane Burton. 1999. Building the Iron 
Cage: Determinants of Managerial Intensity in the Early Years of Organizations. 
American Sociological Review 64 (4): 527–47. 


 ʹͳͷ
Bassanini, Arnold P. and Giovanni Dosi.  2001. When and How Chance and Human 
Will can Twist the Arms of Clio: An Essay on Path Dependence in a World of 
Irreversibilities. In R. Garud and P. Karnoe (Eds.), Path Dependence and Creation: 
43-68. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Bawn, Kathleen. 1995. Political Control vs. Expertise: Congressional Choices About 
Administrative Procedures. American Political Science Review 89: 62-73. 
Bayly, Christopher Alan. 1988. Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire. 
Cambridge University Press: New York. 
Becker, Gary and George Stigler. 1974. Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and 
Compensation of Enforcers. The Journal of Legal Studies 3 (1): 1-18. 
Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole. 2003. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation. Review 
of Economic Studies 70 (3): 489-520. 
Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole. 2006. Incentives and Pro-social Behavior. 
American Economic Review 96 (5): 1652-1678. 
Bendor, Jonathan and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. Spatial Models of Delegation. The 
American Political Science Review 98 (2): 1-19. 
Bendor, Jonathan B. 1988. Review Article: Formal Models of Bureaucracy. British 
Journal of Political Science 18 (3): 353-395. 
Bendor, Jonathan B., Ami Glazer, and Thomas Hammond. 2001. Theories of 
Delegation.  Annual Review of Political Science 4: 235-269. 
Bendor, Jonathan B., and Adam Meirowitz. 2004 Spatial Models of Delegation. The 
American Political Science Review 98: 293-310. 


 ʹͳ͸
Bendor, Jonathan B., and Terry M. Moe. 1985. An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic 
Politics. American Political Science Review 79 (3): 755-774. 
Bendor, Jonathan B., and Terry M. Moe. 1986. Agenda Control, Committee Capture, 
and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics. American Political Science Review 80 (4): 
1187-1207. 
Bendor, Jonathan B., Serge Taylor, and Ronald Van Gaalen. 1985. Bureaucratic 
Expertise vs. Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in 
Budgeting. American Political Science Review 79 (4): 1041-1060. 
Benjamin, Daniel J., James J. Choi and A. Joshua Strickland. 2010. Social Identity 
and Preferences. American Economic Review 100 (4): 1913-1928. 
Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. The Social Construction of Reality. 
New York: Doubleday. 
Berry, William D. 1979.  Utility Regulation in the States: The Policy Effects of 
Professionalism and Salience to the Consumer. American Journal of Political 
Science 23 (2): 263-77. 
Berry, William D. 1984. An alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation: The 
Case of State Public Utility Commissions. American Journal of Political Science 
28 (3): 524-558. 
Bertelli, Anthony and Sven E. Feldmann. 2006. Strategic Appointments. Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory 17 (1): 19-38. 
Bertelli, Anthony, and Sven Feldman. 2007. Strategic Appointments. Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory 17: 19-38. 


 ʹͳ͹
Boeker, Warren. 1989a. Strategic Change: the Effects of Founding and History. 
Academy of Management Journal 32 (3): 489-515. 
Boeker, Warren. 1989b. The Development and Institutionalization of Subunit Power 
in Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly 34 (3): 388-410. 
Boyd, Robert, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles and Peter Richerson. 2003. The 
Evolution of Altrustic Punishment.  Prcoceedings of the National Academy of the 
United Staes America, 100: 3531-3535. 
Braibanti, Ralph. 1963. Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan. In J. La 
Palombara (Eds.), Bureaucracy and Political Development: 360-440. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Brehm, John and Scott Gates. 1997. Working, Shirking, and Sabotage. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Breton, Albert and Ronald Wintrobe. 1975. The Equilibrium Size of a Budget 
Maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy. American 
Journal of Political Science 83 (1): 195-207. 
Brinkerhoff, Derick W. 2000. Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: 
An Analytical Framework. Public Administration and Development 20 (3): 239-252. 
Brint, Steven and Jerome Karabel. 1991. Institutional Origins and Transformations: 
The Case of American Community Colleges. In Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. 
Powell (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis: 337-360. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago. 
Buchanan, James M. 1949. The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested 
Approach.  Journal of Political Economy 57:  496-506 


 ʹͳͺ
Buelens, Marc and Herman Van den Broeck. 2007. An Analysis of Differences in 
Work Motivation between Public and Private Sector Organizations. Public 
Administration Review 67 (1): 65-74. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan and Matthew C. Stephenson. 2007. Regulatory Quality 
under Imperfect Oversight. American Political Science Review 101 (3): 605-620. 
Burki, Shahid Javed. 1969. Twenty Years of the Civil Service in Pakistan: A Re-
evaluation. Asian Survey  9: 239-254. 
Burton, M. Diane and Christine M. Beckman. 2007.  Leaving a Legacy: Position 
Imprints and Successor Turnover in Young Firms.  American Sociological Review 
72(2): 239-266 
Burton, M. Diane and Christine M. Beckman. 2007. Leaving a Legacy: Position 
Imprints and Successor Turnover in Young Firms.  American Sociological Review 72 
(2): 239-266. 
Calvert, Randall, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R.Weingast. 1989. A Theory of 
Political Control and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science 33 
(3): 588-611. 
Carpenter, Daniel P. and George A. Krause. 2012. Reputation and Public 
Administration.  Public Administration Review 72 (1): 26-32. 
Carpenter, Daniel P. and George A. Krause. 2015. Transactional Authority and 
Bureaucratic Politics. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 25 (1): 
5-25. 


 ʹͳͻ
Carpenter, Daniel P., 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, 
Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Carpenter, Vivian L. and Ehsan H. 2001 Institutional Theory and Accounting Rule 
Choice: An Analysis of Four US State Government’s Decisions to Adopt Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles. Accounting, Organization and Society 26: 565-596.  
Carroll, Glenn R. and Michael T. Hannan. 2004. The Demography of Corporations 
and Industries. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Charness, Gary, Luca Rigotti and Aldo Rustichini. 2007. Individual Behavior and 
Group Membership.  American Economic Review 97 (4): 1340-1352. 
Cheema, Ali and Asad Sayeed. 2006. Bureaucracy and Pro-Poor Change. Working 
paper Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
Chen, Yan and Sherry Xin Li, 2009. Group Identity and Social Preferences. 
American Economic Review 99 (1): 431–457. 
Clawson, James G. 1999. Level Three Leadership: Getting Below the Surface. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
Clinton, Joshua D., Anthony Bertelli, Christian R. Grose, David E. Lewis, and David 
C. Nixon. 2012. Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, 
Presidents, and Congress. American Journal of Political Science. 56 (2): 341-354. 
Coglianese, Cary. 2002. Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law. University of 
Illinois Law Review 4:  1111-37. 


 ʹʹͲ
Cohen, Nissim. 2012. Policy entrepreneurs and the design of public policy: 
Conceptual framework and the case of the National Health Insurance Law in Israel. 
Journal of Social Research and Policy 3 (1): 5–26. 
Colquitt, Jason A.  2001. On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct 
validation of a measure. Journal of Applied Psychology 86 (3): 386-400.  
Conybeare, John A. 1984. Bureaucracy, Monopoly and Competition: A Critical 
Analysis of Budget Maximizing Model of Bureaucracy. American Journal of Political 
Science 28 (3): 479-502. 
Crémer, Jacques. 1993. Corporate Culture and Shared Knowledge. Industry 
Corporate Change 2 (1): 351–386. 
Crozier, Michel . 1964. Bureaucratic Phenomenon. University of Chicago Press. 
Dalton, Dan R., William D. Todor, Michael J. Spendolini, Gordon J. Fielding and 
Lyman W. Porter. 1980. Organization Structure and Performance. The Academy of 
Management Review 5 (1): 49-64. 
David, Paul A. 1985. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. American Economic 
Review Proceedings 75 (2):  332-337. 
David, Paul. 1994. Why Are Institutions Carriers of History? Path Dependence and 
the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations, and Institutions. Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics 5 (2):  205-220. 
Davis, John B. 2003. The Theory of Individual in Economics: Identity and Values. 
London: Routledge. 
Davis, John B. 2006. Social Identity Strategies in Recent Economics.  Journal of 


 ʹʹͳ
Economic Methodology 13 (3): 371-390. 
Davis, John B. 2007. Akerlof and Kranton on Identity in Economics: Inverting the 
Analysis. Cambridge Journal of Economics 31 (3): 349-362. 
Davis, John B. 2011. Individuals and Identity Economics.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Deckop, John R., Robert Mangel and Carol C. Cirka. 1999. Getting More Than you 
Pay for: Organizational Citizenship Behaviour and Pay-for-Performance Plans. 
Academy of Management Journal 42 (4):  420-428.  
Denzau, Arthur T. and Robert J. Mackay. 1976. Benefit Shares and Majority Voting. 
American Economic Review 66 (1): 69-76. 
Denzau, Arthur T. and Robert J. Mackay. 1980. A Model of Benefit and Tax Share 
Discrimination by a Monopoly Bureau. Journal of Public Economics 13 (3): 341-368. 
Derthick, Martha. 1979. Policymaking for Social Security. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press.  
Derthick, Martha. 1990. Agency under Stress: The Social Security Administration 
in American Governemnt. Brookings Institution Press. 
Dewatripont, Mathias, Ian Jewitt and Jean Tirole. 1999. The Economics of Career 
Concerns, Part 11: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government 
Agencies. Review of Economic Studies 66 (1): 199-217. 
DiMaggio, Paul J .1991. Constructing an Organizational Field as a Professional 
Project: U.S. Art Museums, 1920-1940. In Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell 
(Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis: 267-92 Chicago: The 
University of Chicago. 


 ʹʹʹ
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powel. 1991b. The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. In Paul 
J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis: 63-82. Chicago: The University of Chicago. 
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1991. Introduction. In Paul J. DiMaggio 
and Walter W. Powell (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis: 
1-38. Chicago: The University of Chicago. 
Dixit, Avinash. 2002. Incentives and Organisations in the Public Sector: An 
Interpretative Review. Journal of Human Resources 37 (4): 696-727. 
Dixit, Avinash. 2012. Bureaucracy, its Reform and Development. Paper presented at 
the A. N. Varma Lecture, India Development Foundation.  
Dokko, Gina, Steffanie L. Wilk  and Nancy P. Rothbard. 2009. Unpacking Prior 
Experience: How Career History Affects Job Performance. Organization Science 20 
(1):51-68. 
Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and 
Company.MA: Harvard University Press. 
Dunleavy, Patrick. 1991. Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice. Hemel 
Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. and  C.B. Schoonhoven. 1990. Organizational Growth: Linking 
Founding Team, Strategy, Environment and Growth among U.S. Semiconductor 
Ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (3): 504-529. 
Eisner, Marc A. 1992.  Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Caroline Press. 


 ʹʹ͵
Elster, Jon. 1989. Social Norms and Economic Theory. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 3 (4): 99-117. 
Epstein, David and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1994. Administrative Procedures,Information, 
and Agency Discretion.  American Journal of Political Science 38 (3): 697-722. 
Executive Office of the President, National Science and Technology Council, 2015. 
Social and Behavioral Sciences Team Annual Report. In: Washington DC.  
Fligstein, Neil. 1991. The Structural Transformation of American Industry: An 
Institutional Account of the Causes of Diversification in the Largest Firms, 1919-
1979. In Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis: 311-336. Chicago: The University of Chicago. 
Friedland, Roger and Robert R. Alford. 1991. Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, 
Practices, and Institutional Contradictions. In Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell 
(Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis: 232-263. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago. 
Gailmard, Sean and John W. Patty. 2007. Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy 
Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise. American Journal of Political Science 51(4): 
873-899. 
Gailmard, Sean and John W. Patty. 2012. Formal Models of Bureaucracy. Annual 
Review of Political Science 15 (June): 353-377. 
Gailmard, Sean. 2002.  Expertise, Subversion and Bureaucratic Discretion. Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organization 18 (2): 536-555. 
Gailmard, Sean. 2009. Discretion Rather than Rules: Choice of Instruments to 
Control Bureaucratic Policy Making. Political Analysis 17 (1): 25-42. 


 ʹʹͶ
Gains, Francesca and Peter John. 2010. What do Bureaucrats like Doing? 
Bureaucratic Preferences in Response to Institutional Reform. Public 
Administration Review 70 (3): 455-463. 
Ganguly, Sumit and C. Christine  Fair. 2013. The Structural Origins of 
Authoritarianism in Pakistan. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 51 (1): 122-
142. 
Garud, Raghu, Arun Kumaraswamy and Peter Karnoe. 2010. Path Dependence or 
Path Creation. Journal of Management Studies 47 (4): 760-774. 
Gerring, John and Strom C. Thacker. 2004. Political Institutions and Corruption: 
The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science 
34: 295-330.  
Gill, Jeff. 1995. Formal Models of Legislative/Administrative Interaction: A Survey 
of the Subfield.  Public Administration Review 55 (1): 99-106. 
Goodnow, Henry Frank. 1964. The Civil Service of Pakistan, New Haven: Yale 
University. 
Goodsell, Charles T. 1981. The Public Encounter: Where State and Citizen Meet. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Gould, William.  2013. A Brief History of Corruption in India. Available at 
http://www.theindiasite.com/a-brief-history-of-corruption-in-india. Accessed on 
September 5, 2014. 
Habib, Hassan. 1973. Babus, Brahmins and Bureaucrats: A Critique of an 
Administrative System in Pakistan, Lahore: Peoples Publishing House. 
Hall, Peter. A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor.  1996. Political Science and the Three New 


 ʹʹͷ
Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44 (4): 936-957.  
Hannan, Michael T. and John Freeman. S. 1977. The Population Ecology of 
Organizations. American Journal of Sociology 82 (5): 929-964. 
Hannan, Michael T. and John Freeman. S. 1984. Structural Inertia and Organizational 
Change. American Sociological Review   49 (2): 149-164. 
Haque, Nadeem and Musleh ud Din. 2006. Public Sector Efficiency: Perspectives on 
Civil Service Reform, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. 
Haque, Shamsul M.  1997. Incongruity Between Bureaucracy and Society in 
Developing Nations: A Critique.  Peace and Change 22 (4):  432-462. 
Heineman, Ben W. and Fritz. Heimann. 2006. The Long War against Corruption. 
Foreign Affairs. 85 (3): 75–86. 
Higgins, Monica. 2005. Career Imprints: Creating Leaders across an Industry. Jossey-
Bass: San Francisco. 
Hoff, Karla and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2016. Striving for Balance in Economics: 
Towards a Theory of the Social Determination of Behavior. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 126 (B): 25–57. 
Hofstede, Geert .1985. The Interaction between National and Organizational Value 
Systems. Journal of Management studies 22 ( 4): 347-357 
Horn, Murray J. and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1989. Administrative Process and 
Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs. Virginia Law 
Review 75 (March): 499–508. 
Horst, Ulrich, Alan Kirman and Miriam Teschl. 2006. Changing Identity: The 


 ʹʹ͸
Emergence of Social Groups. Cornell University, College of Agriculture and Life 
Sciences, Mimeo. 
Howlett, Michael. 2002.  Do Networks Matter? Linking Policy Network Structure 
to Policy Outcomes: Evidence from Four Canadian Policy Sectors 1990-2000. 
Canadian Journal of Political Science 35 (2): 235-267. 
Howlett, Michael. 2009. Governance Modes, Policy Regimes and Operational 
Plans: A Multi-Level Nested Model of Policy Instrument Choice and Policy 
Design. Policy Sciences 42 (1): 73–89. 
Huber, John D. and Charles R. Shipan 2002. Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional 
Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Huber, John D. and Nolan McCarty. 2004. Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and 
Political Reform. American Political Science Review 98 (Aug.): 481-494. 
Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler 2001. Legislatures, and 
Statutory Control of Bureaucracy. American Journal of Political Science 45(2): 330-
345. 
Husain, Ishrat. 1999. Pakistan: the Economy of an Elitist State. Oxford University 
Press: Karachi. 
Hussain, Asaf. 1979. Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan. 
Dawson: Folkston. 
Islam, Nasir. 1989. Colonial Legacy, Administrative Reform and Politics: Pakistan 
1947-1987. Public Administration and Development 9 (3): 271-285. 


 ʹʹ͹
Jaros, Stephen. J. 1997. An Assessment of Meyer and Allen’s 1991 Three-Component 
Model of Organization Commitment and Turnover Intentions. Journal of Vocational 
Behavior  51(3): 319-337. 
Jepperson, Ronald L. 1991. Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism. In 
Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis: 143-163. Chicago: The University of Chicago. 
Jo, Jinhee and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2014.  The Importance of Bureaucratic 
Hierarchy: Conflicting Preferences, Incomplete Control, and Policy Outcomes. 
Economics and Politics 26 (1): 157-183. 
Johnson, Victoria. 2007. What is Organizational Imprinting? Cultural 
Entrepreneurship in the Founding of the Paris Opera. American Journal of Sociology 
113 (1): 97-127. 
Kaplan, Sarah and Rebecca Henderson. 2005. Inertia and Incentives: Bridging 
Organizational Economics and Organization Theory. Organization Science 16 (5): 
509-521. 
Kardar, Shahid. 2006. Reflections on Pakistan’s Economy, Lahore: Heritage 
Publications. 
Kaufman, Bruce E. 1999. Expanding the Behavioral Foundations of Labor 
Economics. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 52 (3): 361-392. 
Kelman, Steven and Sounman Hong. 2014. This Could Be the Start of Something 
Big: Linking Early Managerial Choices with Subsequent Organizational Performance. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 25 (1): 135-164. 
Kelman, Steven. 1987.  Public Choice and Public Spirit. The Public Interest 


 ʹʹͺ
Kennedy, Charles H. 1987. Bureaucracy in Pakistan. Oxford University Press: 
Karachi. 
Kenny, Paul D. 2013. Colonial Legacies and Critical Junctures: Decolonization and 
Corruption in India. 
Khan, Faheem and Musleh ud Din. 2008. Attitudes towards Civil Service of Pakistan. 
The Pakistan Development Review 47 (4): 779-790. 
Kimberly, John R. 1975. Environmental Constraints and Organizational Structures: A 
Comparative Analysis of Rehabilitation Organizations. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 20 (2): 191-206. 
Kranton, Rachel, Matthew Pease, Seth Sanders and Scott Huettel. 2013. Identity, 
Groups, and Social Preferences. Working Paper. 
Krause, George A. and Anne Joseph O’Connell. 2012. Bureaucratic Leadership, 
Institutional Policy Conflict, and the Political Calculus of Fiduciary Investment 
Decisions in U.S. Federal Agencies.  Paper presented at 2011 the Midwest Political 
Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, March 31-April 3. 
Kriauciunas, Aldas and Prashant Kale. 2006. The Impact of Socialist Imprinting and 
Search on Resource Change: A Study of Firms in Lithuania. Strategic Management 
Journal 27 (7):  659-679. 
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole. 1986. Using Cost Observation to Regulate 
Firms. Journal of Political Economy 94 (3): 614-641. 
Lane, Jan-Erik. 2013. The Principal-Agent Approach to Politics: Policy 
Implementation and Public Policy-Making. Open Journal of Political Science 3 
(2): 85-89. 


 ʹʹͻ
Liebowitz, S. J.  and Stephen E. Margolis. 1995. Path Dependence, Lock-in, and 
History. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1): 205-226.  
Lind, E.Allan., and Tom R. Tyler. 1988. The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice. 
New York: Plenum.  
Lindsay, Cotton M. 1976. A Theory of Government Enterprise. Journal of 
Political Economy 84 (5): 1061-1077. 
Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Street-Level Bureaucrats: Dilemmas of the Individual in 
Public Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Macey, Jonathan R. 1992. Organizational Design and Political Control of 
Administrative Agencies. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 8 (1): 93-110. 
Mackay, Robert J. and Carolyn L. Weaver. 1981. Agenda Control by Budget 
Maximizers in a Multi-Bureau Setting. Public Choice 37 (3): 447-472. 
Mackay, Robert J. and Carolyn L. Weaver. 1983. Commodity Bundling and Agenda 
Control in the Public Sector.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (4): 611-635. 
Maddison, Angus. 1971. Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan 
since Moghuls. New York:  
Mahmood, Ehtsham. 2011. Principles of Administrative Law. Mansoor Book House: 
Lahore. 
Mahoney, James. 2000. Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. Theory and Society 
29 (4): 507-548. 


 ʹ͵Ͳ
Malmendier, Ulrike and Stefan Nagel. 2011. Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic 
Experiences Affect Risk Taking. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (1):  373-
416. 
March, James G. 1999. The Pursuit of Organizational Intelligence, Malden, Mass.: 
Blackwell. ͒ 
March, James G. and Herbert A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc. 
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. The New Institutionalism: 
Organizational Factors in Political Life. American Political Science Review 78 (3): 
734-749. 
Marquis, Christopher and Cuili Qian. 2013. Corporate Social Responsibility 
Reporting in China: Symbol or Substance. Working Paper, Harvard Business School. 
Marquis, Christopher and Zhi Huang. 2010. Acquisitions as Exaptation: The Legacy 
of Founding Institutions in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry. Academy of 
Management Journal 53 (6): 1441-1473. 
Marquis, Christopher, and András Tilcsik. 2013. Imprinting: Toward A Multilevel 
Theory. The Academy of Management Journal 7 (1): 195-245. 
Marshall, P. J. 1990. The Whites of British India, 1780-1830: A Failed Colonial 
Society. International History Review 12 (1): 26-44. 
Marshall, P.J. 1998. The British in Asia: Trade to Dominion, 1700-1765, in P.J. 
Marshall (ed). The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume II, the Eighteenth 
Century, Oxford University Press: New York.  


 ʹ͵ͳ
Masatlioglu, Yusufcan and Efe A. Ok. 2005. Rational Choice with Status Quo Bias. 
Journal of Economic Theory 121 (1): 1-29. 
Masatlioglu, Yusufcan,  and Efe A. Ok. 2014. A Canonical Model of Choice with 
Initial Endowments. Review of Economic Studies 81 (2): 851-883. 
Mazmanian, Daniel A. and Paul A. Sabatier. 1983.  Implementation and Public 
Policy. Palo Alto: Scott, Foresman. 
McAfee, R. Preston and John McMillan. 1995. Organizational Diseconomies of 
Scale. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 4 (3): 399-426. 
McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 3(Fall): 243-77.  
McEvily, Bill,  Jonathan Jaffee  and Marco Tortoriello. 2012. Not All Bridging Ties 
Are Equal: Network Imprinting and Firm Growth in the Nashville Legal Industry, 
1933–1978. Organization Science 23 (2): 547-563 
Meier, Kenneth J. and Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. 2006.  Political Control versus 
Bureaucratic Values: Reframing the Debate. Public Administration Review 66 (2): 
177–192. 
Meyer, John P.,  Natalie J. Allen and Catherine A. Smith. 1993. Commitment to 
organizations and occupations: Extension and test of a three-component 
conceptualization. Journal of Applied Psychology 78:  538-551.  
Meyer, John W. and Brian Rowan. 1991. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony. In Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (Eds.), 


 ʹ͵ʹ
The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis: 41-62. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago. 
Meyer, Marshall W.  and  M. Craig Brown. 1977. The Process of Bureaucratization.  
American Journal of Sociology  83 (2): 364-385 
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts .1990. Rationalizability and Learning in Games 
with Strategic Complementarities. Econometrica 58 (6): 1255-1278. 
Miller, Garry J. and Terry M. Moe. 1983. Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of 
Government. American Political Science Review 77 (2): 297-332. 
Mintzberg, Henry  and James A. Waters. 1982. Tracking Strategy in an 
Entrepreneurial Firm. The Academy of Management Journal 25 (3): 465-499. 
Mitnick, Barry M.  1986.  The Theory of Agency and Organizational Analysis. 
Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association. Washington, DC. 
Moe, Terry M.  1985. The Politicized Presidency. In John E. Chubb and Paul E. 
Peterson (Eds.), The New Direction in American Politics. Washington, D.C: The 
Brookings Institution. 
Moe, Terry M. 1982. Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration. 
American Journal of Political Science 26 (2): 197-224. 
Moe, Terry M. 1987.  Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of 
the NLRB. Studies in American Political Development 2 : 236-299 
Moe, Terry M. 1989. The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure. In John E. Chubb and 
Paul E. Peterson (Eds.), Can the Government Govern? : 267-329. Washington D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution. 


 ʹ͵͵
Moe, Terry M. 1990.  The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of 
Public Bureaucracy. In Oliver E. Williamson, ed., Organization Theory: From 
Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond. Oxford University Press. 
Moe, Terry M. 1995. The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public 
Bureaucracy.In Oliver E. Williamson (Eds.), Organization theory From Chester 
Barnard to the Present and Beyond: 116-153. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Moe, Terry M. and Scott A. Wislon. 1994. Presidents and Political Structure. Law 
and Contemporary Problems 57: 1-44. 
Mosher, Frederick. 1968. Democracy and the Public Service. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Nadvi, Khan and Asad Sayeed. 2003. Industrial Capital and Pro-Poor Change. 
Thematic Paper for DFID Pakistan Drivers of Pro-Poor Change.Mimeographed. 
Nelson, Richard R. and Sidney G.Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Nielsen, Richard P. 2003. Corruption Networks and Implications for Ethical 
Corruption Reform. Journal of Business Ethics 42 (2): 125-149. 
Niskanen, William A. 1968. The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy. The American 
Economic Review 58 (2): 293-305. 
Niskanen, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. 
Chicago: Aldine. 
Niskanen, William A. 1975. Bureaucrats and Politicians. Journal of Law and 
Economics 18 (3): 617-643. 


 ʹ͵Ͷ
Niskanen, William A. 1991. A Reflection on bureaucracy and representative 
government. In Andre Blais and Stephen Dion (Eds.), The budget maximizing 
bureaucrat: Appraisal and evidence. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press. 
Nunn, Nathan. 2008a. The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s slave trades. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 123 (1): 139–176.  
O’Tool, Laurence J. Jr. and Kenneth J. Meier. 2015. Public Management, Context, 
and Performance: In Quest of a More General Theory. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 25 (1): 237-256. 
OECD. 2005. OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
OECD. 2014. Regulatory Enforcement and Inspections. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Olsen,  Johan P. 2008. The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic organization. Annual 
Review of Political Science 11: 13-37. 
Olsen, Johan P. 2007. The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic Organization. Working 
paper 14, The Center for European Studies, University of Oslo. 
Pakistan,  Ministry of Finance. 2015. Pakistan Economic Survey 2015-2016. 
Parkinson, C. Northcote and Robert C. Osborn. 1957. Parkinson’s Law and other 
Studies in Administration.  
Peng, Yusheng. 2004. Kinship Networks and Entrepreneurs in China’s Transitional 
Economy. American Journal of Sociology 109 (5): 1045-74.  


 ʹ͵ͷ
Perkmann, Markus, and Andre Spicer. 2014. How Emerging Organizations Take 
Form: The Role of Imprinting and Values in Organizational Bricolage. Organization 
Science 25 (6): 1785-1806. 
Perrow, Charles S. 1972. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. New York: 
McGrawǦ Hill.  
Perrow, Charles. 1986. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. New York: 
Random House. 
Perry, James L. and Lois Recasino Wise. 1990. The Motivational Bases of Public 
Service. Public Administration Review 50 (3): 367–73. 
Perry, James L.  1996. Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of 
Construct Reliability and Validity. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 1: 5-22. 
Pierson, Paul.  2006. Public Policies as Institutions. In Daniel Galvin, Ian Shapiro and 
Stephen Skowronek (Eds.), Rethinking Political Institutions: The Art of the State. 
New York: New York City University Press. 
Pierson, Paul. 2000. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. 
American Political Science Review 94 (2): 251-267. 
Posner, Paul and Chung-Keun Park. 2007. Role of the Legislature in the Budget 
Process: Recent Trends and Innovations. OECD Journal on Budgeting 7 (3): 1-26. 
Posner, Eric A. and   Adrian Vermeule. 2002. Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine. 
University of Chicago Law Review 69: 1721. 


 ʹ͵͸
Posthuma, Richard A., Carl P. Maertz Jr. and James B. Dworkin.  2007. Procedural 
Justice’s Relationship with Turnover: Explaining past inconsistent findings. Journal 
of Orga nizational Behavior 28 (4): 381–398.  
Powell, Walter W. 1991. Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis. In Paul J. 
DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis: 183-203. Chicago: The University of Chicago. 
Prendergast, C.  2007. The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats. American 
Economic Review 97 (1): 180-96. 
Quirk, Paul J. 1981. Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press.  
Repucci, Sarah. 2014. Designing Effective Civil Service Reform: Lessons from Past 
Experience. Public Administration and Development  34:  207-2018. 
Rochefort, David A. and Roger W. Cobb. 1994a. The Politics of Problem Definition. 
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. Political Resource Allocation, 
Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo. Public Choice 33 (4): 27-43. 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1988. Progressive Law and Economics – and the New 
Administrative Law. Yale Law Journal 98: 341-68. 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1996. The Political Economy of Corruption: Causes and 
Consequences. World Bank: Washington D.C. 


 ʹ͵͹
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 2007. The Economics of Administrative Law. Cheltenham 
UK: Edward Elgar. 
Rourke, Francis E. 1984. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy. 3rd Ed., Boston: 
Little, Brown. 
Salancik, Gerald R. and Jeffrey Pfeffer. 1977.Who Gets Power and How They Hold 
Onto It: A Strategic Contingency Model of Power. Organizational Dynamics 5(3): 2-
21. 
Schatz, Florian. 2013. Fighting Corruption with Social Accountability: A 
Comparative Analysis of Social Accountability Mechanisms’ Potential to Reduce 
Corruption in Public Administration. Public Administration and Development 33 (3): 
161-174. 
Schick, Allen. 2002. Can National Legislatures Regain an Effective Voice in Budget 
Policy? OECD Journal on Budgeting 1 (3): 15-42. 
Schoar, Antoinette and Luo Zuo. 2011. Shaped by Booms and Busts: How the 
Economy Impacts CEO Careers and Management Style. Working Paper, National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Schuck, Peter H. 1994. Foundations of Administrative Law.  Foundation Press.  
Schutte,  Sofie  Arjon.  2012. Against the Odds: Anti-Corruption Reform in 
Indonesia. Public Administration and Development  32 (1): 38-48. 
Scott,  W. Richard 1991. Unpacking Institutional Arguments. In W. Powell & P. 
DiMaggio (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis: 164-182. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 


 ʹ͵ͺ
Segal, Ilya and Michael D. Whinston. 2010. Property Rights. In Gibbons, R. and 
Roberts, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Shafqat, Saeed. 2014. In Pakistan Policy Making is largely done by Bureaucracy.” 
The Daily News, January 26, 2014.  
Shepsle, Kenneth A.  1992. Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time 
Consistency: A Comment on Mackey. Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 8 : 111–118. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in 
Multidimensional Voting Models. American Journal of Political Science 23: 23-57. 
Shipan, Charles R. 2004. Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional 
Nature of Congressional influence. American Political Science Review 98: 467–80. 
Siers, Brians. 2007.  Relationships among Organizational Justice Perceptions, 
Adjustment, and Turnover of United States-based Expatriates. Applied Psychology: 
An International Review 56 (3): 437-459.  
Simon, Herbert A. 1947. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Making 
Processes in Administrative Organization. New York: Free Press. 
Simon, Herbert A. 1997. Administrative Behavior. 4th Edition. New York: Free 
Press. 
Simsek, Zeki, Brian C. Fox and Ciaran Heavey. 2015. “What’s Past is Prologue”: A 
Framework, Review, and Future Directions for Organizational Research on 
Imprinting. Journal of Management 41 (1): 288-317.  


 ʹ͵ͻ
Smith, Belinda M. 2002. Time Norms In the Workplace: Their Exclusionary Effect 
and Potential for Change.  Columbia Journal of Gender and Labor 11 (2): 271-360. 
Staw, Barry M. 1976. Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating 
Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance 16 (1): 27-44. 
Stephenson, Matthew C. 2006. Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: 
Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice between Agencies and Courts. Harvard Law 
Review 119: 1035-70  
Stephenson, Matthew C. 2007. Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency 
Expertise. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 23 (2): 469-498. 
Stephenson, Matthew C. 2008.  Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy. 
Michigan Law Review 107: 53-110.  
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. 1965. Social Structure and Organizations. In J. March (Eds.), 
Handbook of Organizations: 142-169. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Stocker, Frederick T.  2011. India’s Anti-Corruption Cross Roads. Manufacturing 
Alliance for Productivity and Innovation (MAPI) Policy Analysis, December 
2011.Arlington VA. Available at https://www.mapi.net/system/files/LAR-508_1.pdf. 
Accessed on September 15, 2014. 
Sydow, Jorg, Georg Schreyo and Jochen Koch.  2009. Organizational Path 
Dependence: Opening the Black Box. Academy of Management Review 34 (4): 689-
709. 
Taylor, Frederick Winslow.  1911. The Principles of Scientific Management. New 
York: W.W. Norton. 


 ʹͶͲ
Teece, David J., Gary Pisano and  Amy Shuen. 1997. Dynamic Capabilities and 
Strategic Management. Strategic Management Journal 18: 509-533. 
Thornton, Philip, and William Ocasio. 2008. Institutional Logics and Institutional 
Change. In Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin and Roy Suddaby 
(Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism: 99-128. CA: Sage 
Publications.  
Tilcsik, Andras. 2012. Remembrance of Things Past: Individual Imprinting in 
Organizations. Harvard University: Cambridge MA.  
Tinker, Hugh. 1966. Structure of the British Imperial Heritage.In Braibanti, R. (ed.) 
Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition. Duke 
University Press: Durham, N.C. 
Tirole, Jean. 1986. Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: on the Role of Collusion in 
Organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2 (2): 181-214. 
Toerell, Jan. 2007. Corruption as an Institution: Rethinking the Nature and Origin of 
the Grabbing Hand. Quality of Governing Series Working Paper no. 2007:5. 
Goteborg University. 
Tucker, David J., Jitendra V. Singh and Agnes G. Meinhard. 1990. Founding 
Characteristics, Imprinting and Organizational Change. In J. Singh (Eds.), 
Organizational Evolution: New Directions:  182-200. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Tullock, Gordon. 1965. The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington, D.C: The Public 
Affairs Press. 


 ʹͶͳ
Turner, J. C., M. A. Hogg, P. J. Oakes, S. D. Reicher and  M. S. Wetherell. 1987. 
Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell. 
Vachris, Michelle A. 2004. Principal-Agent Relationships in the Theory of 
Bureaucracy. In C. K. Rowley and F. Schneider (Eds.), The Encyclopedia of 
Public Choice. New York: Springer. 
Vergne, Jean-Philippe and Rodolphe Durand.  2010. The Missing Link Between the 
Theory and Empirics of Path Dependence: Conceptual Clarifications, Testability 
Issue, and Methodological Implications. Journal of Management Studies 47 (4): 736-
759. 
Volden, Craig. 2002. Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States. 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 18 (1): 187-220. 
Walsh, James P. and Gerardo River Ungson. 1991. Organizational Memory. Academy 
of Management Review 16 (1): 57-91. 
Warren, Patrick L. 2012. Allies or Adversaries: Appointees and Policymaking under 
Separation of Powers. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 28 (3): 407-446. 
Washbrook, D. A. 1999. India, 1818-1860: The Two Faces of Colonialism. In 
Andrew. Porter (Ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III, The 
Nineteenth Century: 395-421. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Waterman, Richard W. and Kenneth J. Meier. 1998. Principal Agent Models: An 
Expansion. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8 (2): 173-202. 


 ʹͶʹ
Waterman, Richard W., Amelia A. Rouse, and Robert L. Wright. 1998. The 
Venues of Influence: A New Theory of Political Control of the Bureaucracy. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8 : 13–38. 
Wayne, Sandy J., Lynn M. Shore and Robert C. Liden . 1997. Perceived 
Organizational Support and Leader-Member Exchange: A Social Exchange 
Perspective. Academy of Management Journal  40 (1): 82-111. 
Weber, Max .1922. (1978). Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and  
Claus Wittich. Reprint, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
Weber, Max. 1914. (1978). Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Weber, Max. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: 
Collier-Macmillan Limited. 
Weigel, Wolfgang. 2006. Why Promote the Economic Analysis of Public Law? Homo 
Oeconomicus 23 (2): 195-216.  
Weingast, Barry R. 1984. The Congressional Bureaucratic System: A Principal-
Agent Perspective. Public Choice 44 (1): 147-191. 
Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall. 1988. The Industrial Organization of 
Congress; on why Legislatures, Like Firms, are Not Organized as Markets. Journal 
of Political Economy 96 (1): 132-163. 
West, William F. 1997. Searching for a Theory of Bureaucratic Structure.  Journal 
of Public Administration Research and Theory 7 (4): 591-613. 


 ʹͶ͵
Wichardt, Philipp C. 2008. Identity and Why We Cooperate with Those We Do. 
Journal of Economic Psychology 29 (2): 127-139. 
Wilder, Andrew. 2013. The Politics of Civil Service Reforms in Pakistan. Journal of 
International Affairs  63 (1): 19-37. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1964. The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: 
Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1999. Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost 
Economics Perspective. The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15 (1): 
306-342. 
Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why 
They Do It. New York: Basic Books. 
Wilson, Woodrow. 1987. The Study of Administration. Political Science Quarterly 2 
(2): 197-222. 
Wood, B. Dan and Richard W. Waterman. 1994. Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role 
of Bureaucracy in a Democracy. Boulder, CO.  
World Bank. 2012. Public Office, Private Interests. Washington DC: The World 
Bank. 
Ziring,  Lawrence  and Robert LaPorte. 1974. The Pakistan Bureaucracy: Two Views. 
Asian Survey 14 (12): 1072-1073. 
Zucker, Lynne G. 1991. The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence. In 
Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis: 83-107. Chicago: The University of Chicago. 


 ʹͶͶ
Zyglidopoulos, Stelios.1999. Initial Environmental Conditions and Technological 
Change. Journal of Management Studies 36 (2): 241-262. 
 
Executive Summary
This dissertation analyzes the over-arching question of how the institutional and social 
context of public bureaucracy impact the choices of bureaucrats. These choices are 
introduced in the form of inertial-preferences and identity-driven preferences in the
decision-making of bureaucrats. The study proposes theoretical frameworks to explain 
policy drift. These frameworks determine how “context-oriented preferences” moderate 
the trade-off between budget maximizing motivations and the policy choice of bureaucrats.
In order to understand the context of bureaucratic choices directly stemming from 
organizational, institutional and social factors, the study encompasses two generic research 
routes that are covered in the three content chapters.
In the first research route, the impact of history on present organizational structures is 
investigated with the theory of organizational imprinting. This refers to the process through 
which economic, social and institutional factors that prevailed at the time of founding shape 
present organizational forms and attributes. 
The second research route builds on the notion that a bureaucratic organization is a 
formalized social system. The bureaucrats consider it as essential to comply with 
organizational goals in order to be considered as a member of the organization. In order to 
analytically seize the social context of the bureaucratic organization, the notion of identity 
is conceptually integrated into the decision calculus of the bureaucrat. 
Apart from the introductory chapter, which sets the stage for the dissertation, there are three 
content chapters and a concluding chapter. 
Chapter 2 provides a long-term temporal perspective on the persistence of organizational 
design. The long-term view on the matter allows us to better explore and explain why 
corruption and rent-seeking remain entrenched in many bureaucracies, although history
has provided ample chances for an organization to change its path. The chapter identifies 
the triggers of bureaucratic rigidity with the help of the bureaucracy in Pakistan, which has 
not essentially changed over the last 150 years. It also provides an account of how certain 
practices during the colonial era of the Indian sub-continent led to unintended 
consequences in the form of bureaucratic power, corruption and control over economic 
policies. 
Chapter 3 continues to follow the organizational imprinting theory and deals with the 
question of how organizational imprinting affects the choices of bureaucrats at the micro 
level. A rational choice model shows how the introduction of status quo/imprinting 
influences the policy choice of bureaucrats. They may be stuck with initial policy choices, 
which may lead to persistent inefficiencies. This chapter arrives at the conclusion that once
bureaucracy acquires imprinted characteristics, the forces of inertia and 
institutionalizations contribute to policy rigidity/status quo bias in the decision-making of 
the bureaucrat. 
Chapter 4 looks further into the choices of bureaucrats following the second research route.
It builds on the theory of identity economics and uses the notion of situation-specific 
norms. The chapter explores the blueprints or scripts that bureaucrats internalize and which
tell them how to behave in a specific situation. The analysis shows that in a game theoretic 
framework, a bureaucrat captures utility gains from behaving in a manner, which is in line
with the established identity and experiences disutility when his behavior deviates from 
what is dictated by identity. 
The concluding chapter provides the relevant policy insights. The analyses of the inertial 
and identity-driven choices point out that many well-known anomalies in the behaviour of 
bureaucrats are best explained with reference to contextual factors. These factors can either 
help to produce socially optimal choices or force policy choices that are non-optimal from 
a welfare point of view. Consequently, policy interventions might be necessary to enable 
bureaucrats to change choices, especially when these factors hinder optimal choices.
However, when these factors facilitate optimal choices, no policy intervention is required; 
rather the focus must be to streamline the system in order for bureaucrats to act according 
to their organizational context. This final chapter summarizes the findings of this 
dissertation, points out the limitations and discusses paths for future research.
Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift wordt de overkoepelende vraag gesteld hoe de institutionele en sociale 
context van de publieke bureaucratie van invloed is op de keuzen van bureaucraten. Deze 
keuzen worden geïntroduceerd in de vorm van inertiële voorkeuren en identiteits-
gestuurde voorkeuren in het besluitvormingsproces van bureaucraten. Het onderzoek stelt 
theoretische kaders voor ter verklaring van beleidsdeviaties. Deze kaders bepalen hoe “op 
context gebaseerde voorkeuren” van invloed zijn op de afweging tussen drijfveren die 
gericht zijn op het optimaliseren van de begroting en de beleidskeuze van bureaucraten.
Om de context van bureaucratische keuzen die rechtstreeks voortvloeien uit 
organisatorische, institutionele en sociale factoren te begrijpen, maakt het onderzoek 
gebruik van twee generieke onderzoekstrajecten die in de drie inhoudelijke hoofdstukken 
worden besproken.
Het eerste onderzoekstraject bestudeert de impact van de geschiedenis op huidige 
organisatiestructuren aan de hand van de organisatorische inprentingstheorie
(organizational imprinting). Dit is het proces waarbij de economische, sociale en 
institutionele factoren die ten tijde van de oprichting van een organisatie golden bepalend 
zijn voor de vorm en kenmerken van de organisatie in het heden. 
Het tweede onderzoekstraject is gebaseerd op de gedachte dat een bureaucratische 
organisatie een geformaliseerd sociaal systeem is. De bureaucraten vinden het van 
wezenlijk belang om te voldoen aan de doelstellingen van de organisatie, zodat zij 
beschouwd zullen worden als een lid van de organisatie. Om de sociale context van de 
bureaucratische organisatie exact te kunnen analyseren, is het begrip identiteit theoretisch 
geïntegreerd in de besluitvorming van de bureaucraat. 
Naast een inleidend hoofdstuk, waarin de context en hoofdlijnen van het proefschrift 
worden gepresenteerd, zijn er drie inhoudelijke hoofdstukken en een afsluitend 
hoofdstuk. 
Hoofdstuk 2 biedt een langetermijnperspectief op de persistentie van organisatie-
ontwerpen. De langetermijnvisie op deze materie stelt ons beter in staat om te 
onderzoeken en verklaren waarom corruptie en politieke rente zo diepgeworteld blijven 
in veel bureaucratieën, terwijl de geschiedenis de organisatie voldoende kansen heeft 
geboden om van koers te wisselen. In het hoofdstuk wordt vastgesteld door welke 
factoren bureaucratische starheid wordt veroorzaakt, aan de hand van de bureaucratie in 
Pakistan die in de afgelopen 150 jaar niet wezenlijk is veranderd. Daarnaast wordt in het 
hoofdstuk beschreven hoe bepaalde gedragingen op het Indiase subcontinent tijdens het 
koloniale tijdperk hebben geleid tot onbedoelde gevolgen in de vorm van bureaucratische 
macht, corruptie en controle over het economisch beleid. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt verdere aandacht besteed aan de theorie van de organisatorische 
inprenting en wordt de vraag gesteld op welke manier organisatorische inprenting van 
invloed is op de keuzen van bureaucraten op microniveau. Een rationeel keuzemodel laat 
zien hoe de invoering van status quo/inprenting de beleidskeuzen van bureaucraten 
beïnvloedt. Ze kunnen gedwongen zijn om vast te houden aan initiële beleidskeuzen, wat 
tot permanente inefficiënties kan leiden. De conclusie die in dit hoofdstuk wordt bereikt 
is dat zodra een bureaucratie ingeprente kenmerken krijgt toebedeeld, de krachten van 
inertie en institutionalisering zorgen voor beleidsstarheid/een status quo bias in het 
besluitvormingsproces van de bureaucraat. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt het tweede onderzoekstraject gebruikt om dieper in te gaan op de 
keuzen van bureaucraten. Hierbij wordt uitgegaan van de theorie van de 
identiteitsrendabiliteit (identity economics) en het begrip situatie-specifieke normen 
toegepast. In dit hoofdstuk worden de blauwdrukken of scripts behandeld die door 
bureaucraten worden geïnternaliseerd en die hen vertellen hoe zich te gedragen in een 
specifieke situatie. Uit de analyse blijkt dat bureaucraten in een speltheoretische context 
voordeel behalen door gedrag te vertonen dat in overeenstemming is met de gevestigde 
identiteit en nadelige gevolgen ondervinden als hun gedrag afwijkt van datgene wat door 
de identiteit wordt voorgeschreven. 
Het afsluitende hoofdstuk biedt een overzicht van relevante beleidsinzichten. De analyses 
van op inertiële en identiteitsgestuurde voorkeuren gebaseerde keuzen geven aan dat veel 
bekende afwijkingen in het gedrag van bureaucraten het beste kunnen worden uitgelegd 
aan de hand van contextuele factoren. Deze factoren kunnen ofwel bijdragen aan de 
totstandkoming van sociaal optimale keuzen, ofwel beleidskeuzen forceren die vanuit een 
welzijnsoogpunt niet optimaal zijn. Bijgevolg zijn beleidsinterventies wellicht 
noodzakelijk om bureaucraten in staat te stellen kun keuzen te veranderen, met name 
wanneer deze factoren het maken van een optimale keuze verhinderen. Als deze factoren 
tot optimale keuzen leiden is er vanzelfsprekend geen noodzaak voor beleidsinterventies. 
De nadruk zou dan moeten liggen op het stroomlijnen van het systeem, zodat 
bureaucraten overeenkomstig hun organisatorische context kunnen handelen. Dit laatste 
hoofdstuk bevat de bevindingen van dit proefschrift, wijst op de beperkingen en geeft 
suggesties voor toekomstig (vervolg)onderzoek.
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